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Preface
(Michiel van Elk, Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Thinking back about past events often involves a vivid memory of the people, the places
and the context involved. Clear pictures of conference venues and cities that seem
frozen in time come to mind when thinking about past scientiVc meetings. The vi-
sual nature of our memories may be taken as an example of the embodied view of
language and cognition, which is the general topic of this volume. On this account,
our knowledge about the world is grounded in sensory and motor concepts that were
acquired through bodily experience. For instance, the concept ‘to grasp’ entails a mo-
tor representation of the hand action that is involved in actual grasping. In line with
this suggestion, it has been found that the processing of action verbs is associated with
activation in similar regions in the premotor cortex that are involved in the actual exe-
cution of the action that the verb refers to (Pulvermuller, 2013). Similarly, understanding
a concept like ‘grasping’ when observing the action of another person has also been as-
sociated with activation in motor-related brain regions, suggesting that a process of
motor simulation could support action understanding (Gallese & LakoU, 2005).
In the last decade, we have seen an enormous interest in embodied cognition theories
among scholars from a wide range of diUerent backgrounds. Cognitive neuroscientists
have primarily investigated the when and how of activation in modality-speciVc brain
areas in response to language and concept processing (van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering,
2014). Psychologists have experimentally determined the bidirectional relation between
bodily and cognitive processing (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Philosophers have focused on
the question whether embodied simulation processes meet the necessary and suXcient
requirements to support higher-level processes such as mind reading or false belief un-
derstanding (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). Linguists have investigated how our everyday
use of concrete and abstract language in written and spoken form is related to basic
sensory and motor concepts (Gibbs, 2003).
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I am convinced that this multidisciplinary approach is one of the major strengths of
embodied cognition. In a time in which many scientiVc disciplines have become increas-
ingly specialized, a unifying theory that spans diUerent domains and that ranges from
developmental psychology to linguistics and from philosophy to dynamical systems
theory has a great potential. At the same time, the challenges faced by such a multidis-
ciplinary approach are non-trivial as each Veld is characterized by specialist problems
that are often deVned by the use of a speciVc jargon. This theoretical challenge was
faced directly at the Sensory-Motor-Concepts in Language and Cognition meeting, in
which linguists, philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists participated – all with
a shared interest in embodied cognition. As can be seen in the contributions to this vol-
ume a wide range of topics was addressed from a variety of diUerent perspectives and
encompassing both experimental and theoretical contributions. An intriguing ques-
tion is whether these diUerent contributions are related and how they could lead to a
cross-fertilization of ideas.
A possible starting point for such an integrative attempt is to acknowledge that al-
though the topics addressed by diUerent disciplines may be diUerent, they all share
a similar conceptual framework. At this point, an interesting parallel can be drawn
with evolutionary accounts of language. Starting from the premise that language con-
ferred an adaptive advantage in the ontogeny of our species, diUerent disciplines have
focused on more proximate or ultimate causes of language development (Arbib, 2005).
For instance, anthropological accounts have investigated the fossil records to determine
precursors of the human vocal tract as a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of
language. Developmental psychologists typically conduct experimental studies to in-
vestigate how infants over the course of their Vrst years acquire basic language abilities
that often seem to go beyond the linguistic input that they received. Neuroscientists
have elucidated the neural networks underlying language production and processing
and have pointed out a striking overlap between the brain areas involved in the pro-
duction of language and gestures, suggesting that gestural communication could be a
precursor of a prototype of language. Thus, although diUering in their topic of in-
vestigation and their experimental approach, these Vndings converge on the idea that
language should be understood in terms of its adaptive function and its relation to other
more basic forms of action and communication.
Similarly, within the framework of embodied cognition the diUerent approaches con-
verge on the notion that language and cognition involve the use of sensory motor con-
cepts. This may be reWected in the use of metaphors referring to concrete sensory
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motor domains, eUects of concrete experiences on word reading and the activation of
sensory motor brain areas in response to reading action verbs. Furthermore, each of the
diUerent domains can be characterized by similar discussions regarding the question
whether an embodied cognition explanation is the only and most viable account of the
extant data. For instance, embodied theories of conceptual content are often contrasted
with amodal theories, according to which our thinking is based on an internal and sym-
bolic ‘language of thought’ that is abstracted away from concrete experience (Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008). One important argument that is often used in the debate between
embodied and amodal theories of cognition is the grounding problem: it remains un-
clear how concepts derive meaning if they are unrelated to concrete experiences (Barsa-
lou, 2008). The embodied account proposes an intuitive and plausible solution to this
problem: the meaning of concepts is derived from the fact that concepts are by deV-
nition sensorimotor in nature. More recently, several authors have proposed a hybrid
model according to which semantic processing involves both multimodal and modality-
speciVc processing (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Ralph, Sage, Jones, & Mayberry, 2010).
These ideas may lead to a conceptual reVnement of the current theoretical ideas and
it would be interesting to see whether eventually theoretical integration is possible, not
only within speciVc research domains such as neuroscience or psychology, but across
diUerent domains as well. The collection of papers in this volume provides an excellent
Vrst attempt for such an endeavor.
Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge Liane Ströbel without whom this
project would not have been possible. She organized a stimulating conference and took
the eUort of making the proceedings of this meeting available in the form of this special
issue of Düsseldorf University Press. It is my sincere hope that the discussions that
were started throughout this project will be continued in the future and will lead to a
further exchange of people and ideas.
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Introduction:
Sensory Motor Concepts – at the Crossroad
between Language & Cognition
(Liane Ströbel)
This book presents selected papers from the conference “Sensory Motor Concepts in
Language and Cognition” organized by the DFG Collaborative Research Center 991:
“The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” and held from
December 01–03 at the University of Düsseldorf, Germany. It brings together re-
searchers working in the Velds of computer linguistics, linguistics, literary, neuro-
science, philosophy and psychology, whose work contributes to the interdisciplinary
study of cognitive phenomena, speciVcally in the exploration of the role of sensory
motor concepts for language and cognition in general. The aim of this book is to un-
cover hidden potentials and available prospects of inter and trans-disciplinary research
in the Veld of sensory motor concepts by deVning common interests and objectives, and
sketching paths for a fruitful interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, cooperative projects,
and research transfer.
What is so fascinating about sensory-motor concepts?
According to Barsalou, mental representations used in cognitive tasks are grounded in
the sensory-motor system. Therefore it is assumed that the human system of concepts
cannot be regarded as either abstract or amodal, but as immediately anchored in the
perception, experience and simulation of sensory-motor actions (Barsalou, 2008). This
assumption is supported by the following facts: a) sensory-motor knowledge is the most
speciVc and best-diUerentiated concrete human experience we possess, and b) sensory-
motor concepts are not only conceptually simple and easy to encode given the fact
that they are part of our everyday life, but due to their semantic complexity they can
11
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also function as cognitive anchorage points for a diverse range of encoding strategies.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that we use sensory-motor concepts as a model for
less speciVc, less diUerentiated, more abstract knowledge, such as emotions, needs or
temporal and spatial relations. The mere fact that even the words to understand and
to comprehend (< Latin prehende¯re ‘to catch, to seize’) can be traced back to sensory-
motor concepts and that we use sensory-motor-based metaphors, such as to grasp an
idea or to handle a problem underlines the predominance of sensory-motor source
domains in the lexicon. But grammar, too, is full of morphemes which can be traced
back to sensory-motor activities. One example is the way we refer to time, e. g. French
le passé ‘the past’ (something that has gone by), maintenant ‘now’ (< Latin manu
tenendo ‘in the hand holding’) and l’avenir ‘the future’ (< Latin advenı¯re ‘still to come’)
or that we encode emotions or feeling with the help of a possessive verb related to hand
action, such as I have concerns, etc. Many light verbs and auxiliaries can also be traced
back to hand or food actions, such as to give a smile, to take a walk, or I am going
for a swim, etc. Similar the copulae in Spanish can be traced back to bodily positions
(e. g. ser [< Latin sede¯re ‘to sit’] or estar [< Latin sta¯re ‘to stand’]) or the negation
in French to the denying of an action, such as to not take a step (ne . . . pas ‘not a
step’), etc. (Ströbel, 2010, 2011). In all these examples the underlying strategy is based
on the fact that not only the same brain areas are activated whether we fulVll or just
imagine an action, but that we can also imagine a sensory-motor task, such as grasping
an object without actually grasping it (Gallese and LakoU, 2005) and that is exactly what
makes sensory-motor concepts so suitable for rendering abstract entities less abstract
by connecting them to concrete bodily actions (Ströbel, 2014).
The linguistic perspective is covered by theories in cognitive science which support
this assumption by asserting that many concepts are grounded in sensory-motor pro-
cesses (Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2005; Pezzulo et al., 2011; Wilson, 2002). Psycholinguistic
studies conVrm that diUerent sensorimotor experiences directly shape people’s use and
understanding of complex situations and metaphorical statements. Neurological studies
using neuroimaging techniques (e. g. fMRI, EEG) and also patient studies (Grossman et
al., 2008) have furthermore provided several pieces of the puzzle concerning auditory
language perception, reading and language production and deliver valuable insights
into this highly developed cognitive function.
The interdisciplinary interest in the topic is also reWected in this volume. Looking
at the subject from a number of diUerent perspectives, the various contributions here
elaborate the fact that language and body are closely interrelated.
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Sensory-Motor Concepts and Language
The close connection between sensory-motor concepts and language is illustrated in the
Vrst part of this volume: Raymond Gibbs points out that much of everyday cognition
and language has its roots in ongoing bodily experience. In his article, he describes a
number of studies from the Velds of experimental psychology and corpus linguistics
and illustrates how metaphoric ideas and talk emerge from embodied simulation pro-
cesses. Valentina Cuccio purposes a usage-based model of language. Taking the idea
that speaking is acting as a starting point, she uses studies on action understanding in
order to clarify language production and comprehension and to explain how inferential
meaning is deduced from literal sentences. The close connection between sensory-
motor concepts and metaphor is discussed by Johann-Mattis List, Anselm Terhalle
and Daniel Schulzek. Analyzing traces of embodiment in Chinese character forma-
tion, they underline the complex interactions between speaking, writing, and meaning.
Wolfgang Müller’s approach starts from the assumption that – much like emotions
in actual life – emotions in literature are also grounded in the kinesthetic experience
of the body. In his contribution, he illustrates that literature is a productive Veld for
experimentation in matters of embodied cognition.
The diversity of Sensory-Motor Concepts and its implications
The diversity of sensory-motor concepts and its implications is highlighted in the sec-
ond part of this volume: Gerard Steen divides the group of sensory-motor concepts
into Vve subgroups, namely motor concepts, sensory concepts, sight concepts, sound
concepts, location and direction concepts. Furthermore, he also points out that the dif-
ferent groups of sensory-motor concepts are preferred in diUerent registers and that
a complete study of sensory-motor concepts would involve a four-way interaction be-
tween sensory-motor concepts, metaphor, word class, and register. Ralf Naumann
outlines a theory of action verbs that combines an abstract, modality-independent com-
ponent with a modality-speciVc component located in certain regions of the premotor
cortex. His proposal is based on the observation that a verb like kick can be used to
express diverse types of actions that diUer with respect to parameters (e. g. telic vs.
atelic, result vs. no result or atomic vs. iteration). Sander Lestrade addresses the ques-
tion whether we should analyze “place”, a generalized location, expressing the absence
of a change of location, on a par with mode expressions specifying the type of such a
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change, i. e. “source” and “goal”. In his paper, he discusses the status of place markers
in a cross-linguistic sample of spatial-case inventories. Andrea Bellavia focuses on
the connection between aspectuality and embodiment by analyzing a speciVc class of
idiomatic constructions which systematically denote a change of location undergone by
a body part at the source domain and which is metaphorically projected into the target
domain denoting an event carried out in an intensive fashion. He is advancing a two-
level integration model in order to display the semantic compositional representation
of such idiomatic constructions.
Sensory-Motor Concepts and Perception
The close connection between sensory-motor concepts and perception is the focus of
the last part of this volume: Lionel Brunel, Denis Brouillet and Rémy Versace’s
approach is based on the close link between memory and perception and analyzes the
inWuence of an auditory memory component upon the sensory processing of a sound
by demonstrating the strong linkage between the access to our memory and the reac-
tivation of the relevant sensory components, as part of the function of the respective
context or the task. Martin Butz and Daniel Zöllner argue that progressively com-
plex concepts and compositional structures can be developed starting from very basic
perceptual and motor control mechanisms. They propose that the innateness of con-
cepts may not be directly genetically imprinted, but concepts and compositional concept
structures may be indirectly predetermined to develop due to the ontogenetic path laid
out in the genes of the organism, the morphological constraints given by the body of
the organism, and the environmental reality with which the organism interacts. Alex
Tillas investigates the relationship between natural language and thinking. He takes
as his starting point the assumption that thinking is imagistic, to the extent that con-
ceptual thoughts are built out of concepts which, in turn, are built out of perceptual
representations; and that concepts – the building blocks of thoughts – are association-
istic in their causal patterns. His claim is supported by independent empirical evidence
obtained from work done with aphasic subjects.
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Abstract
An important claim in cognitive science is that much of everyday cognition and lan-
guage has its roots in ongoing bodily experience. One place where embodiment is
critical is in the creation and use of metaphoric talk. This article describes some of
the studies from experimental psychology and corpus linguistics demonstrating how
metaphoric ideas and talk emerge from embodied simulation processes where people
imagine themselves engaging in the actions mentioned in the language (e. g., “grasp the
concept”). Some of this newer work demonstrates how experimental studies can test
ideas from linguistics, but that corpus studies can also be used to examine falsiVable
hypotheses Vrst seen in psychology, on the embodied nature of metaphoric meaning.
1 Introduction
Embodied metaphor refers to the idea that many metaphoric concepts are grounded
in recurring patterns of bodily experience (Gibbs, 2006; LakoU & Johnson, 1999). For
example, both “I am struggling to get a good start in my career” and “My marriage is on
the rock” refers to the concept that LIFE IS A JOURNEY. People’s journey experiences,
where they start at some source point, follow a path, and end up at some goal or
destination, are used to better structured more abstract concepts like life or career or
relationship. Much research in cognitive linguistics shows the importance of embodied
source domains in metaphoric ideas and talk.
To a signiVcant extent, the experimental research on embodied metaphor is seen as
veriVcation for cognitive linguistic theories of embodied metaphor. But the rise of new
work in corpus linguistics now sets the stage for a diUerent kind of interdisciplinary
collaboration between linguists and psychologists. This paper presents one example of
this interaction between experimental psychology and corpus linguistics on the topic of
embodied metaphor. My aim is to demonstrate some of the ways these two Velds can be
integrated; especially in regard to testing speciVc potentially falsiVable hypotheses.
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2 Experimental Studies on Embodied Metaphor
Many psycholinguistic studies have been conducted over the last 25 years to explore the
ways that embodied metaphors may be recruited during people’s use and understanding
of metaphoric language (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). These varied psychological Vndings,
collected using a variety of experimental methods, indicate that the metaphorical map-
pings between embodied source domains and abstract target domains partly motivate
people’s understanding of the speciVc Vgurative meanings of many conventional and
novel metaphors.
For example, some experiments examined how immediate bodily experience inWu-
ence metaphor interpretations. In one series of studies on metaphorical talk about time,
students waiting in line at a café were given the statement “Next Wednesday’s meeting
has been moved forward two days” and then asked “What day is the meeting that has
been rescheduled?” (Borodistky & Ramscar, 2002). Students who were farther along
in the line (i. e., who had thus very recently experienced more forward spatial motion)
were more likely to say that the meeting had been moved to Friday, rather than to Mon-
day. Similarly, people riding a train were presented the same ambiguous statement and
question about the rescheduled meeting. Passengers who were at the end of their jour-
neys reported that the meeting was moved to Friday signiVcantly more than did people
in the middle of their journeys. Although both groups of passengers were experienc-
ing the same physical experience of sitting in a moving train, they thought diUerently
about their journey and consequently responded diUerently to the rescheduled meeting
question. These results suggest how ongoing sensorimotor experience has an inWuence
on people’s comprehension of metaphorical statements about time.
One idea that has attracted a good deal of attention in cognitive science is the pos-
siblity that much cognition and language is organized around embodied simulation pro-
cesses (Gibbs, 2006). Several diUerent behavioral studies provide support for the view
that embodied simulations play some role in people’s immediate processing of verbal
metaphors (Gibbs, 2006). People may create partial embodied simulations of speak-
ers’ metaphorical messages that involve moment-by-moment “what must it be like”
processes that make use of ongoing tactile-kinesthetic experiences (Gibbs, 2006). Un-
derstanding abstract, metaphorical events, such as “grasping the concept,” for example,
is constrained by aspects of people’s embodied experience as if they are immersed in
the discourse situation, even when these events can only be metaphorically and not
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physically realized (i. e., it is not physically possible to grasp an abstract entity such as a
“concept”).
For instance, people’s speeded comprehension of metaphorical phrases, like “grasp
the concept” are facilitated when they Vrst make, or imagine making, a relevant bod-
ily action, such as a grasping motion (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). One unique study re-
vealed that people walked further toward a target when thinking about a metaphorical
statement “Your relationship was moving along in a good direction” when the con-
text ultimately suggested a positive relationship than when the scenario alluded to a
negative, unsuccessful relationship (Gibbs, 2012). This same diUerence, however, was
not obtained when people read the nonmetaphorical statement “Your relationship was
very important” in the same two scenarios. People appear to partly understand the
metaphorical statement from building an embodied simulation relevant to LOVE RE-
LATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS, such that they bodily imagine taking a longer journey
with the successful relationship than with the unsuccessful one.
A diUerent set of experiments examined people’s understanding of the embodied
metaphor TIME IS MOTION by Vrst asking people to read Vctive motion sentences, as in
“The tattoo runs along his spine” (Matlock, Ramscar, & Boroditsky, 2005). Participants
read each Vctive motion statement or a sentence that did not imply Vctive motion (e. g.,
“The tattoo is next to the spine”), and then answered the “move forward” question (e. g.,
“The meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two
days.”). People gave signiVcantly more Friday than Monday responses after reading the
Vctive motion expressions, but not the non-Vctive motion statements. These results
implies that people inferred TIME IS MOTION conceptual metaphor when reading the
Vctive motion expressions which primed their interpretation of the ambiguous “move
forward” question.
A follow-up group of studies had people engage in abstract motion to see if it in-
Wuenced their responses to the “move forward” questions (Matlock et al., 2011). Par-
ticipants Vrst Vlled in the missing numbers in an array that either went in ascending
(e. g., between 5 and 17) or descending (e. g., between 17 and 5) order. When the partici-
pants then answered the “move forward” question, they gave far more Friday responses
after Vlling in the numbers for the ascending condition and gave more Monday answers
having just Vlled in the numbers for the descending order condition. People appear to
understand the meaning of time metaphors through a mental simulation of the implied
motion, Vndings that are congruent with the claim that conceptual metaphors are active
parts of verbal metaphor processing.
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These diUerent behaviorial studies oUer support for cognitive linguistic claims about
embodied metaphor, but do so in a more systematic manner that allows for speciVc
hypotheses to be tested, and possible falisVed.
3 Psycholinguistics and Corpus Linguistic Studies
The experimental studies reviewed above all employed constructed examples, following
most cognitive linguistic work on embodied metaphor. But there is now more emphasis
in linguistics on corpus studies examining the use of metaphor in naturalistic discourse.
For example, read the words path and road when they are used in the two diUerent
metaphorical contexts below, and consider whether they convey the same meaning
(Johansson-Falck & Gibbs, 2012):
1. The Spaniard lost 10–8 6–3 2–6 8–6 to Charlie Pasarell in 1967. And even if Agassi
survives his Vrst test, his path to a second successive Vnal is strewn with trip wire,
with former champions Boris Becker and Michael Stich top seed Pete Sampras
and powerful ninth seeded Dutchman Richard Krajicek all in his half of the draw.
[emphasis ours]
2. The learner who is well on the road to being a competent reader does bring a
number of things to the task, a set of skills and attributes many of which are still
developing. He or she brings good sight and the beginnings of visual discrimina-
tion. [emphasis ours]
The meaning of path may be appropriate in (1) because of the uneven nature of
Agassi’s journey toward winning the tennis match, while road seems apt in (2) be-
cause the journey becoming a competent reader’s is well-established, and one that
many people have metaphorically travelled. Previous corpus linguistic studies show
that metaphorical uses of path, road, as well as way, are not only structured according
to primary/conceptual metaphors such as action is motion, life/a purposeful activ-
ity is a journey, and purposes are destinations, but also appear to be inWuenced by
people’s embodied experiences with the speciVc concepts that these terms refer to in
their non-metaphorical uses (Johansson Falck, 2010). Thus, both similarities and dif-
ferences between real world paths, roads and ways are reWected by how metaphorical
paths, roads and ways are described both by the kinds and frequencies of obstacles that
people face on these journeys, and the kinds of actions people engage in, on, or near
metaphorical paths, roads or ways.
22
Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning
Johansson-Falck and Gibbs (2012) conducted two studies, one a psychological ques-
tionnaire and the second a corpus linguistic investigation to see if embodied simulation
processes are also prominent in people’s use and understanding of expressions like his
path to a second successive Vnal is strewn with trip wire in reference to Agassi’ metaphor-
ical journey to a tennis tournament championship as seen in (1) above. Thus, people’s
embodied simulation in regard to their imaginative understandings of traveling along
diUerent paths and roads provides a major constraint on what gets mapped in various
metaphorical instances of path and road.
A Vrst study investigated people’s experiences with paths and roads. Participants
were given a booklet that Vrst asked them to create a mental image of “being on a path”
and then, on the next page, to form a mental image of “being on a road.” Following this,
the participants turned the page and saw a series of questions, each of which could be
answered by circling either the word path or road. Analysis of participants’ responses
revealed the following qualities that people strongly felt they experienced along paths
and roads.
Paths
Something you travel on by foot
More up and down
More aimless in their direction
Something you stop on more often
More problematic to travel on
Roads
Straighter
Wider
Paved
Lead to a speciVc destination
Something you drive on
Overall, the results of this Vrst study employing human participants demonstrated
that people’s imaginative perceptions of paths and roads focus on the more central
rather than peripheral aspects of their bodily actions relevant to these real-world arti-
facts (e. g. on driving, but not walking, on roads, and on walking, but not driving, on
paths etc.). Traveling along paths is clearly diUerent in important ways from that of
roads.
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A second study in this series provided a detailed corpus analysis of 240 metaphorical
of path and and 47 instances of road in the British National Corpus. Most generally, the
corpus Vndings matched the intuitions we obtained in our Vrst psychological study. For
instance, path was frequently used to talk of more diXcult, and varied, diXculties in
travel in these contexts (23 %), but roads were never used in this way. On the other
hand, only 12 % of the path examples, but 60 % (based on only 3 of 5 instances) of the
road instances included explicit mention about where the artifact leads (i. e. to eternity,
to ruin, to stardom). The same diUerences are seen in the ways that path and road are
used to describe the target domain of purposeful activities/lives. Again, there were
many more mentions of the diXculties associated with travel along paths (38 %) than
roads (13 %). These diXculties may be related to obstacles in or on the path/road (e. g.,
their path to a winning was obstructed by an excellent performance from India, or the
constant traps and barriers laid by the forces that would block our path and drag us down),
or they correspond to a diXcult area that someone or something is leaving or trying
to leave e. g., ([people] seek a path out of divisive ideological camps, or break though the
barriers of error to seek the road to truth).
Paths, but not roads, are connected with choices between alternative courses of ac-
tion. 21 % of the path instances with the function of describing purposeful activi-
ties/lives, but none of the road cases included words or phrases suggesting that there
may be more than one path to achieve a goal (e. g. only, best, the same, typical, a diUerent
path to the same goal).The term road, on the other hand, is more often used in talk about
activities that people want to be eXcient than paths (e. g., purposeful activity/life
and Vnancial/political developments/processes), and paths are more often used to de-
scribe actions or developments that may have a more hesitant, aimless, or step by step,
quality than roads (e. g., courses of action/ways of living, other types of develop-
ment and paths in computer/mathematics developments/processes. Path is used in
talk about processes and road in talk about ends of processes and result. Finally, path
is more closely connected to choices between diUerent courses of action, compared to
the much more eXcient and single goal-oriented road.
The link between people’s imaginative understandings of paths and roads and the
metaphorical uses of path and road in discourse has several theoretical implications.
First, people mentally simulate diUerent kinds of actions in journeys along paths and
roads and apply these experiences to shape their in-the-moment metaphorical under-
standings of abstract actions through the use of path and road. Second, the consistent
patterns of Vndings for the psychological survey and the corpus investigation suggest
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that metaphorical language including terms that refer to artifacts is to some signiVcant
extent predictable. Most importantly, our combination of a psychological investiga-
tion of people’s experiences of paths and roads with an extensive corpus analysis of
metaphorical path and road shows that neither a conceptual metaphor theory explana-
tion in terms of mappings at the levels of primary or complex metaphor, nor a purely
social theory in which the use of path and road are negotiated between speakers, suf-
Vciently account for the link between metaphorical meaning, mind and world. Instead,
people’s imaginative perceptions of paths or roads are inWuenced by their understand-
ings of these artifacts through embodied experience, which can then be simulated in the
context of metaphoric thinking and speaking.
4 Conclusion
There is a large body of both experimental and corpus linguistic work on the embod-
ied nature of many metaphoric concepts. The studies described in this article show how
experimental and corpus research can nicely feed one another to create hypotheses that
can be tested using either experimental or corpus linguistic methods. More speciVcally,
cognitive linguistic studies strongly suggest that people’s recurring bodily experiences
critically motivate aspects of their metaphoric talk. Psycholinguistic studies conVrm
that diUerent sensorimotor experiences directly shape people’s use and understanding
of various metaphorical statements. But the psycholinguistic work is limited in testing
people’s immediate understanding of individual metaphors and does not explore the
role of embodiment in larger discourse contexts. However, recent corpus linguistic re-
search has demonstrated how speciVc hypotheses can be tested by examining detailed
patterns of metaphoric language use within naturalistic speech and text (also see Ste-
fanowitsch, 2011). This work shows that the metaphorical uses of certain words is not
simply a social process or accomplished via the direct activation of encoded primary or
conceptual metaphors. Instead, similar to the experimental research, corpus linguistic
methods are capable of revealing the constraining presences of embodied simulation
processes in the ways people think and speak of diUerent abstract, and in this case
metaphorical, concepts. In this way, then, corpus linguistic analyses do not simply oUer
ideas for possible testing using behavioral methods, but can be the site of testing explicit
hypotheses themselves.
Embodied experience seems critical to people’s use and understanding of metaphoric
idea and language, a conclusion that vastly diUers from traditional disembodied theo-
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ries of metaphorical meaning and language use. Of course, many other factors, ranging
from purely linguistic, social and cultural processes also shape the creation and inter-
pretation of metaphoric discourse. But it is unlikely that any of these forces can act
alone, apart from the inWuence of bodily activity. The studies described in this article
provide additional evidence that the embodied nature of metaphoric concepts is best
characterized in terms of embodied simulation hypotheses in which people imagine
themselves engaged in the actual events mentioned in the language, even when these
involves actions that are physically impossible to perform in the real world.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to focus on a problem that has not been suXciently attended to
by researchers in the embodied language paradigm. This problem concerns the inferen-
tial level of communication. In real-life conversations implicit and inferential meaning
is often the most important part of dialogues. However, embodied language researches,
up to now, have not suXciently considered this aspect of human communication. Simu-
lation of the propositional content is not suXcient in order to explain real-life linguistic
activity. In addition, we need to explain how we get from propositional contents to in-
ferential meanings. A usage-based model of language, focused on the idea that speaking
is acting, will be presented. On this basis, the processes of language production and
comprehension will be analyzed in the light of the recent Vndings on action compre-
hension.
Keywords: Inferential Communication, Embodied Language, Motor Simulation
1 Some remarks on the Embodied Language Paradigm
According to many authors (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese 2008; Gallese & LakoU, 2005; Pul-
vermüller, 1999, 2002) linguistic meaning is embodied. This means that the compre-
hension of an action-related word or sentence activates the same neural structures that
enable the execution of that action. Gallese (2008) presented this hypothesis as the
“neural exploitation hypothesis”. Language exploits the same brain circuits as action
does. According to this hypothesis, our linguistic and social abilities are grounded in
our sensory-motor system. The Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is the neural structure
that supports both our motor abilities and our social skills, language included. Thus, in
this account, actions and language comprehension are mediated by motor simulation.
We understand actions such as John taking a bottle from the refrigerator and drinking
some milk, at least in part, by simulating the same actions in the Mirror Neuron System;
and we understand a sentence such as “John took the bottle from the refrigerator and
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drank some milk”, at least in part, by simulating the corresponding actions in the same
neural network that executes those actions.
This seems to hold true even for the understanding of abstract linguistic meanings.
Indeed, in that case, metaphorical thought allows us to map from a sensory-motor do-
main to an abstract domain. This mechanism, according to Gallese and LakoU (2005),
is the basis for the construction and comprehension of abstract meanings and concepts.
Now, imagine entering a bar, you look at the barman and say: “Water”. Or imagine
being a VreVghter, you are in front of a building on Vre and you scream out loud to
your co-worker: “Water!”. Imagine getting lost in the desert. At some point you see
an oasis and say aloud to your exhausted friend: “Water”. In each of these cases, the
word ‘water’ by itself expresses a full proposition, and it is a diUerent proposition in
each case (Wittgenstein, 1953; Lo Piparo, 2007).
It is also vey likely that, in all of these examples, linguistic comprehension implies
a mental simulation by the interlocutor. And it is also very likely that in these three
diUerent contexts the very same word will enables three completely diUerent mental
simulations. In the Vrst case the simulation will probably concern the actions of putting
water in a glass and giving the glass to a customer. In the second case, the simulation
will concern the action of pumping water on the building using a Vre hydrant. And
Vnally, in the last example the interlocutor will comprehend that very same word as an
information, “there is water over there”, and as an invitation, “let’s go to drink some
water”. His mental simulations will most likely concern these linguistic contents.
The very same word, then, can express full propositions with entirely diUerent mean-
ings. None of these possible meanings is literally present in the speech act. Indeed,
propositions produced and comprehended in these examples are implicit and inferen-
tial. Considering that, in the simulative account, language comprehension is realized
by means of an embodied simulation of the propositional content, how can we explain,
in this account, the simulation of a full proposition starting only from the uttering of
a single word?
Imagine now a boy that returns home. His father sees him and asks: “So?” and the
boy answers with a smile: “It was Vne”. This conversation can only be understood by
someone who shares the same background knowledge as the participants. For example,
the boy could have returned from an exam, a job interview, or from a date with a girl
he really likes, and the father is asking about this. Thus, it is likely that in this case both
the father and the son are performing a mental simulation. But is the mental simulation
pertinent to the words “So” and “That’s Vne” or to the implicit meanings that can be
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inferred from those words? The latter is more likely. Consider that these very same
words uttered in a diUerent context by diUerent people would have a very diUerent
meaning.
The aim of this paper is to focus on a problem that only very recently has started to
be addressed by researchers working in the embodied language paradigm. This problem
concerns the inferential level of communication. In real-life conversations, implicit and
inferential meaning is often the most important part of a dialogue. However, up to now
embodied language researches have not suXciently considered this aspect of human
communication.
Indeed the most inWuential model of language at work in embodied language re-
searches is mainly based on the idea that we have semantic circuits in our brain where
our linguistic knowledge, in terms of words meanings, is stored in a pretty stable way
(Pulvermüller 2002). Language comprehension, thus, implies the activation of our se-
mantic knowledge that is often coded in terms of action, perception or emotion knowl-
edge, according to the wittgensteinen idea that diUerent word kinds impliy diUerent
form of knowledge (Pulvermüller 2012). However, a semantic-based model of language
understanding, that basically relies on a Vxed and conventional repertoire of meanings,
is not suXciently explicative of what really happens when people speak. A simulation
of propositional content does not suXciently explain real-life linguistic activity. Indeed,
the question that must be addressed is: what does it mean for the two utterances in the
above dialogue to be subjected to a simulation of their propositional content. In ad-
dition, we need to explain how we get from the propositional content to the implicit
content and inferential meaning. Simulative understanding is “immediate, automatic
and almost reWex-like” (Gallese 2007). Pulvermüller (2012, 442) describes the brain pro-
cesses that reWect comprehension as immediate, automatic and functionally relevant
as well. However, can this deVnition of comprehension processes explain how we get
from literal meaning to inferential meaning? This question should push us to reWect on
the nature of automatic processes and to deepen out understanding of such processes.
It could be that even automatic and subpersonal processes are sensible to the context.
Findings from recent empirical studies support this hypothesis. Contextual eUects on
motor simulation during linguistic processing have been assessed in behavioural (e. g.
van Dam, Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, & Bekkering 2010) and functional magnetic reso-
nancge imaging (fMRI) studies (e. g. Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto & Tomasino 2012; van
Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). These Vndings sug-
gest that contextual information prevails over semantics. However, how precisely this
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happens is still an open question. Anyhow, these data raise an issue that all semantic-
based account of language understanding should address. Also, not trivial philosophical
implications on our understanding of what semantics really is and how it works and on
the notion of automaticity should be drawn from these data.
It is worth noting that in this paper it is not questioned the fact that language is em-
bodied. Instead, the aim of the paper is to highlight the limitations that studies mainly
focused on descriptive and action related usages of language inevitably have. These
limitations have been mainly undervalued by researchers working in the embodied lan-
guage paradigm. Even in those studies that addressed non-literal usages of language,
experimental sets seem to miss a realistic pragmatic context that can trigger a process
of inferential communication. They rarely take into account more pragmatically com-
plex dialogues such as, for example, the one between the father and son previously
discussed. Thus, if these kinds of stimuli, by far much closer to real-life linguistic ac-
tivity, were taken into consideration, we would probably see that language production
and comprehension imply the activation of the Mirror Neuron System in a peculiar,
pragmatically-based, way. In other words, as some studies already suggest (Papeo et
al. 2012; van Ackeren et al. 2012; van Dam et al. 2010), motor simulation occurring
during linguistic comprehension is very likely contextually determined and not Vxedly
linked to the literal meaning of words.
Consequentially, there is a second related problem that it is worth noting here. It
concerns the deVnition of meaning and semantics adopted, sometimes implicitly some-
times explicitly, in the embodied language paradigm.
The language model adopted in this paradigm seems to be that of the dictionary. In
the dictionary model of language, there is a Vxed repertoire of words and each word is
associated to a meaning. Of course, language seems to also show some imperfections
such as polysemy and homonymy, but even these facts can be explained by the model
of the dictionary. Indeed, each acceptation of a polysemic or homonym word works
as if it were a diUerent word with its own related meaning that we can eventually
Vnd in the dictionary. The word’s context allows the activation of the right meaning
in any sentence. However, sometimes the context is too ambiguous, and this leads to
misunderstandings. This appears to be the only room left for pragmatics in embodied
language research (even when contextual eUects are taken into consideration, these are
considered as something outside the speaker that, in some way, interacts with Vxed
meanings stored in the speaker “heads”).
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In contrast, the pragmatic dimension of language is more extensive than the problem
of polysemy and homonymy even though they are more complex than what has been
sketched-out here. A more comprehensive account of language should be provided in
order to address issues concerning the pragmatic dimension of language.
1.1 A Usage-Based Model of Language
Since the Vrst half of the nineteenth century, researchers in the Velds of the Philosophy
of Language, Pragmatics, Linguistics, Discourse Psychology and even Anthropology
have been outlining a usage-based model of language. The vast and very rich literature
on this topic numbers among its contributors philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Austin
and Grice, linguists such as Levinson and Horn, discourse psychologists as Barlow and
Kemmer and anthropologists such as Sperber. Although partially diUerent currents of
thought can be identiVed among these researchers, their accounts present some com-
mon features. Hence, the next question to address is: what are the deVning features
of the usage-based model of language?
A good starting point is an examination of semantics and its role in the construction
of linguistic meaning. The key to understanding the role of semantics is the distinction
between what is literally said and what is intended by the utterance of a sentence (the
sentence’s meaning and the speaker’s meaning, in Grice’s words). This distinction in
itself suggests that the semantic level only, with compositionality rules, is not suXcient
in order to understand linguistic activity. A second, pragmatic, step of language com-
prehension seems to be necessary. However, the problem is to determine to what extent
the Vrst semantic level can be considered autonomous from the pragmatic level of lan-
guage. In other words, is there a residual literal meaning that we can call semantics
or, should meaning be always considered as contextually determined at every level? In
the latter option holds true, language understanding does not procede from a minimal,
literal, proposition to the indended meaning. Pragmatic processes operate extensively
at every level of language comprehension.
Currently, in the pragmatic debate these two diUerent accounts of the semantic/prag-
matic distinction are known as Minimalism and Contextualism. However, indepen-
dently of this debate, neither Minimalism nor Contextualism accepts the idea that a
consideration of semantics as a Vxed repertoire of meanings, can suXciently explain
the process of language production and comprehension. Semantics does not seem to
be enough. In fact, if we look at what usually happens in real-life conversations again,
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we will see that linguistic meaning is tightly linked to the context of speech, to the
background knowledge of the speakers, to their shared knowledge and to their aims
in that context (Carapezza & Biancini in press). To know the dictionary deVnition of
each word plus the rules of their composition is not suXcient in order to receive the
speaker’s meaning.
We all perfectly know the corresponding deVnition of the words ‘so’, ‘that’, ‘is’ and
‘Vne’ in the dictionary. However, this knowledge is not suXcient in order to understand
what the father and son in our example are talking about. Hence, to understand lan-
guage we need to understand how, when, where, by who and why words are used. This
idea leads to a deVnition of meaning that is very diUerent from the one presented in
the dictionary model of language. In this account, meaning is deVned by the use of a
word in a speciVc context.
We can now turn to another point. Linguistic meaning is the product of a mutual
identiVcation of communicative intentions. Without the possibility of understanding
other people mental states, and in particular their communicative intentions, language
would be a mere code. Indeed, it is the ability to understand other people’s mental states
and in particular their communicative intentions that makes irony, Vgurative language,
jokes or even misunderstandings possible. If we only simulate the propositional content
of an ironic utterance, how can we understand its ironic meaning? And how can we
get the ironic meaning if we do not understand the presuppositions and implicatures
of that sentence? And how can we understand the presuppositions and implicatures of
a proposition if we do not understand other people mental states?
In other words, how can we get the meaning of this sentence without implying a
complex mindreading ability?
This last point allows us to make a leap forward. Indeed, the key to understanding
inferential communication is exactly a complex mindreading ability. The automatic,
immediate and reWex-like form of mindreading realized by embodied simulation is not
suXcient in order to explain inferential communication.
Questions concerning the identiVcation of the functional mechanisms of mindread-
ing involved in real-life conversations and their neural implementation are still open.
These issues will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
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2 Becoming Ironic. How Do Children Develop an
Understanding of Irony?
Irony is a very clear example to highlight the role of mindreading in language compre-
hension. Moreover, studies on the development of the ability to understand irony can
help us to identify those steps of socio-cognitive development that we need to achieve
in order to become ironic.
Irony has been a widely addressed topic of study for more than two millennia. In the
1st century AD, the Roman rhetorician Quintilian deVned irony as a Vgure of speech
consisting in intending the opposite of what is literally said – contrarium quod dicitur
intelligendum est. This deVnition is still very popular along with many others diUerent
theories of irony nowadays available.
As Colston and Gibbs (2007) noted in their introduction to the edited volume “Irony
in Thought and Language”, a host of diUerent theories of irony have been presented and
are currently discussed. And each of them seems to be able to explain only a part of this
very complex phenomenon. For some researchers (Wilson and Sperber, 1992), irony
implies an echoic reference to a desired or expected event while an undesired event is
taking place. For others (Clark and Gerrig, 1984), irony is the realization of a pretence.
The speaker is acting out the beliefs or behaviours of others and in doing so he is taking
distance from them.
These two accounts are just examples, though inWuential, but by no means represen-
tative of the huge quantity of theories of irony that are presently discussed (see Colston
and Gibbs, 2007 for a review of contemporary theories of irony).
However, despite the number of diUerent deVnitions, irony is, beyond all doubt,
a very good example of inferential communication. This is true for many reasons.
In order to receive the ironic meaning of an utterance, we need to understand the
presuppositions and implicatures of that utterance. Indeed, the use of irony implies,
at least, a form of violation. Irony can express the violation of expectations (Colston,
2000; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 1992), the
violation of relevance, appropriateness and manner (Attardo, 2000), or the violation of
the Gricean Maxim of quality (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995). In any case, each of
these forms of violation entails a presupposed shared knowledge. Indeed, in order to
feel that something is the expression of a violation, we need to know, implicitly or
explicitly, that something diUerent should have been the case in that context. Speaker
and addressee need to share this knowledge and they need to reciprocally know that
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they share this kind of knowledge. If not, irony will not succeed. Moreover, if irony
succeeds, we understand the meaning of the speaker’s intentional violation. And this
meaning is not explicitly expressed, the speaker and addressee need to implicate it.
Thus, the processing of irony entails the ability to manage with presuppositions (the
shared knowledge) and implicatures (meanings inferred from violations). Furthermore,
the addressee needs to comprehend the goal of the speaker in order to understand his
ironic meaning and to make reference to context (both the physical context of speech
and the background knowledge of the speaker and the addressee). These issues hold
true for many other language usages, but in irony comprehension they are particularly
evident.
How can we explain the process of inferential understanding in an embodied ac-
count? That is, how can we explain the comprehension of something that is not literally
present in the sentence but only presupposed and implicated by it? Can we hypothe-
size that it is a chain of simulations that leads to the inferential, ironic meaning? Does
this chain of simulation need to start with the simulation of the propositional content
or not? Does the process of inferential understanding need to be implicit or explicit?
These are empirical open questions that are waiting for experimental studies.
A look at the development of irony-understanding might help to clarify these exper-
imental questions. Indeed, developmental studies can help us to identify the cognitive
mechanisms necessary for irony-understanding and this could make the task of looking
for their neural implementation easier.
Why do developmental studies of irony matter? Developmental studies on irony
tell us something about the step of cognitive development that is necessary in order to
produce and understand irony. These studies are focused on the identiVcation of the
social-cognitive mechanisms needed in the production and understanding of irony. On
the other hand, studies on the production and comprehension of irony in adults seem to
be more focused on the pragmatic description of the phenomenon. Adults studies seem
to be interested in the social functions of irony, in its communicative eUects, in the role
played by the context in the construction of ironic utterances and so on and so forth.
They do not seem to be strictly focused on the identiVcation of the social-cognitive
mechanism underlining the use of irony as developmental studies would (Filippova and
Astington, 2010).
As Filippova and Astington (2010) have recently claimed, much of the research that
has been carried out in the developmental line of study (e. g., Happé, 1993, 1995; Sulli-
van, Winner, & HopVeld, 1995; Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998; Winner
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& Leekam, 1991) has highlighted the fact that the ability to make second-order mental
state attributions is required in order to be able to produce and comprehend irony. This
claim is so strong in developmental studies that the production and comprehension of
irony is often used as a test for evaluating the possession of a sophisticated mindreading
ability, i. e. a full Theory of Mind. Indeed, Theory of Mind, the ability to attribute mental
states to other people and to understand them shows a gradual development. It is possi-
ble to identify diUerent levels of Theory of Mind. The Vrst entails the ability to implicitly
attribute intentions, mainly motor intentions, to others. The second level implies the
capacity to explicitly reason about other people mental states (desires, beliefs, inten-
tions, etc.). A third level implies the ability to reason about other people mental states
concerning, in their turn, other people’s mental states (e. g. “I know/believe/predict
that John knows that Mary knows”). Accordingly, diUerent kinds of Theory of Mind
tests, such as the false-belief test, are usually run. Clements and Perner (1994), using
an anticipatory looking paradigm, showed false belief understanding in 2 years and 11
month-old children; in Southgate et al. (2007), the age of false belief understanding
was lowered to 25 months using the same experimental paradigm. Recently Buttelman,
Carpenter and Tomasello (2009) carried out a study using an active helping paradigm.
This study showed false belief understanding in 18 month-old infants. In these stud-
ies, children are not requested to explicitly and verbally reason about other people’s
intentions. Their helping behaviours and their eye gaze directions seem to suggest false
belief understanding.
A false-belief task can also be explicit and verbal and it can test Vrst and second or-
der mental representations. Indeed, in the “Anne and Sally” test (Wimmer and Perner,
1983) the experimenter asks children about Anne’s (false) belief or asks about what
Sally knows that Anne knows. The former is a Vrst-order mental representation test,
it is passed by children around the age of 4 years; the latter is a second-order mental
representation test and children are usually able to pass the test only after their 4th
birthday. The use of irony is considered as a proof of a full Theory of Mind ability.
In fact, many studies carried out with both typically and atypically developing chil-
dren seem to suggest that the understanding of second-order mental representations
is needed in order to acquire irony (Happé, 1993, 1995; Sullivan, Winner, & HopVeld,
1995; Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998; Winner & Leekam, 1991). Al-
though there is not a general agreement on the exact age at which children start to use
irony, this is, beyond all doubt, a later achievement in language acquisition. According
to some researchers (Demorest et al. 1983, 1984) children become competent ironists
35
Valentina Cuccio
at about 13 years of age. According to others (e. g., Harris & Pexman, 2003; Sullivan
et al., 1995; Winner & Leekam, 1991; see Filippova and Astington 2010 for a review)
children of 6 years of age can already comprehend some form of irony. As Filippova
and Astington argue, this diUerence may be due to the fact that those studies looked
for diUerent aspects of irony understanding. Moreover, they might show evidence of
a gradual development of irony comprehension. In any case, even the results attesting
irony competence at six years of age are fully compatible with the claim that irony en-
tails second-order mental states understanding. Indeed, results by Perner and Winner
(1985) attest understanding of second-order mental states at around the age of six or
seven years.
Very brieWy, we can say that irony entails the ability to go beyond the propositional
meaning of an utterance, which sometimes can be literally true and sometimes can be
literally false, and to grasp a speaker’s intended meaning through the recognition of a
form of violation. In order to carry out this inferential process, a complex mindreading
ability seems to be necessary. Indeed, psycholinguistic studies carried out in typically
and atypically developing children verify the necessity of a second-order mindreading
ability in order to produce and comprehend irony.
Irony is then a paradigmatic example of inferential communication. Studies on
the development of irony understanding oUer us some hints about the socio-cognitive
mechanisms that are necessarily involved in the development of inferencial abilities in
language production and comprehension. Most of the studies on embodied language
seem to still disregard the question of how this inferential process works during lin-
guistic activity and where and how in the brain it is implemented.
2.1 Speaking is Acting
In a recent article by Friedmann Pulvermüller (2012), the sketch of a neurobiological
model of language is preceded by an introduction about semantic theories. Importantly,
Pulvermüller introduces pragmatic concepts in the embodied language research. In-
deed, the ideas of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein are given plenty of room in this
introduction. In particular, Wittgenstein’s notions of “meaning as usage” and “word
kinds” are presented. There are diUerent kinds of meaning that lead to diUerent kinds
of words and, Pulvermüller says, each kind leads to the activation of a diUerent area
of the brain. So, for example, we have object-words, action-words or emotional words.
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Semantic knowledge, in these word kinds, is coded in our brain respectively in terms
of perception knowledge, action knowledge or emotional knowledge.
However, despite the interesting discussion of these wittgensteinian notions, the
account of semantics that Pulvermüller proposes is complety describable according to
the dictionary model of language. In fact, his account is grounded on the idea that
semantics is made up of the binding of a word form and a kind of meaning knowledge.
And that language comprehension is the act of connecting the word form to the right
knowledge, i. e. to a pattern of neural activation. Pulvermüller does not really look at
usages of words in speech act contexts, that was one of Wittgenstein main concerns
and one of the most interesting aspects of his philosophical legacy. The problem of
how intentions, background knowledge, context, etc. . . . , come together to construct
meaning is not addressed by Pulvermüller nor by most of the other reserchers working
in the embodied paradigm.
Boulenger, Hauk and Pulvermüller (2009) carried out a fMRI study on idiom com-
prehension, considered as examples of non-literal meaning. This study compared the
comprehension of literal and non-literal sentences (idiomatic) containing action-related
words. The authors found that the comprehension of both literal and idiomatic sen-
tences containing action-related words led to somatotopic activation along the motor
strip. These Vndings were further conVrmed in a later study carried out by Boulenger,
Shtyrov and Pulvermüller (2012) using a diUerent technique (MEG – MagnetoEncephalo-
Graphy) that aUords more temporal information about brain processes. Data from this
second study revealed somatotopic activation of precentral motor systems during the
processing of both literal and idiomatic sentences containing action-related words.
However, despite the fact that these studies take into consideration forms of non-
literal meaning, they seem to be very far away from the goal of understanding infer-
ential communication in real-life linguistic activity. Indeed, participants of both studies
read sentences (e. g. “Pablo kicked the habit” and “Pablo kicked the ball”) on a computer
screen, without any contextual information. This means that participants did not have
to face any pragmatic task that could have triggered inferential understanding and, con-
sequently, for example, a diUerent modality of recruitment of the motor system. If we
utter the sentence “Pablo kicked the habit” in a real-life conversation in order to talk,
for example, about a friend that has stopped smoking, would the pattern of neural acti-
vation be exactly the same? We can hypothesize that, on the basis of our background
knowledge, the idiom is interpreted as “Pablo stopped smoking” and the somatotopic
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activation in the motor system could, thus, pertain to the action of smoking and not the
action of kicking.
It is now possible to turn to another issue of pragmatics studies that seems to be
undervalued in the embodied language researches when it might be very important in
order to understand how language works. This issue concerns the deVnition of language
as action. To speak is never just a mere neutral description of states of aUairs. Speaking
always implies the carrying out of both a physical and a social action. By using irony,
we can ridicule or praise someone; with a declaration we can start a war, a love aUair,
or a hearing in the court; with words we can apologize, we can get married, we can
name children or boats. And the list could go on inVnitely because the social actions
carried out by language are potentially countless. It is important to note that speaking
is also an action in the physical sense. Indeed, speaking implies the movement of the
oro-facial muscles and often of the hands, which can be involved in co-speech gesturing
(or hands and co-sign mouthing in the case of sign languages).
Therefore, this should lead researchers to look at language as the performance of
physical and social actions. Speaking is acting in a broader sense than just naming
objects, actions or abstract concepts. By speaking, we always want to do something. In
fact, many of the actions that make us human can only be carried out in language.
Speaking implies some kind of background knowledge, goals and intentions; it im-
plies physical movements and it has social eUects. On the whole, non-linguistic in-
tentional actions seem to share these very same features. And besides, linguistic ac-
tivity entails communicative intentions, mainly not present in non-linguistic and non-
communicative actions.
However, often linguistic actions are undervalued and what is taken into account is
only the process that links a sign, i. e. a word form, to a meaning.
The deVnition of language as action has been widely discussed by philosophers of
language like Austin and Wittgenstein. However, researches working in the embodied
language paradigm, despite the fact they were greatly responsible for the discovery
of empirical evidence in support of the claim that language is deeply grounded in the
brain systems for action and perception, seem not to consider speaking as being an
action itself. When I say “Pablo kicked the ball” or “Pablo kicked the habit” I have an
intention and I expect my action to have an eUect in the real world. And I presuppose
that you share the knowledge with me that will allow you to understand what I am
saying.
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Imagine that I want you to hire Pablo in your company, but you do not agree with
me because Pablo has been having trouble with alcohol. I come to your oXce and
say: “Pablo kicked the habit”. This utterance is suXcient to let you understand my
request. Without a sophisticated and mutual recognition of intentions and beliefs, this
linguistic exchange could not work. Furthermore, how could I perform this action of
requesting without language? Humans, then, have a very complicated kind of action,
linguistic actions. Hence, we should look at language from the same perspective we use
to understand action.
This leads us again to the problem of the mindreading systems needed in order to
understand action/language.
3 Comprehending Others’ People Actions
If speaking is acting (the speaker is performing an action and the addressee has to
interpret the speaker’s action), studies on action understanding can help us to clarify
language production and comprehension. In particular, these studies could help us in
the task of understanding how the mindreading ability is involved in the construction
of meaning. How do we get inferential meaning out of literal sentences and what is the
role of mindreading in the construction of inferential meaning?
Recently, many works have been devoted to the task of identifying the neural mech-
anisms that support our ability to understand other people mental states. This ability
seems to be necessary for action understanding (see Frith and Frith 2006 for a review).
In fact, as Frith and Frith argue (2006, 531), mental states determine actions.
Very often the inferential process of mentalizing is carried out automatically. This
means that it does not entail conscious thought or deliberation.
Often, when we are involved in the task of understanding other people actions, im-
plicit and automatic inferences are carried out in the Mirror Neuron System. However,
simulations carried out in the Mirror Neuron System cannot always explain the full
process of understanding others’ goals and intensions (Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchel,
Macrae and Banaji, 2006). For example, as Mitchel, Macrae and Banaji argue (2006),
motor simulation cannot explain long-term attitude. The question is still under debate.
Despite the fact that mindreading seems to be a very important function, its neural im-
plementation seems to be still controversial. In particular, while the role of the Mirror
Neuron System is less controversial in order to understand motor intentions of familiar
actions, the possibility of a diUerent neural implementation is under consideration for
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a more sophisticated form of mindreading that would allow for the understanding of
non-familiar actions.
Following Brass et al. (2007), it is possible to say that we have two diUerent ac-
counts of the systems that allow us to interpret other’s behaviours. According to one
of them, based on the process of motor simulation, we understand others’ actions by
simulating them through the activation of the mirror neuron system. According to a
second account, action understanding is realised by means of inferential processes im-
plemented in non-mirror circuits of the brain (Brass et al., 2007). The Vndings of Brass
and colleagues (2007) support the idea that action understanding in novel and implau-
sible situations is primarily mediated by an inferential interpretive system rather than
the mirror system. Following the authors, an action is implausible if its goal is not
obvious but required context-based inferencing. According to the authors, implausible
action understanding activates a brain network involved in inferential interpretative
processes that lack mirror properties (Brass et al. 2007). No diUerential activation was
found in the mirror neuron system in relation to the contextual plausibility of observed
actions.
Then, in this model the comprehension of implausible action is the result of a
context-sensitive inferential process of mentalizing.
Turning again to the problem of language production and comprehension, what kind
of mindreading mechanism is at work when we produce and comprehend linguistic
actions? And in particular, what kind of mindreading mechanism is at work in the un-
derstanding of inferential communication (e. g. irony, jokes or the daily conversations
such as the one previously discussed)?
In light of the Vndings of Brass et al. (2007), it is reasonable to hypothesize that in
the understanding of inferential meaning in daily communication we also need a more
complex and inferential form of mindreading that should be involved, being an integral
part of it, in the dynamic process of the construction of meaning. It is plausible that
this mechanism interacts with other mechanisms also involved in linguistic compre-
hension, such as the mechanism of motor simulation. These considerations push us
to deepen our understanding of the role of contextual eUects on language and action
understanding. Furthermore, these considerations push us to reWect more on the role
of these contextual eUects on automatic mechanisms such as the mechanism of motor
simulation. Only further empirical studies can help to clarify these issues.
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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a frame approach for modelling and investigating certain pat-
terns of concept evolution in the history of Chinese as they are reWected in the Chinese
writing system. Our method uses known processes of character formation to infer dif-
ferent states of concept evolution. By decomposing these states into frames, we show
how the complex interaction between speaking, writing, and meaning throughout the
history of the Chinese language can be made transparent.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we discuss the complex interaction of the written form, spoken form
and meaning in Chinese. We show that conceptual processes such as metonymy or
metaphor and the sensory-motor grounding of human conceptualization are reWected
in Chinese character development. Our analysis is based on the modelling of conceptual
processes by means of a frame-based approach to character formation.
After introducing the notion of embodiment and its role for language development
and linguistic analysis, we point out some general properties of the Chinese writing
system, i. e. Chinese character forms, their place in traditional sign models and prin-
ciples of character formation. We then give a short introduction on how concepts can
be modelled as recursive attribute-value structures called frames. The main section con-
sists of a frame-based analysis of selected character formation processes which illustrate
the diUerent ways phonemic, graphemic, and semantic components interact.
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2 Embodiment and language
The term embodiment refers to a number of partly overlapping theories whose common
denominator is the claim that cognition requires the interaction of a body with the
world (Wilson 2002, Ziemke 2003). The view we adopt in this paper is that abstract
concepts evolve on the basis of concepts which arise from perception and action. This
approach is taken by Barsalou (1999) who proposes that concepts are constructed from
perceptual symbols, i. e. subsets of modal representations which are stored in long-term
memory and reused symbolically to stand for objects in the world.
2.1 Conceptual development and language reconstruction
LakoU and Johnson (1980) were the Vrst of now many linguists (e. g. Gibbs 2003 and
Steen 2010) to underline the fundamental role that metaphor plays in the construction of
abstract concepts based on physical concepts. They postulate that systematic correlates
between emotions (such as happiness) and more basic sensory-motor experiences (such
as an erect body posture, which is supposed to be often concomitant with happiness)
lead to the metaphorical understanding of the more abstract concept on the basis of
the concept resulting from the perceptual experience (LakoU 1980: 58). This conceptual
relation is reWected in language where words like up and down stand for spatial concepts
as well as for emotional states: cheer up!, I’m feeling a bit down, we’ve had our ups and
downs.
Thus, the word up preserves information regarding the sensory-motor source concept
which underlies the abstract emotional concept. The link, which allows the inference
that there is a relation between the two concepts, is the fact that they are associated
with the same sound chain [ʌp]. Moreover, the emotional concept became a meaning
of up only recently, whereas the spatial meaning is close to that of the Indo-European
etymon *upo ‹under, from under› (Pokorny 1959).
Not all cases are phonetically and morphologically as transparent as *up, which
means that more reconstruction work concerning the *formal part of the linguistic sign
is necessary to be able to draw *conclusions about the semantic side. The sound chain
of the Latin word *capacitas ‹ability› goes back to the Indo-European root *keh2p- ‹to
seize, to grasp› via Latin * capere ‹to seize› – or to the non-laryngealized * *kap-, which
cannot be excluded – (Georges 1998, Rix et al. * 22011), and French [Sɛf] ‹boss, * chief›
stems back from Latin [kaput] ‹head› (Gamillscheg 1997, see Figure * 1 and Figure 2),
which in turn might be derived from the root of Latin * capere as well (Vaan 2008).
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Indo-European  Latin  Latin  Latin 

Fig. 1: Etymology of Latin capacitas.
 
: : : 
Latin  Gallo-Romance  Old French  Modern French 

Fig. 2: Etymology of French chef
Independently of the morphological * transparency, the genetic relation (or identity
as in the case of * up) between the sound chains can thus be seen as a trace of the *
sensory-motor grounding of the more abstract concepts ‹ability› and ‹boss› * on the
basic concepts ‹grasp› and ‹head›. This information about * conceptual development
is of interest for historical semanticists and * cognitive scientists in search of linguistic
evidence for embodiment.
However, reconstructing the history of a word, i. e. regressing its sound chain back
to earlier forms, leads to a sound chain which is no less arbitrary with respect to the
concept it designates than the word itself. Tracing back the evolution of French chef, we
obtain the Latin word caput. Its sound chain does not tell us anything about its meaning
which is something we have to investigate at the same time.1
2.2 Traces of embodiment in Chinese character forms
As we have seen, reconstructing the form of a linguistic sign does not automatically
provide knowledge about its meaning. This is diUerent with the Chinese writing system.
1 Our anonymous reviewer points out that the -ut ending does contain information about gender, declension
or number, and thus provides semantic content. However, this does not alter our argument because -ut,
as a linguistic sign, is as arbitrarily linked to its meaning as cap-.
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Chinese characters consist of 1) the character meaning, 2) the character reading, i. e. a
sound chain, and 3) the (written) character form. Reconstructing the evolution of the
character form does not lead us to a collection of brush strokes related arbitrarily to
any kind of concept, but to an iconic image character, to a representation of the concept
originally designated by the form.
 

Fig. 3: Development of the Chinese character forms for ‹chief, first› and ‹fish›.
Consider the Chinese character forms for the concepts ‹chief, Vrst› and ‹Vsh› (shoˇu
首 and yú魚, see Figure 3). Tracing back their evolution, we obtain less abstract images
and end up with the source concept of ‹chief› which is ‹head› and for ‹Vsh› which is,
not surprisingly, ‹Vsh›. The abstract concept ‹chief, Vrst› is grounded on the physical,
bodily concept ‹head› whereas ‹Vsh› is not grounded on another basic concept as it is,
in itself, a concept with physical, visible and touchable instantiations which are directly
perceivable by sensory-motor means.
Thus, the successful reconstruction of the Chinese character form directly provides
the concept associated with it. Of course, we do not deny that even the interpretation of
the underlying image is subject to a certain arbitrariness. In the case of Chinese shoˇu
首, for example, it cannot be completely ruled out that the underlying image depicts
something else than a head; and even if we admit that it shows a head the question arises
as to what kind of head it is. However, because of their form representing character,
these signs are less open to interpretation than are non-onomatopoeic sound-based
signs: assuming that we do not have any additional information, an icon provides more
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clues than a sound chain. This makes the Chinese writing system attractive for the
study of embodiment.
3 Chinese characters
The Chinese writing system (CWS), as we know it today, is famous for its structural
properties reWected by a complicated interaction of phonetic and semantic elements.2
Since the Chinese characters can be divided into elements carrying phonetic as well as
semantic functions, it is sometimes called a ‘semanto-phonetic writing system’ (yìyı¯n
wénzì意音文字, cf. in Zho¯u 1998: 60), yet this characterization exaggerates the actual
power of Chinese characters to display phonetic information in a transparent way: Most
of the “phonetic” characteristics of the CWS are relics of the processes of character
formation which, as they took place asynchronously, were always characterized by
a complex interaction between the Chinese language spoken at diUerent times of its
history, the sociocultural background of those people who created the characters, and
general patterns of reasoning and conceptualization.
3.1 General characteristics of the Chinese writing system
From a phonetic perspective, the CWS can be characterized as a syllabic writing system,
since every character represents a syllable of the Chinese language. From a semantic
perspective, on the other hand, it is a morphemic writing system, since the majority of all
characters represents a minimal semantically meaningful unit of the Chinese language.
In contrast to the dichotomic structure of alphabet systems, a Chinese character there-
fore has a trichotomic structure, since it can be characterized by its form, its meaning,
and its reading (List 2009). Thus, the Chinese character caˇi采 ‹to pluck› is deVned by its
written form采, its meaning ‘to pluck’, and its reading [ʦhai214] (see Figure 4). Given
this speciVc structure, we prefer the term morpheme-syllabic writing system (Chao 1968:
102) over the above-mentioned term semanto-phonetic writing system, since this term
more closely reWects the concrete units of the semantic and the phonetic domain that
are referred to by a Chinese character.
2 The use of the term “phonetic” follows the terminology that is used in the mainstream discussions on the
topic. Our anonymous reviewer, however, is surely right in stating that it is rather “morphonological” than
strict “phonetic identiVcation” we are dealing with here.
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Fig. 4: The trichotomic structure of Chinese characters.
3.2 External and internal structure of Chinese characters
An important aspect of Chinese character forms is their two-fold structure: Character
forms can be analysed with respect to their external and their internal structure (List
2008: 45 f.). Here, external structure refers to the formal aspects of the way the forms are
built, i. e. the number, the order, and the direction of strokes. Internal structure refers
to the motivation underlying the creation of the forms. While an analysis with respect
to the external structure is strictly synchronic, an analysis of the internal structure is
always done with respect to the diachronic dimension of a character.
As an example, consider again the character caˇi采 ‹to pluck› (see Figure 5, middle).
Based on its external structure one can divide the form into a sequence of eight diUerent
strokes (see Figure 5, left). The internal structure, on the other hand, can only be
understood when going back in time and looking at the oracle bone version of the
form, which dates back to around 1000 BC (see Figure 5, right). Here, one can see a
hand which plucks some kind of fruit from a plant.3 Judging from the old version of the
character form alone, the pictographic motivation might not be too obvious. But both
the picture for ‹hand› and the picture for ‹fruits on a plant› are reWected in other old
character forms as well, so there can be little doubt that the original motivation for the
creation of the character form was to depict the process of grasping.
3.3 Basic types of Chinese character formation
By now, it should have become clear that – in contrast to many alphabetic systems –
the formation of the Chinese character forms was not accomplished ad hoc, but instead
took a certain amount of time, whereby many character forms were created during
3 This is, of course, an overstatement, since we cannot see an action on a static picture, but have to infer
the action from what we see.
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
Fig. 5: Chinese character form (middle) with its internal (right) and its external (left) structure.
diUerent time periods. The way new character forms were derived remained, however,
rather stable during the history of the CWS.
Based on the internal structure of the form, one can roughly distinguish three dif-
ferent types of character forms: (1) semantic characters, i. e. characters whose formation
was only semantically motivated, (2) phonetic characters, i. e. characters whose forma-
tion was purely phonetically motivated, and (3) semanto-phonetic characters, i. e. char-
acter forms whose formation was both semantically and phonetically motivated.4 As
an example for the Vrst formation type, consider, again, the character căi采 ‹to pluck›.
As was shown in the preceding paragraph, its form was originally a pictogram of a
hand grasping some kind of fruit. Therefore, the motivation was purely semantic. The
original form never provided any hint regarding the pronunciation of the word which
it was supposed to refer to.5 As an example for the second formation type, consider
the character kù 酷 ‹cool›. This is a recent borrowing from English, pronounced as
[ku51] in Chinese, and the Chinese reWection of the word cool in the modern sense of
being Cowboy-like and calm. Since the Chinese originally did not have a written rep-
resentation for this loan word, they chose to use another character with an identical
reading in order to reWect this speciVc word, resulting in a pure phonetic motivation for
this speciVc use of the character.6 As an example for the third formation type, which
combines phonetic and semantic motivation, consider the same character kù酷with its
original meaning ‹cruel›. Its form can be divided into the two elements yoˇu酉 ‹bottle
with liquid› and gào告 ‹to tell›, where the Vrst probably serves as a semantic trigger
for the original meaning of the word (“ripe”), while the second has a phonetic function,
4 This is a very rough classiVcation of Chinese characters, for a more reVned classiVcation, see, e. g., List
(2008).
5 At least we don’t have positive evidence for a phonetic function.
6 This is a bit of an oversimpliVcation, since in China the selection of characters to represent words that have
so far no written representation is always driven by certain semantic considerations.
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giving a hint to the pronunciation of the word (cf. Old Chinese *kʕuk for告 vs. *khʕuk
for酷).7
Based on this rough distinction between the three diUerent types of character forms,
one type of primary and two types of secondary character formation can be distin-
guished. Primary character formation was often pictographic or ideographic. Secondary
character formation, i. e. the formation of character forms based on already existing
ones, was either based on phonetic borrowing or on semantic reinforcement.8 As an ex-
ample, consider the character xiàng象 ‹elephant›. The formation type of its character
form is primary, since it originally was semantically motivated, as a pictogram of an
elephant, and one can therefore display the relations between meaning, reading and
form of the character as illustrated in Figure 6 (left). Yet, already very early on, the
Chinese used this character form not only for ‹elephant›, but also for ‹image›, which
was pronounced in the same way as the word for elephant. Lacking a character form for
such an abstract concept, they simply took the Chinese character form for ‹elephant›,
and assigned it a diUerent meaning. Therefore, the second meaning of the form象 is
purely phonetically motivated, and a new character was formed by means of borrow-
ing. The relation between reading, form, and meaning can be displayed as illustrated in
Figure 6 (middle). In even later times, the Chinese apparently did not feel quite com-
fortable with having two meanings expressed by a single character form, and so they
created a new character for ‹image›. This was done by adding a semantic element to the
character form, which would distinguish ‹elephant› from ‹image›. Taking the form of
the character rén ‹human› as an additional semantic element, a new character was built
by means of semantic reinforcement. In contrast to the previous character forms, the
new form has a double reference to both the reading and the meaning of the character,
as illustrated in Figure 6 (right).
4 Frames
In cognitive sciences, the term frame is used for several kinds of meaning representa-
tions of situations or objects. What all approaches have in common is that concepts are
not considered as atomic units, but rather as highly structured entities. Barsalou (1992)
develops his frame theory in contrast to meaning representations by feature lists, as
7 Old Chinese readings follow Baxter & Sagart (2011).
8 This is a very rough description of the basic types of Chinese character formation. For a more detailed
account on Chinese character formation, see especially Qiú (1989).
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Fig. 6: Basic types of character formation.
they have been used in early cognitive semantics. Barsalou passes criticism on decom-
posing concepts in unordered samples of features because “people do not store repre-
sentational components independently of one another” (Barsalou 1992: 27). Instead,
Barsalou points to evidence from several experiments that human cognition is based
on attribute-value structures: The attributes describe general properties or dimensions
of the object or category being represented, and the values are speciVcations of the
attributes. From this point of view, the values correspond to features in feature lists,
while the attributes represent the relations between these features and the represented
object or situation. According to Barsalou, frames are recursive in that values and at-
tributes are represented in further frames. Thus, it is almost impossible to reconstruct a
“complete” frame. Rather, we will always refer to partial frames in the following, i. e.
we will only point out those attributes that are currently relevant.
Petersen (2007) uses directed graphs to model frames in the sense of Barsalou. In
frame graphs, the arcs correspond to attributes and the nodes correspond to values (see
Figure 7 for an example). The central node of the frame is marked by a double border.
It designates the object or category being represented in the frame. Mathematically,
attributes correspond to partial functions mapping values to values. As a consequence,
attributes are right-unique, i. e. every attribute is speciVed by exactly one value. Be-
cause of their right-uniqueness, attributes are predestined to be named with functional
nouns in the sense of Löbner (2011) who distinguishes four basic types of nouns, de-
pending on two binary features: relationality and uniqueness. Functional nouns are
inherently unique and inherently relational, because their reference to a possessum is
uniquely given once a possessor argument is saturated. Typical examples are nouns like
mother or nose that identify their referent uniquely according to a possessor: a mother is
always a mother of someone, and everyone has exactly one [biological] mother. Anal-
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ogous statements are the case for the noun nose. Due to their inherent relationality
functional nouns mostly occur in possessive constructions (cf. Löbner 2011: 14–18).

Fig. 7: car frame as a directed graph.
Löbner (2005) argues that functional nouns are verbalizations of attributes in frames
such that concepts can be decomposed in terms of functional nouns. On this basis, we
are able to identify the range of values an attribute can take. Building on Guarino
(1992), we distinguish between the relational and the denotational interpretation of
functional nouns. The relational interpretation refers to the relation that links the
possessor somehow to the possessum. The denotational interpretation, however, is
the referent to a certain possessum according to a given possessor. In mathematical
terms, relational nouns are functions, where the relational interpretation corresponds
to the mapping rule of the function and the denotational interpretation to the value the
function takes according to a given argument. For instance, the relational interpretation
of the concept mother in the NP Paul’s mother is the mapping rule “x is mother of y”,
while the denotational interpretation is the referent of the NP.
Due to their twofold interpretation, functional nouns are able to designate attributes
as well as their values: attributes correspond to the relational interpretation of func-
tional nouns and values to their denotational interpretation. For instance, the func-
tional noun motor describes the attribute ‹motor› in Figure 4 as “value x is the motor
of the object y” while its denotational interpretation makes it possible to refer to the
motor of the object itself. Thus, the values of an attribute have to be hyponyms of the
denotational interpretation of the functional noun with which the attribute is named.
This interpretation of attributes is in line with Barsalou who postulates that “[v]alues
are subordinate concepts of an attribute” (Barsalou 1992: 31). A special case is attributes
in verb frames that contain information about theta roles. Their range is determined by
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selectional restrictions of the verb. We will mark value ranges in verb frames by naming
the range on top of the value node (see Figure 8 for an example).
Fig. 8: Frame of the verb to hit.
5 A frame model of character formation and concept evolution
Since we assume that frames are the general format of human cognition, frame theory
oUers a tool to describe stages in concept evolution that are reWected in Chinese char-
acter formation. In the following, we discuss three examples which illustrate how the
sensory-motor grounding of human conceptualization is reWected in the formation of
new Chinese characters.
The Vrst example illustrates the development of the character cài 菜 ‹vegetable›.
Originally, there was no speciVc character for this concept, and therefore the character
caˇi采 ‹to pluck› was used to designate the concept. The problematic polysemy was only
later resolved, and the character form was modiVed by adding the form of the character
caˇo ‹grass› on top. The frame of the ‹plucking action› contains a theme argument
which takes a kind of plant as its value. On the linguistic surface, ‹to pluck› could be
expressed by the word [*m-sʕr@ʔ], which is the way the word was pronounced around
600 BC (Baxter & Sagart 2011). Since a vegetable is something that is typically plucked
when it is ripe, it is a possible value for the theme argument. Chinese word formation
around 600 BC allowed the derivation of verbs by preVxation and suXxation (Sagart
1999). One common process involved the suXx [*-s] which provokes a nominalization
of verbs (Sagart & Baxter 2011): adding [*-s] to [*m-sʕr@ʔ] yields the word [*m-sʕr@ʔ-s]
which has the meaning ‹plucked (things)›.
Over time, the meaning ‹plucked (things)› developed into the more speciVc meaning
‹vegetable›. The metonymical relationship between ‹to pluck› and ‹vegetable› and the
formal relationship between the character reading associated with ‹to pluck› and the
one associated with ‹vegetable› resulted in the use of the same form for ‹to pluck›
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
Fig. 9: Frames for ‹to pluck a vegetable› and ‹grass›.

Fig. 10: Creation of a new character for the concept ‹vegetable›.
and ‹vegetable› (see Figure 9). Problematic polysemies, e. g. polysemies concerning
concepts which are part of the same frame, tend to be resolved by the speakers (Blank
1997: 357). To distinguish the concepts on the linguistic surface, a new form for the
concept ‹vegetable› was created (see Figure 10). The concepts ‹vegetable› and ‹grass›
are instantiations of the class ‹plant›. To solve the polysemy, the form for ‹grass›
is added to the form for ‹pluck›. Thus, a character form for ‹vegetable› is created
by grounding the concept on the metonymically related motor action ‹to pluck› and
subsequently, the ambiguity of the character form for ‹pluck› is resolved.
The second example illustrates the development of the form of the character quˇ娶
‹to marry (a woman)› which is built as a combination of quˇ 取 ‹to grasp› and nüˇ 女
‹woman› (see Figure 11). The systematic correlates between the symbolic, i. e. abstract,
act of marriage and the sensory motor experiences accompanying it, i. e. taking the
bride to another place, as opposed to jià 嫁 ‹(leaving the family) to marry (a man)›,
result in the grounding of the symbolic act on the bodily actions. This is reWected in
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the combination of the characters for quˇ 取 ‹to grasp› and nüˇ 女 ‹woman› to a new
character which stands for ‹to marry›.
The frame of a typical grasping action contains the theme argument which typically
has objects as values. The form of its character quˇ取 is an abstraction of a picture show-
ing a hand grasping an ear. The pronunciation sounded approximately like [*ʦhoʔ]
(Baxter and Sagart 1999).9 The theme argument allows many kinds of values, for in-
stance women. The concept ‹woman› is represented by nüˇ女, a form which originally
depicted a person sitting with the legs to the side. When the class of the theme argu-
ment is ‹woman›, the whole frame represents the bodily action ‹to grasp a woman›.
The concept ‹to grasp a woman› is more speciVc than the non-saturated concept ‹to
grasp›, i. e. the upper-type concept of the theme attribute is substituted by a subsumed
concept of the original concept, so that the range of the attribute is reduced (see Figure
12).
The lexicalization of this new, specialized meaning resulted in a situation where the
reading [*ʦhoʔ] and the associated form取 had two taxonomically related meanings.
This problematic polysemy was resolved by merging the characters quˇ取 ‹to grasp› and
nüˇ女 ‹woman› to create the new form quˇ娶 which stands for the concept ‹to marry
(a woman)›, an abstract concept grounded on the sensory motor concept ‹to grasp a
woman› (see Figure 13).
The third example illustrates the creation of the character xiaˇng想 ‹to think› which
– judging from its derivation as a compound of the characters xia¯ng 相 ‹to observe›
and xı¯n心 ‹heart/mind› – can be metaphorically understood as ‹to observe with one’s
heart/mind›. This means again that an abstract concept is put down to a sensory
motor concept which results directly from perceptual experience. The metaphorical
process consists of a modiVcation of the attribute-value structure of the concept ‹to
observe› – which typically takes as instrument the concept ‹eye› (see Figure 14) – as the
instrumental argument is saturated by the concept ‹heart›. As the argument saturation
violates the original concept structure, no literal understanding is possible, so that the
resulting concept is necessarily abstract.
In the abstract concept, ‹heart/mind› Vgures as the value of the instrumental ar-
gument. The reading that represented the concept ‹observe with one’s heart/mind›,
i. e. ‹to think›, was derived from the pronunciation of the more general concept ‹to
observe›: [*saŋs] was changed to [*saŋs-ʔ > *saŋ-ʔ], meaning ‹to think› (Schuessler
9 As the anonymous reviewer pointed out, this is the practice of “cutting oU the ears of an enemy and
hanging them on a ritual girdle as a trophy, later called guó聝.”
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
Fig. 11: Frames of ‹to grasp› and ‹woman›.

Fig. 12: Frame of the more specific concept ‹to grasp a woman›.

Fig. 13: Creation of a new character for ‹to marry (a woman)›.
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2007: 46 f.). The polysemy of the form which now stood for ‹to observe› and ‹to think›
was disambiguated by integrating the character form for xı¯n心 ‹heart/mind› into the
character form for xia¯ng相 ‹to observe› (see Figure 15).
Fig. 14: Frame of ‹to see›.
Fig. 15: Creation of a character for ‹to think›.
6 Summary
The processes of Chinese character formation reWect diUerent states in concept develop-
ment. They are well documented throughout the history of Chinese. Thus, the Chinese
language oUers rich possibilities to study concept evolution. Frame theory oUers a tool
for decomposing these diUerent states in concept evolution in a cognitively adequate
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way. Therefore, a frame approach may shed new light on concept development by
analysing the interaction between writing, speaking, and meaning. In this paper, we
demonstrated how frames can be used to model and investigate such diUerent instances
of concept evolution as metonymy, argument saturation, and metaphora. At the current
state, our work remains exploratory, yet we are conVdent that the method provides a
promising starting point for future research.
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Abstract
This article attempts to relate to literature insights on the role of sensory and motor
processes as essential constituents of cognition. It concentrates on the representation
of emotion. The starting-point of the investigation is the fact that the representation
of emotion in literature is – analogous to emotion in actual life – essentially consti-
tuted by motion and other physical or physiological manifestations. The investigation
is supported by cognitive research and by neuroscientic research concerning the interde-
pendence of emotion and motion. Evidence is adduced that emotional experiences are
in a great quantity of literary texts represented as cognitive experiences with a strong
participation of kinesthetic activities of the body.
Keywords: embodied cognition, emotion, motion, facial feedback, body metaphors
1 Introduction
Cognitive science has recently had such a strong impact on literary studies that one
can speak of a cognitive revolution in the scholarly treatment of literature (Stockwell,
2002). The new concept of embodied cognition or grounded cognition, which accords
the body a central role in shaping the mind (Wilson 2002, Barsalou: 2008, 2010), has,
however, not yet found reverberations in literary studies. Embodied cognition is an
extraordinarily wide concept. It means that the areas in the brain which activate the
body and those which are involved in processing reason and linguistic meaning work
interdependently. (Wilson, 2002, Mahon/Caramazza, 2008) In fact, an embodied theory
of meaning seems to take shape which relates the meaning of words and sentences to
bodily action. (See for instance Glenberg and Paschak, 2002)
The present article1 is a new departure in that it attempts to relate to literature in-
sights on the role of sensory and motor processes as essential constituents of cognition.
1 I am indebted for valuable help and inspiration to my Jena colleagues Doreen Triebel, Dirk Vanderbeke and
Oliver Bock. For whatever may be open to criticism in this study they are not responsible.
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(Pezullo et al., 2011) The notion of sensory-motor processes is comprehensive, since it
includes, on the one hand, gestural, facial aspects and other movements of the body,
and, on the other hand, phenomena such as smelling, tasting and hearing. It is not
always possible to treat these processes separately. The following contribution con-
centrates on emotion, which has been a quite prominent topic in cognitive studies for
the last two decades. (Hogan, 2010, p. 237) It attempts to show that writers of Vctional
literature seem to have had a notion of embodied cognition long before the term was
created. A basis for applying sensory-motor concepts to literature as a product of the
imagination is that “imagining and doing use a shared neural substrate” (Gallese/LakoU,
2005, p. 456), i. e. when one imagines seeing something, the same parts of the brain
are used as when one actually sees. Or when we imagine that we are moving, some
of the same parts of the brain are used as when we actually move. Movement, per-
ceived on a screen or represented in a text, may cause cognitive processing analogous
to real-life movement. This notion can even be extended to the use of metaphors. It
has been shown that not only actual and imagined physical activities, but also physi-
cal events evoked in metaphors (LakoU/Johnson, 1999, Schrott, Jacobs, 211) and idioms
(Boulenger, Hauk, Pulvermüller, 2008) can be related to the motor cortex. The whole
development in philosophy and psychology from Descartes’ dualism of res cogitans and
res extensa to modern views of the interconnectedness of body and mind in Antonio
Damasio’s reference to the “embodied mind” (Damasio, 1984, 1999) or Matthew Rat-
cliUe’s understanding of feelings as “bodily states” (RatcliUe, 2008), which provides a
cultural context for recent advances in cognitive science, cannot be treated within the
frame of this article. If certain developments in the philosophy and psychology of feel-
ing lead to concepts which come close to what is called embodied cognition in cognitive
science, this contribution will discuss literature as another signiVcant area of cultural
production which can be related to the context of embodied cognition.
2 Motion and Emotion
The starting-point of the following investigation is the fact that the representation of
emotion in literature is – analogous to emotion in actual life – essentially constituted
by motion and other physical or physiological manifestations. The etymology of the
word is already signiVcant. Emotion is derived from the French verb émouvoir, which is
based on Latin emovere – in the Latin verb the preposition “e“ means "without"/”out of”
and movere means "move“. The connection of the phenomenon of emotion with motion
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is ubiquitous in general language use, as the following randomly chosen metaphorical
words and phrases show: “Gefühlsbewegung”, “revulsion of feeling”, “he fell in love”,
“he fell into a depression”, “his heart started pounding when he saw her”.
Before starting our investigation, at least one piece of evidence from neuroscience
for relating emotion and motion will be adduced to support our procedure by cognitive
research. A team of researchers from Cambridge and Berlin made experiments on
18 persons, using magnetic resonance imaging to compare brain activation evoked by
emotion words to that evoked by face- and arm-related action words. (Moseley, 2011)
The result was that emotion words evoked activity in the motor brain systems. That
means that emotion words activate the motor system in a way comparable to action
words. So the attempt to correlate emotion and motion is corroborated by Vndings
of neuroscience. For what holds true for actual reality can also be taken granted for
imagined reality.
If we look at the representation of emotion in literature, we notice that it is, as
is the case in actual reality, essentially constituted by motion and other physical or
physiological manifestations. This holds true for visual art, too, as Edvard Munch’s
painting “The Scream” shows.
Edvard Munch, The Scream 1893, National Gallery, Oslo
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The hands of the screaming person are elongated and pressed tightly to the head. The
mouth is wide open; so are the eyes, empty and unfocussed. The person is not actually
in motion. The painting shows a face freezed with horror, which is the result of a
movement, which is also reWected in the landscape. Munch’s work is an outstanding
example of the visual representation of embodied emotion. However, we must be aware
of the fact that the painting is a work of art, of great art at that, and not what cognitivists
would normally study. It transcends what is accessible to scientiVc experiments. But
it is based on a principle on which many modern scientiVc theories of emotion are
founded, namely that emotion is largely manifested in the body.
3 Facial Feedback in Narrative Prose
Textual analysis will begin by examining the representation of facial and other physical
activity in narrative prose in relation to emotion. Cognitivists like Adelman and Zajonc
interested in the phenomenon of emotion have emphasized “the role of emotional facial
action in the subjective experience of emotion” (Adelman, 1989, p. 249). Adelman avoids
‘the convention of referring to emotional facial action as “expression” since this term
imposes an a priori theory, implying that emotional facial action (facial eUerence) has its
major role in the manifestation of internal states.’ (Adelman, 1989, pp. 249–250). While
I agree with Adelman and Zajonc in avoiding subjectivist and expressionist theories, I
take the liberty of using, at times, the term “facial (or bodily) manifestation” rather than
“facial eUerence” (“eUerent”, ‘carrying or conducting outwards from a part or an organ
of the body, esp. from the brain or spinal cord’).
Before looking at the representation of facial manifestation in literature, attention
will be drawn to a famous experiment carried out by Fritz Strack (1967) which is rel-
evant to our argument. This is the so-called pen experiment which proves the facial
feedback hypothesis from a scientiVc perspective. Subjects had to hold a pen in their
mouth in ways that either inhibited or facilitated the muscles usually associated with
smiling. Holding a pen with the teeth only was considered a facilitating condition since
it involved the muscles active in smiling; holding a pen with the lips only was consid-
ered an inhibiting condition, since it did not involve or, rather, inhibited the muscles
associated with smiling. Subjects who had the pen between their teeth showed more
intense humour responses, when cartoons were presented to them, than subjects who
had the pen between the lips. The question of the quality of the response – aUective
or cognitive – cannot be discussed here. (See Dem 1967.)
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Narrative texts in which a great amount of bodily and facial activity is represented are
novels of the Thirties and the Forties of the last century (Dashiell Hammett, Raymond
Chandler, Ernest Hemingway etc.), which I some time ago termed the behavioristic
novel (Müller 1981). In this kind of narration the representation tends to leave out
internal description and concentrate on outward physical manifestation, i. e. on what
cognitivists call facial and bodily feedback. Here is an example from Hammett’s novel
The Glass Key (1931):
(1) When he [Ned Beaumont] rose from the telephone he was smiling with pale lips.
His eyes were shiny and reckless. His hands shook a little. (Hammett, 1975, p. 127)
That physical activity suggests emotion in these sentences is indicated by the ref-
erence to the character’s smile and by his “reckless” eyes. Yet what he really thinks
remains unstated. It may be a challenge to the reader to reconstruct his undisclosed
thoughts along the lines of the theory of mind. (Zunshine, 2006) Our capacity for mind
reading can be in demand if we are confronted with real people just as with literary
Vgures. We may encounter analogous situations in real life and in the Vctional world
of the screen or the book. When a person’s gestural and facial activity goes without
words we have to perform a cognitive achievement. An example from one of Raymond
Chandler’s novels, which are told by the I-narrator Philip Marlowe, represents the body
action of a person, who has committed body-stripping, from the narrator’s perspec-
tive. The following quotations have been collected from the scene in question, in which
pressure is put on the character by the narrator:
(2) Tiny beads of sweat showed on Flack’s lip above his little moustache. – He hunched
down in a chair and stared at the corner of the desk. After a long time, he sighed. –
His eyes were small and thoughtful. His tongue pushed out over his lower lip. –
I stopped and watched the faint glisten of moisture forming on his forehead. He
swallowed hard. His eyes were sick. – He just sat there and stared at me with
his nasty little eyes half closed and his nasty little moustache shining. One of his
hands twitched on the desk, an aimless movement. (Chandler, The Little Sister,
1975, Chapter 11)
The emotions of the character remain unspeciVed. The representation is restricted to
outward physical manifestation. Yet the eUect on the reader is to perceive, in a cognitive
act, the character as extremely uncomfortable. Nor is the narrator’s response explicitly
communicated. His attitude of distaste and contempt is only suggested by the dinginess
and meanness of the described person and by the adjective “nasty” which is applied to
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the eyes and moustache. The representation of his own facial activity as a response is
not possible for the narrator, for the text is written in the form of I-narration. Yet it is
astonishing to what extent the narrator applies description of physical details also to
his own body, as the two following examples show:
(3) I grinned suddenly, bent over and quickly and with the grin still on my face, out of
place as it was, pulled oU Dr. Hambleton’s toupee [. . .] (Chandler, 1975, The Little
Sister, Chapter 9)
(4) Then I put it [the telephone] down very slowly and looked at the hand that held it.
It was half open and clenched stiU, as it was holding the instrument. (Chandler,
1975, The Lady in the Lake, Chapter 28)
In the Vrst quotation the narrator describes even a facial manifestation – grinning,
the grin on his face –, which he cannot see. For the explication of more complicated
examples we have to refer to the concepts of mirror neurons and theory of mind. To do
so in a graphic way we will Vrst look at a painting which refers to a complex situation of
interfacial response, Nicolas Poussin, “Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake“ (1648).
The reason for the shift of our argument to another art medium is that an interfacial
phenomenon is, in this ocular form, easier to grasp and interpret.
Nicolas Poussin, Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake 1648, The National Gallery, London
This painting, which has been characterized as a “study in fear” and has been used
as a cover image for Richard Wollheim’s book On the Emotions (1999), reproduces an
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emotionally disturbing scene in an apparently serene Arcadian landscape. At the bot-
tom of the left-hand side a man is being killed by a snake. From the right side a young
man with terriVed, pain-distorted face, turned to the spectator, is Weeing from the place
of the accident. The emotional stress represented in the face is unfortunately not to be
seen clearly enough in the reproduction of the painting, which is exhibited in in the Na-
tional Gallery in London. In the middle of the painting there is a woman, who from her
position cannot perceive the place of the accident. But her face and posture assumes the
same pained appearance as the man’s. Her agitation is also shown in her wild gestures
and her forward-bending posture. She may be screaming. If she were a real person,
we would have to say that her motor cortex has been activated most strongly by the
running man she is seeing.
Poussin leaves the accident itself almost in the dark. The painting’s emphasis is on
the emotions reWected in the faces of the two other Vgures. The fact that the woman,
though not knowing the reason for the man’s fear, shows the same physical evidence
of fear as the man, can be, from a contemporary scientiVc vantage-point, explained by
the theory of mirror neurons. This theory, which I referred to earlier in this paper, is
based on the empirically gained insight – Vrst derived from the observation of mon-
keys – that the same parts of the brain are active when a person performs an action as
when the person sees another individual performing the same action. (Rizzolatti: 1999,
2526–2528) This phenomenon can be explained in terms of the facial feedback theory. It
would also be possible to explain Poussin’s scene of facial interaction in terms of the
theory-of-mind concept.2 This would mean that the woman in the painting, looking at
the frightened face of the man, forms an idea of what he feels and feels the same by
way of empathy, as her facial aspect indicates. In fact, in a recent article on face-to-
face interactions Martin Schulte-Rüther et al. (2007) applied both the Mirror Neuron
Theory and the Theory of Mind to face-to-face interaction. I personally would prefer
to describe the scene in the painting under discussion as face-to-face interaction with
embodied cognition on the part of the woman. She empathizes with the man on account
of the pain manifested in his face, the empathy causing motor activity. That mind read-
ing and cognition belong together is stated by Alan Richardson’s following quotation:
“What’s termed our ‘theory of mind’ [. . .] would be greatly impoverished if we did not
have a reasonably reliable, and therefor largely unconscious, cognitive mechanism for
gauging the emotions and intentions of others through reading their faces.” (Richardson
2010: 65)
2 This was suggested to me by my colleague Dirk Vanderbeke.
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Let us now look at two passages in Raymond Chandler’s novel The Little Sister, where
the protagonist realizes his emotional state only by looking at himself in a mirror:
(5) Passing the open door of the wash cabinet I saw a stiU excited face in the glass.
I went over to the wash-basin and washed my hands and face. I sloshed cold water
on my face and dried it oU hard with the towel and looked at it in the mirror.
‘You drove oU a cliU all right,’ I said.
(Chandler, 1975, The Little Sister, Chapter 23)
(6) I got up and went to the built-in wardrobe and looked at my face in the Wawed
mirror. It had a strained look. I’d been living too fast. (Chandler, 1975, The Little
Sister, p. 133)
These examples may be a far cry away from Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase in
which the child for the Vrst time succeeds in recognizing and identifying him/herself as
a complete self in front of a mirror, but the look of the protagonist at himself in a mirror
in the novel by Chandler also has a cognitive function. In the passages quoted the
narrator Vnds out something about himself by looking at himself. In the Vrst example
the narrator even talks to his face. It would be problematic to apply the mirror neuron
concept to self-perception in the two passages, for one would have to assume self-
division in the observer, in which one part of the self observes the other part, although
a dual self is indicated in the Vrst quotation, which refers to “a stiU excited face” and not
to “my stiU excited face”. The protagonist even addresses his face. The two examples
could be explained as special instances of the theory of mind applied to a character
Vnding out something about his person by looking at himself in a mirror. However,
more plausible would be the reference to Daryl Bem’s “self-perception theory”. This
theory explains that people form new attitudes and beliefs, including those related to
the self, from observing their own behavior. Bem (1967) maintains that people deduce
their own internal states, like attitudes and emotions via the same processes by which
they deduce the internal states and dispositions of others. SpeciVcally, Bem assumes
that people use their facial expressions as a source of information to infer their own
attitudes. This is what happens in the two quotes in which Philip Marlowe looks at
his own face in the mirror. Before the mirror the character comes to self-perception
and partially also to conclusions concerning the state of his mind. Be that as it may,
in the context of sensory motor concepts the novels by Hammett and Chandler provide
abundant evidence of embodied cognition.
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4 Emotion as Cognition I: An Example from Narrative Prose
As for emotion, I am making a wide claim, namely to postulate that emotional expe-
riences, whether actual or imaginary, are cognitive events, to which sensory motor pro-
cesses contribute essentially. A similar position has been taken by Meyer-Sickendieck
(2012) who regards the perception of moods as cognitive acts which have a profound ef-
fect on the body. Physical manifestations like the body shaking, the heart beating faster,
eyes being averted and facial expressions like smiling or tears are more than” physio-
logical accompaniments”, as Oately states (Oately, 1994, p. 53, Oately, 1992. p. 20–21),
but, looked at in the context of the present project, they are part and parcel of cogni-
tion. In this respect the approach taken here diUers from Raymond Gibbs’ important
chapter on emotion (Gibbs, 2005, pp. 239–274), which focuses on consciousness rather
than cognition. I can, however, not refer to empirical evidence for substantiating my
assumptions concerning the representation of emotion in literature. Meyer-Sickendieck
pursues such an empirical project, as he declares in the conclusion of his book, but his
methodology does not seem to reach the precision of brain scientists. As a literary critic
I have to rely on literary texts. Since poetic language does not diUer radically from ev-
eryday language and since poetic language frequently evinces linguistic features which
are a heightened form of normal speech, my examples may perhaps be not without
relevance for linguists and cognitive scientists.
I will begin with an example of narrative prose, a passage from William Faulkner’s
novel Light in August, which deals with the fate of a white African-American:
(7) He turned into [the street] running and plunged up the sharp ascent, his heart
hammering, and into the higher street. He stopped here, panting, glaring, his
heart thudding as if it could not or would not yet believe that the air was now the
cold hard air of white people. (Faulkner, 1971, p. 88)
Here physical action emerges as emotion, be it fear or revulsion. While running
from a district of blacks to a district of whites, the protagonist passes through diUerent
emotional states. As frantic as he may be, he is aware of what happens. The passage
represents motion and emotion and cognition in an insoluble conjunction. Emotion is
motion, as the pounding heart indicates. The passage can be regarded as an extreme
literary example of embodied cognition, in which the sensory-motor component goes
together with cognition.
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5 Emotion as Cognition II: Examples from Romantic Poetry
Romantic lyric poetry represents, on the whole, a strongly subjective and intimate form
of discourse which with its orientation on the individual self tends to be at variance
with the socially established systems of discourse which, according to Niklas Luhmann
(Liebe als Passion, 1982), inWuence linguistic and literary representation. It may be
objected that it makes no sense to approach this kind of poetry, which is to a large extent
characterized by interiority, from the point of view of the sensory-motor concept. I will
try and show that such an objection would not be justiVed. My analysis begins with
a look at a notoriously emotional poem, which has a curious aspect that had puzzled
me for a long time until I looked at it in terms of the sensory-motor concept. It is Percy
B. Shelley’s “The Indian Serenade”. In this poem it is intense emotion which makes
the lover “arise from dreams” of his beloved and forces him to her chamber-window.
Emotion inevitably concurs with motion. The speaker declares that it is a “spirit in my
feet” which leads him to her window:
(8) And a spirit in my feet
Hath led me – who knows how?
To thy chamber window, Sweet! (Shelley, 1970, p. 500)
The puzzling phrase in this poem is “a spirit in my feet”. For a neuroscientist it
may seem absurd or downright silly to locate a “spirit” in a foot. But it is interesting
that Shelley, who could not know anything about neuroscience, felt the need for a
physical source or agency which caused the action of his lover, a source interestingly
diUerent from the heart which would in the cardiocentric tradition (Niemeier 2011) be
responsible for a lover’s action. The heart or the soul is, at least in this poem, not the
seat of the feelings. Nowadays we would of course retrace the source of the lover’s
motion in the poem to his brain. In want of any such concept the foot had to serve
as a kind of substitute. The passage explicitly illustrates a coincidence of emotion and
motion with cognitive implications. Cognition is involved in the self-observation and
the self-description of the poems’ speaker.
The following quotations from romantic poems provide evidence for the hypothesis
that emotion tends to be represented as cognition and to be embodied in motion in the
poetry of the age. Lines like –
(9) I die! I faint! I fail (“Indian Serenade”, Shelley, 1970, p. 580)
(10) I pant, I sink, I tremble, I expire! (Epipsychidion, Shelley, 1970, p. 424)
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(11) My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains
My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains
One minute past and Lethe-wards had sunk:
[. . .] (“Ode to a Nightingale”, 1–4, Keats, 1970, p. 207)
– have traditionally been called subjective or self-expressive. The most important repre-
sentative of a poetics of expression which accounts for such texts, emphasizing notions
of subjectivity and expressiveness, is M. H. Abrams’ famous book The Mirror and the
Lamp (1953). In the light of sensory-motor concepts such poems should rather be called
self-diagnostic or self-reWexive. It is signiVcant that in all these examples emotion co-
incides with motion. Emotion manifests itself in physical terms or, more precisely, in
motion. This is the case even in the lines from Keats’ ode, although the depressed state
of having “sunk” down is described only on a metaphorical level. Poetry intensiVes here
what we have noted above with reference to everyday language, namely that emotional
states are frequently expressed in physical terms, for example in words like “downcast”
(German “niedergeschlagen”) or “spurred” (German “beWügelt”). Keats is, incidentally,
one of the greatest diagnosticians in English poetry, which reWects his deep interest in
medicine and new ideas in brain anatomy and neurophysiology. (Richardson 2010: 75)
Here is another example. In “Ode on a Grecian Urn” the “happy” world depicted on the
urn is described, which is far above “all breathing human passion”
(12) That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d,
A burning forehead, and a parching tongue. (Keats, 1970, p. 210)
The lines refer to an emotion of extreme sorrow, but the terms in which it is rep-
resented are intensely physical or sensory, almost in the form of a medical diagnosis.
Self-description is intensiVed to the point of self-diagnosis: the heart is sickened, the
forehead burning, and the tongue dried out. The great amount of physical manifestation
in these and many more cases is a testimony of cognition rather merely accompaniment
of it.
In order to point at the recipient’s side of an embodied understanding of emotion
I will quote a passage from the poet A. E. Housman’s famous lecture The Name and
Nature of Poetry in which he equates the emotional eUect of poetry with a physical one:
(13) Experience has taught me, when I am shaving of a morning, to keep watch over
my thoughts, because, if a line of poetry strays into my memory, my skins bristles
so that the razor ceases to act. This particular symptom is accompanied by a shiver
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down the spine; there is another which consists in a constriction of the throat and
a precipitation of water to the eyes: and there is a third which I can only describe
by borrowing a phrase from one of Keats’s last letters, where he says, speaking of
Fanny Brawne, ‘everything that reminds me of her goes through my like a spear’.
The seat of this sensation is the pit of the stomach. (Housman, 1933, p. 47)
This is an extreme example of the eUect of poetry caused by emotions which react
on the body in a multitude of ways from a bristling of the skin to the sense of being
penetrated by a spear in the pit of the stomach. The importance of the physical side in
the representation of emotions, which is emphasized in my argument, could be supple-
mented by investigations of the production and the reception side of the poetic process,
which is not possible within the frame of this article.
6 Embodied Cognition in a Modern Poem
The lyrical poems dealt with so far have been taken from romantic poetry. To give just a
glimpse of embodied cognition, which continues to emerge, in varied forms, in later po-
etry, at least one twentieth-century poem will be adduced. In this context the study by
Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek has to be referred again, Lyrisches Gespür. Vom geheimen
Sensorium moderner Poesie. (2012). Meyer-Sickendiek is strongly interested in the lyric
representation of fugitive moods which are barely felt out by a sensitive subject and he
discusses the corporeality of perception. His theoretical approach, which is focused on
mood (“Stimmung”) rather than feeling, is related to the New Phenomenology of Her-
mann Schmitz. It provides the basis for extremely subtle analyses. Although it does not
refer to sensory-motor concepts, it ties in with the present study, since it understands
the apprehension of a mood (“das Erspüren einer Stimmung”) as a cognitive act. The
poem to be looked at here is by William Carlos Williams:
(14) To a Poor Old Woman
munching a plum on
the street a paper bag
of them in her hand
They taste good to her
They taste good
to her. They taste
good to her
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You can see it by
the way she gives herself
to the one half
sucked out in her hand
Comforted by
a solace of ripe plums
seeming to Vll the air
They taste good to her
(Williams, 1951, p. 99)
In this poem there is a total focus on the woman who is eating plums with the great-
est relish, even sucking the fruit from her hand. Her feelings of sensuous pleasure are
denoted by the statement “They taste good to her”. Even the last stanza, which artic-
ulates a kind of epiphany, is concentrated on smell and taste. In the second stanza it is
the device of repetition with the shifting of the line ends within the repeated sentence, –
an intricate counterpointing of syntax and meter – which has an iconic and intensify-
ing eUect. The shifting enjambment mimes the process of munching and savouring the
plums. The notion of embodied feeling is here expressed by a distinct poetic technique –
repetition. The last stanza conveys a sense of satisfaction which transcends the limits
of the object beheld. Emotion words refer to sensuous contentedness ("Comforted / a
solace of ripe plums") and an impression of the air being Vlled with the smell of plums
("seeming to Vll the air") is evoked. There is also a cognitive component in the woman’s
pleasure. She obviously knows what she is doing and she enjoys what she is doing, as
it is suggested by the repeated clause, “They taste good to her”. The poem is an interest-
ing case in that in addition to the visual dimension it includes the senses of tasting and
smelling. Its imagery is multisensory. (Starr, 2010) It is one of the purest examples of
embodied feeling in poetry.
7 Emotion Manifested in Kinetic Body Metaphors
From a cognitive point of view there is hardly a diUerence between metaphor in general
and in literary language. LakoU and Johnson argue that human thought and speech are
constructed metaphorically from the basic kinesthetic experiences of living in a body
(Crane 2010: 104). In an illuminating experiment Boulanger, Hauk and Pulvermüller
(2009) could show that idioms – which contain action metaphors like “grasping the
idea” – activate the motor cortex just as non-Vgurative expressions referring to action
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do. Their conclusion is that “Motor systems of the brain, including motor and premotor
cortex, and the motor cognitions they process appear to be central for understanding
idioms.” (Boulanger, Hauk and Pulvermüller 2008: 1913) Metaphors which refer to mo-
tions of the body like
(15) My blood freezes – I could vomit – He fell into a tumult of contradictory feelings –
Grasping ideas requires some intelligence
are not radically diUerent from metaphors in poetry. The most important diUerence
seems to be that poetic metaphors usually strive for the quality of novelty or originality.
It can be said that metaphor is a supreme device of expressing emotion in poetry. It is
in fact a catalyst of emotion. Also in this context the relation between motion and
emotion, which is our topic, is particularly frequent, as the poems quoted above show.
Further evidence is provided by the following examples from Gerard Manley Hopkins’
so-called terrible sonnets (Poems 65 and 67):
(16) No worst, there is none. Pitched past pitch of grief,
More pangs will, schooled at forepangs, wilder wring. (Hopkins, 1967, p. 100)
(17) Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours. (Hopkins, 1967, p. 101)
(18) I am gall, I am heartburn. God’s most deep decree
Bitter would have me taste: my taste was me;
Bones built in me, Wesh Vlled, blood brimmed the curse. (Hopkins, 1967, p. 101)
In each of these instances extreme emotions are rendered in physical terms: in the
Vrst case spiritual pain manifests itself physically in terms of wringing pangs, in the
second the self’s spiritual helplessness is expressed by the image of the leaven of the
self, unable to raise a dough, and in the third metaphors of taste are used to express
the emotional state of the self, which is, in the absence of God, thrown back on itself
and has to taste itself. It should not be forgotten that these are written or rather printed
words, condensed dust on the page, if you do not read them aloud, and yet there is
an enormous sense of physicality to them;3 the body as the testimony of emotions
is powerfully present, for, as we have argued, the respective areas of the brain are
activated regardless of their metaphorical character. At the same time Hopkins’ lines
evince great self-awareness and self-perception on the part of the speaker. Again I
3 I am aware that reading a poem silently also has a sensory quality. If this was not the case, sound eUects
and the rhythmical quality of the poem would remain unnoticed. The exploration of this phenomenon
would be another challenge of cognitive research.
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would not like to call such poetic discourse self-expression. On account of its strong
cognitive quality I would prefer the term self-deVnition or self-diagnosis.
8 A Note on Embodied Cognition in Literature and the
Historical Aspect – Shakespeare
The examples adduced for embodied cognition in the context of the representation of
emotion have been taken from nineteenth and twentieth-century literature. The tex-
tual corpus should, of course, be extended to earlier literature, and it should be asked
whether historical developments can be identiVed in the treatment of the relation of
emotion and motion in literature. A Vrst impression gained during the research for this
study is that a climax of embodied cognition and emotion is to be found in the literature
of the romantic period. However, is evident that further historical research and an ex-
pansion of the corpus are needed. Petrarch’s Canzoniere, for instance, one of the most
important models for lyric production all over Europe, has explicit descriptions of feel-
ings in physical terms such as the lover’s freezing and burning in his changing moods.
It would certainly be fruitful to look at Petrarch and his tradition or at metaphysical
poetry with respect to embodied feeling and cognition, but I would like to have just a
brief look at Shakespeare, who in this, as in so many other aspects, proves to be quite
modern. Darwin quotes him as one of the chief authorities on human expression. (Alan
Richardson 2010: 71) There is no room to go into Mary Thomas Crane’s important study
on conceptual metaphors in Shakespeare’s Brain. (2000) First, two lines from Hamlet’s
Vrst soliloquy are to be quoted:
(19) O that this too sullied Wesh would melt,
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew,
(Shakespeare 2005, p. 113, Act I, Scene 2, ll. 129–30)
Hamlet’s disillusionment with his family and his self-loathing are manifested in phys-
ical terms, in his desire for his body to melt away. The protagonist does not in the Vrst
place refer to his feelings of depression, but his psycho-physical condition. Hamlet’s
world-weariness manifests itself in a desire for the dissolution of his body. Another
example is Macbeth, who contemplates murder to gain the crown, yet is so terriVed by
fear that the image of murder unsettles his bodily functions,
(20) [. . .] why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unVx my hair,
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And make my seated heart knock at my ribs,
Against the use of nature? (Shakespeare, 1971, p. 21, Act I, Scene 3, ll. 134–37)
Here again the image of the body’s life, with the hair standing on end and the heart
knocking at the ribs, coincides with the protagonist’s feelings. In fact, the physiological
event is not a mere symptom, but a manifestation of mental disorder. There is also a
pronounced cognitive dimension in the passage, in the form of self-observation and self-
diagnosis. Macbeth feels an emotion and simultaneously perceives it as a manifestation
of the body.
An examination of modernist poetry could lead to the result that there are poets like
T. S. Eliot and Wallace Stevens who tend to write ‘disembodied ‘ poetry, i. e. poetry
that is averse to embodied cognition, while others like Ezra Pound and William Carlos
William are in favour of embodied cognition. As early as 1988 Max Nänny wrote an
article on Ezra Pound as a “Right Brain Poet”. By way of analogy one could call T. S.
Eliot a left brain poet. But such classiVcations should be treated with caution from a
cognitive and historical point of view. As far as Eliot is concerned, his theory of the
“dissociation of sensibility” could be discussed in terms of the cognitive approach.
9 Conclusion
It may be objected that the material treated in this study is rather diversiVed and dis-
parate and that the evidence presented moves freely between genres and periods, but as
an extenuating circumstance it can be pointed out that an innovative approach is tried
out in this contribution, which opens new perspectives and is waiting to be substan-
tiated in a more comprehensive and systematic procedure. Some results can at least be
ascertained. Emotion and motion have turned out to be two sides of a coin. Motion
is understood as the kinesthetic experience of the body, which comes into play with
any emotional experience, no matter whether in real life or Vction, although the liter-
ary artist has aesthetic strategies at his or her disposal which make possible intensiVed
representation of emotion. Analyses have shown that literature is a veritable Veld for
experimentation in matters of embodied cognition. Embodied cognition could be iden-
tiVed in the representation of facial feedback, both in views from outside (external) and
from inside (internal). The thesis that emotion is closely linked to physical manifesta-
tion, that emotion is actually inseparable from motion has been conVrmed in numerous
examples from narrative prose and poetry. The application of the term “sensory-motor”
to cognitive phenomena represented in literature proved to have certain advantages,
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since it allows for the appreciation of diUerent aspects of body activity involved in cog-
nition (changes of the position of the body, movement of the limbs, facial expression,
smelling, taste), which could be found in the instances of represented emotion exam-
ined. It should be noteworthy and encouraging for cognitivists and neuroscientists
advocating sensory-motor concepts that in literature there is massive evidence for their
theories from times in which nobody as yet dreamed of neurons let alone sensory-motor
concepts. The interdisciplinary beneVt can be mutual, the literary scholar proVting from
the mind and brain scientist exploring hitherto unknown dimensions of human reality,
and the scientist learning that poets have all along known more about the mind’s con-
struction than they would have believed possible.
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Abstract
This paper explores the relation between metaphor and Sensory Motor concepts in lan-
guage use. Sensory Motor concepts in language use are deVned as a number of semantic
Velds distinguished by WMatrix, comprising Sensory lexis and Motor lexis, including
words under ‘Sight’ and ‘Sound’ as well as ‘Moving, Coming, Going’ and ‘Pushing,
Putting, Pulling’. The incidence of this lexis and its metaphorical use is examined in
the VU Amsterdam Metaphor Corpus, a 190,000 word selection from BNC Baby anno-
tated for metaphor. The relation between the selected semantic Velds and metaphorical
and non-metaphorical use reveals a substantial distinction between the metaphorical use
of Sensory Motor lexis and all other lexis as well as between the metaphorical use of Sen-
sory lexis and Motor lexis. Interactions with word class and with genre are also explored,
indicating more speciVc behavior of each of the various groups of lexis expressing the
distinct concept categories. The paper concludes by suggesting that Sensory-Motor con-
cepts may indeed play a special role in metaphorical language use, and that additional
distinctions are needed to capture the four-way interaction between metaphor, word
class, register and semantic Veld.
Keywords: Sensory-Motor concepts, semantic Velds, metaphor, language use
1 Introduction
How are Sensory-Motor concepts expressed in language? And when are Sensory-Motor
concepts used metaphorically in language? I will explore these questions in order
to oUer some tentative views of the relation between Sensory-Motor concepts and
metaphor in usage. The connection between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor
is natural since Sensory-Motor concepts aUord one of the most popular source do-
mains for generating metaphorical language and thought: according to the inWuential
cognitive-linguistic account of metaphor launched by LakoU and Johnson (1980), we
think of for instance understanding as a sensory experience (understanding is see-
ing) and of change as a motor experience (change is motion). More recently, one
basic group of metaphors, called ‘primary metaphors’, have been distinguished on the
basis of their immediate grounding in embodied cognition by means of so-called ‘image
schemas’, which are presumably derived from sensory-motor experience (e. g., Gibbs,
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2006; Hampe, 2005). Since then, Sensory-Motor concepts have been taken as funda-
mental to Vguration in thought and language (e. g., LakoU and Johnson, 1999; Mandler,
2004).
In this paper I will utilize a substantial set of generally representative linguistic
data to explore the relation between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor in usage.
Previous work done in our lab led to the Vrst attempt at an encompassing corpus-
linguistic description of the relation between metaphor and its use in language (Dorst,
2011; Herrmann, 2013; Kaal, 2012; Krennmayr, 2011; Pasma, 2011; Steen et al., 2010a, b).
This research on metaphor in usage has shown a highly varied distribution of metaphor
across registers and word classes:
• Some registers are more metaphorical than others, ranging from academic and
news through Vction to conversation.
• Some word classes are also more metaphorical than others, ranging from prepo-
sitions and determiners through nouns and verbs to adjectives and adverbs.
• And some word classes are more metaphorical in some registers than in others;
for instance, adjectives have higher metaphorical usage in news, Vction and con-
versation than may be expected by chance, but not in academic texts, where they
do behave according to chance (Steen et al, 2010a: 211).
Since, in addition, some word classes are more frequent in some registers than others (cf.
Biber and Conrad, 2009), the underlying general interaction between register and word
class needs to be taken into account when interpreting the relation between metaphor,
register and word class.
These patterns were determined without paying explicit attention to their relation
to distinct semantic Velds. The data do naturally include the use of all semantic Velds
that can be distinguished, including those Velds presumably relating to Sensory-Motor
concepts. This means that, in theory, the relation between Sensory-Motor concepts and
metaphor in usage could be analyzed as a four-way interaction, between (a) Sensory-
Motor concepts, (b) metaphor, (c) register and (d) word-class. Taking our previous
work as a provisional startingpoint, the simplest model of this four-way interaction
would yield a 2*2*4*8 design for analysis, with Sensory-Motor concepts having two
levels (Sensory-Motor concept or not), metaphor having two levels (metaphor or not),
register having four levels (academic, news, Vction, and conversation), and word class
having eight levels (adjective, adverb, conjunction, determiner, noun, preposition, verb,
remainder). Such a design is clearly much too complex to remain meaningful without
further context, certainly for an exploratory paper like the present one. I am therefore
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going to dismantle the four-way interaction into a number of components that are the-
oretically meaningful in order to achieve a Vrst understanding of the possible relation
between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor in usage. The following Vndings are
hence partial and tentative, in the awareness that future research on a grander scale
will have to take into account more complex interactions as possibly inWuencing the
general trends.
The overall aim of this exploration is to sketch a Vrst picture of the employment
of Sensory-Motor concepts for metaphorical purposes in language use. Data collection
and analysis are based on a data set that has since been corrected, requiring another
round of research in order to take these corrections into account. I have also selectively
applied just a handful of small-scale statistical tests that ideally need inclusion in a more
encompassing and sophisticated approach in the future. What I aim to do in this paper,
therefore, is to present a relatively informal account of the most important tendencies in
the data that are visible in spite of the error and noise I just acknowledged. Since these
most important tendencies are starkly visible, future research is not expected to have
drastic eUects on the present conclusions and is hoped to proVt from the Vrst sketch
and new questions I can oUer at this moment.
2 Method
The data were collected from the VU Amsterdam Metaphor Corpus (Krennmayr and
Steen, in press), a sample of just under 190,000 words from the BNC Baby, which itself is
a four-million word sample from the British National Corpus. This is a 100 million word
collection of samples of written and spoken language from a wide range of sources,
representative of present-day British English. The VU Amsterdam Metaphor Corpus
(from now on, ‘VUAMC’) was annotated for metaphor, yielding about 25,000 metaphor
related words (13.6 %). These were then analyzed for relations with word class and
register, revealing a three-way interaction between metaphor, word class, and register
(Steen et al., 2010a, b). The version of the database used for the present paper still
includes a number of mistakes, both in Part-of-Speech tagging as well as in metaphor
annotation. These were since corrected for a second, revised edition but the Vgures
presented here are adequate enough to be representative for a Vrst exploration of the
trends discovered.
All separate VUAMC text Vles were concatenated into four long Vles organized by
register: academic texts, news texts, Vction, and conversation. Each of these Vles was
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uploaded into WMatrix, a web interface including a tool for semantic Veld identiVcation
(Rayson, 2009). The semantic Velds distinguished in WMatrix are applied in its lexicon
which describes the various senses of the distinct words in the English language that
have been included. Words in a text that is uploaded can thus be automatically analyzed
for the semantic domains that WMatrix attaches to the lexical units. WMatrix makes
a distinction between 21 broadly deVned semantic Velds, including M, ‘movement, lo-
cation, travel and transport’, and X, ‘psychological actions, states, and processes’, with
additional subcategories. Six Sensory-Motor domains were deemed of highest inter-
est to the exploratory purposes of this study: M1, ‘Moving, Coming, and Going’, M2,
‘Pushing, Putting, and Pulling’, and M6, ‘Location and Direction’, as well as X3, ‘Gen-
eral Sensory’, X3.2, ‘Sound’, and X3.4, ‘Sight’. Lexical items representing these domains
include leave, turn, walk (M1), take,place, hold (M2), to, in, there, where (M6), feel, feeling,
experience, sense (X3), hear, sound, noise (X3.2), and see, look, eye (X3.4). It should be
noted that all of these classiVcations are based on independent work done for WMatrix
by Paul Rayson and his associates (Rayson, 2009). I hence take on board any decisions
they have made in assigning particular lexemes to particular semantic Velds and con-
ceptual categories. For instance, it is self-eveident that these decisions have to do with
the value of lexical units in the present-day system of the English language and ignore
their historical provenance, even though this may be relevant for other research pur-
poses. It is only by exploiting the tool as it is available now in empirical work in speciVc
areas like the one reported here that constructive criticism can be formulated and the
tool can be improvement for future work.
An example of the output of WMatrix for one sentence is given below:
0000025 010 AT The Z5
0000026 010 MC2 1990s T1.3 N1 T3
0000027 010 VH0 have Z5 A9+ A2.2 S4
0000028 010 VVN witnessed X3.4 G2.1 A10+@ S9
0000029 010 AT1 a Z5
0000030 010 NN1@ shift A2.1+ S5+c T1.3/I3.1
0000031 010 II in Z5
0000032 010 AT the Z5
0000033 010 NN1 art C1 X9.1+
0000034 010 NN1 establishment T2+ H1c G1.1c I3.1c
0000035 010 GE ’s Z5
0000036 010 NN2 attitudes X2.1/E1
0000037 010 II towards Z5
0000038 010 NN1 art C1 X9.1+
0000039 010 VVN produced A2.2 A1.1.1 A10+ K4 K3 Q4.3 F4
0000040 010 II21 outside M6[i2.2.1 A1.8-[i2.2.1 Z5
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0000040 020 II22 of M6[i2.2.2 A1.8-[i2.2.2
0000041 010 APPGE its Z8
0000042 010 JJ traditional S1.1.1 A6.2+ T3++
0000043 010 NN2 parameters A1.7+ N3.1 N2
0000044 001 . .
Case numbers are followed by clause identiVers and Part-Of-Speech tags for the
relevant lexical unit located in the fourth column. Each lexical unit is then followed
by the list of semantic Veld tags assigned to it by WMatrix. If a word is tagged as M1,
M2, or M3 or X3, X3.2 or X3.4, as is the case for units 028, witnessed, and 040, outside/of,
it is included in our study as expressing a Sensory-Motor concept.
A special feature called ‘domain push’ was activated for the selected domains. The
domain push function enables identiVcation of all lexical units that have these semantic
domains, even when these semantic domains are not the relevant sense in context. The
latter is clearly important for the identiVcation of those words that are used in abstract
senses in the current context but in concrete Sensory-Motor senses in other contexts.
All WMatrix output was visually inspected and a small set of overt errors were ad-
justed or removed. The data were then included in an SPSS database containing the
general VUAMC information, including register and text identiVcation, word class in-
formation, and metaphor information. This database was subjected to a small number
of non-parametric statistical analyses by means of the chi-square test in order to exam-
ine Vrst associations between a number of selected variables for portions of the data.
A more sophisticated and encompassing quantitative analysis is envisaged for future
research.
3 Results
3.1 Sensory Concepts, Motor Concepts, and Metaphor
Sensory concepts and Motor concepts in this study each comprise three subcategories,
which may or may not display their own speciVc behavior in relation to metaphor.
That is what we will examine in this section. We now Vrst turn to the group of Sensory
concepts, divided into three categories: General Sensory concepts, Sound concepts and
Sight concepts. Their relation to metaphorical use is displayed in table 1.
There are 2,162 words in the VUAMC (N = 186,688) that are connected to the three
selected Sensory domains, which is just over one percent. There is substantial variation
between the three Sensory concepts as a whole: Sight concepts (n = 1,193) comprise
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Non-metaphor Metaphor Total
General sensory 322 191 513
(62.8) (37.2) (100.0)
Sound 348 108 456
(76.3) (23.7) (100.0)
Sight 843 350 1193
(70.7) (29.3) (100.0)
Total 1513 649 2162
(70.0) (30.0) (100.0)
Tab. 1: Frequencies (and row percentages) of three types of Sensory words, divided by non-metaphorical and
metaphorical use
more than half of all Sensory concepts, while General Sensory concepts (n = 513) and
Sound concepts (n = 456) account for the other other half in roughly equal measure.
The relation between the three concept types and metaphor is signiVcant (C2(2) = 21.68,
p = < 0.001), Phi and Cramer’s V indicating a modest eUect size (0.10, p < .001). Gen-
eral Sensory concepts display a greater proportion of metaphorical usage than aver-
age (37.2 %), while Sound concepts display a smaller proportion of metaphorical usage
(23.7 %) than average; Sight concepts are roughly average in their metaphorical use
(29.3 %). The signiVcant chi-square test indicates that this association between concept
type and metaphor is statistically reliable. Since we do not have comparable Vgures for
other languages and since the data as well as method of analysis are relatively speciVc, I
do not want to speculate about their general signiVcance. In the following sections we
will take a closer look at the nature of all three sets of Sensory concepts. There we will
make the link with their distribution across word classes and registers and attempt to
understand how Sensory concepts relate to these essential dimensions of metaphorical
language use.
Irrespective of this variation it is highly evident that Sensory concepts are much
more metaphorical than all other concepts in the VUAMC: as mentioned above, the
complete corpus has an average of 13.6 % of metaphorical use (Steen et al., 2010a, b).
The odds of Sensory concepts being metaphorical in language are about three times
higher than the odds of all other concepts being metaphorical in language. The theoret-
ical assumption that Sensory concepts may play a special and relatively frequent role in
the grounding of metaphor in usage is hence supported by these corpus-linguistic data.
It lends further credence to the cognitive-linguistic proposals in Hampe (2005), a col-
lection of chapters on the relation between image schemas as the mental repository of
Sensory-Motor experience on the one hand and abstract cognition, including metaphor-
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ical cognition and language use, on the other. For instance, here is Mark Johnson, who
writes:
The principal philosophical reason why image schemas are important is that they
make it possible for us to use the structure of sensory and motor operations
to understand abstract concepts and draw inferences from them. The central
idea is that image schemas, which arise recurrently in our perception and bodily
movement, have their own logic, which can be applied to abstract conceptual
domains. (2005: 24)
At this point it may be useful to list the most frequent lexical units that are related
to each of the three semantic domains of Sensory concepts and show their relation to
metaphorical and non-metaphorical use (see table 2). It is striking that the ten most
popular Sensory concepts for each of the three categories also account for the bulk of
all sensory language use in the complete VUAMC: General Sensory 98 %, Sound 60 %,
and Sight 86 %, respectively. It looks as if Sensory vocabulary is not highly varied
but limited to a small number of frequently used basic terms. It is also striking that
most of these lexical units are verbs, with nouns coming at some distance. Sensory
language use apparently favours expression of sense experiences as actions, processes,
events, or states. A third observation has to do with the diUerentiation between words
that are preferably non-metaphorical (e. g., tell, experience, hear, sound, ring, buzz, eye,
watch), words that are preferably metaphorical (e. g., feel, catch, strike), and words that
are somewhat balanced between non-metaphorical and metaphorical use (e. g., sense,
pop, see, look).
Thus, some Sensory language items typically appear in literal use, as may be illus-
trated with reference to tell:
(1) . . . but how can you tell?
(2) . . . and to tell you the naked truth . . .
(3) Tell me what you want.
(4) . . . you cannot tell one from the other . . .
(5) Please, I’ve found something I must tell you.
(6) Doctor’ll tell us.
Other Sensory language items typically appear in metaphorical uses, such as catch (only
9 is not metaphorical):
(7) be up to the US and Canada to decide whether they want to face towards the
Atlantic or PaciVc or be caught between two great trading oceans
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General
Sensory
(n = 513)
Sound
(n = 456)
Sight
(n = 1193)
Not-M Met Not-M Met Not-M Met
1 tell 200 20 hear 74 6 see 270 159
2 feel 23 102 sound 51 2 look 226 64
3 experience 35 1 ring 24 4 eye 63 6
4 sense 13 23 buzz 22 0 watch 65 3
5 catch 9 22 strike 5 15 view 18 33
6 feeling 10 7 pop 11 8 miss 33 11
7 suffer 12 3 listen 15 0 notice 32 2
8 distinguish 5 5 noise 13 1 stare 13 3
9 greet 7 2 silence 12 0 glance 12 1
10 make+out 3 1 meow 11 0 observe 9 4
Total 317 186 238 36 741 286
Table 2: Lexical units and frequencies of top 10 Sensory concepts in non-metaphorical (‘Not-M’) and metaphorical
(‘Met’) use
(8) he caught the stomach-turning odour of decay
(9) The people who get caught and imprisoned may not be a representative picture
of all criminals
(10) Delaney’s stillness caught the attention of the others
(11) She did and caught her breath
And yet other Sensory language items appear to be equally eligible for non-metaphorical
(12 and 15) and metaphorical (13 and 14) use:
(12) Because of this he had never seen the Oxford and Cambridge boat race until this
year
(13) They see themselves not as author and illustrator with separate roles but as a
partnership of book-makers
(14) so then I’m sure my colleagues will see the point of that
(15) Otherwise the best place to see working trams has been the tram museum at Crich
Taken as a whole, all Sensory language seems to be roughly equally useful for the
designation of concrete, genuine Sensory experiences as for more abstract experiences
that are metaphorically expressed by means of Sensory vocabulary. This is typically not
the case for all metaphor since the average proportion of all metaphorical language is
13.6 %. At the same time, within this group, there is also some division of labour be-
tween non-metaphorical and metaphorical designation: some words seem to specialize
into one direction whereas others prefer another direction, as was illustrated just now.
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Worthy of note is the fact that the top 10 for Sound displays only 13.1 % metaphorical
use; this suggests that the higher Vgure for metaphorical use for the complete Sound
concept category is due to the remaining set of lexical units, which are used much less
frequently than the ones in the top ten. These must be a diUerent type of words, or so it
seems, since they are used metaphorically more frequently. Further research will have
to delve into this possible diUerentiation.
We now turn to the other main group of Sensory-Motor concepts, the Motor con-
cepts. These also comprise three main categories for the purposes of this study: (a)
Moving, Coming, and Going; (b) Pushing, Putting and Pulling; and (c) Location and Di-
rection. Their association with metaphorical versus non-metaphorical use is displayed
in table 3.
Motor concepts are much more frequent than Sensory concepts, exhibiting 24,353 in
the data, which amounts to some 13 % of the entire VUAMC corpus. There is substantial
variation between the incidence of the three distinct groups of Motor concepts: Location
and Direction concepts comprise 72.9 % of all Motor concepts, while Moving, Coming
and Going account for 17.1 % and Pushing, Putting and Pulling, for 10 %. The relation
between these three distinct Motor concept categories and metaphor is signiVcant (C2(2)
= 51.43, p < 0.001), Phi and Cramer’s V revealing a small eUect size (0.05). The Pushing,
Putting and Pulling category has a greater proportion of metaphorical use (almost one
in two) than the other two categories (just over one in three for Moving, Coming, and
Going, and two in Vve for Location and Direction), which explains the statistically
signiVcant relation between concept category and metaphor.
Non-metaphor Metaphor Total
Moving, 2,553 1,599 4,166
Coming, (61.5) (38.5) (100.0)
Going
Pushing, 1,278 1,135 2,423
Putting, (53.0) (47.0) (100.0)
Pulling
Location, 10,737 7,051 17,788
Direction (60.4) (39,6) (100.0)
Total 14,568 9,785 24,353
(59.8) (40.2) (100.0)
Table 3: Frequencies (and row percentages) of three types of Motor words, divided by metaphorical and non-
metaphorical use
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As a group, Motor concepts are much more frequently metaphorical than all other
concepts, given the overall average of 13.6 % of all metaphorical use. The odds of Motor
concepts being metaphorical in language use are no less than four times higher than the
odds of all other concepts being metaphorical in usage. The theoretical assumption that
Motor concepts may play a special role in the grounding of metaphor in usage is hence
also supported by these corpus-linguistic data.
Below we will take a closer look at the nature of all three sets of Motor concepts in
order to elucidate why Location and Direction is so much more frequent than the other
groups. But a Vrst indication of an answer may be provided by taking a look at the top
10 most frequent Motor concepts in metaphorical and non-metaphorical use (table 4).
Moving,
Coming, Going
Pushing,
Putting, Pulling
Location,
Direction
(n = 4,166) (n = 2,423) (n = 17,788)
Not Met Not Met Not Met
1 get 468 243 take 83 222 to 3475 1025
2 go 551 146 place 180 86 in 1026 1904
3 come 149 121 put 86 112 for 1417 –
4 leave 79 47 move 56 29 on 323 780
5 move 56 29 turn 50 35 there 808 37
6 turn 50 35 hold 29 43 this 98 703
7 walk 78 4 bring 32 31 by 716 67
8 run 20 45 lead 18 45 about 12 394
9 follow 8 47 pull 40 10 right 266 3
10 return 30 22 set 17 29 where 188 62
Total 1489 539 581 642 8329 4975
Table 4: Lexical units and frequencies of top 10 Sensory concept, divided by non-metaphorical and metaphorical
uses
The ten most popular Motor words within each category account for the follow-
ing percentages of all Motor language use in the complete VUAMC: Moving, Coming,
Going 48.7 %, Pushing, Putting, Pulling 50.5 %, and Location and Direction 74.8 %, re-
spectively. In comparison with Sensory vocabulary, the Vrst two Motor vocabulary
categories (Moving, Coming, Going, and Pushing, Putting, Pulling) turn out to be much
more varied, the top ten lexical units accounting for about half of the number of cases
in the corpus. Location and Direction is more limited to a smaller number of frequently
used basic terms.
The latter may clearly be related to the strikingly high numbers of prepositions,
adverbs, and demonstratives emerging in that category, which recur throughout the
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data, with a total lack of verbs and nouns. Motor language involving Location and
Direction most frequently concerns expression of sense relations between entities and
processes, whereas Motor language involving movement and exerting force is more like
the Sensory concepts and concerns actions, processes, events and states predominantly
designated by verbs and their nominal derivations.
A third observation that can be made has to do with the diUerent distribution than in
Sensory words, which are preferably non-metaphorical, metaphorical or mixed. Most
Motor language is roughly equally useful for the designation of concrete Motor ex-
periences as for other experiences that are metaphorically derived and expressed by
means of Motor vocabulary. Note that the lack of metaphorical use of ‘for’ is an artefact
of the annotation method used in our corpus analysis, where both ‘of’ and ‘for’ were
taken as too semantically bleached to display reliably recognizable contrasts between
non-metaphorical and metaphorical uses (Steen et al., 2010a).
It should be noted that the top 10 for Moving, Coming, Going displays only 26.7 %
metaphorical use; this suggests that the higher Vgure for metaphorical use for the com-
plete Moving, Coming, Going concept category of 38.5 % is due to the remaining set of
lexical units that are used much less frequently but, apparently, more often metaphor-
ically. As with the Sound category above, this may be a diUerent type of words meriting
further exploration. Another interesting observation is the fact that the top 10 Pushing,
Putting and Pulling words are used more frequently metaphorically than not metaphor-
ically. This is a unique Vnding so far and also requires further inspection in the future.
Both of these Vndings in this exploratory study suggest important avenues for further
research.
There is a substantial diUerence between the frequencies of Sensory concepts and
Motor concepts in all of the data, Motor concepts occurring about eleven times as fre-
quently as Sensory concepts. Is it possible that this is an indication that motion is less
abstract and even more basic, as it were, than sensory experience, which typically in-
volves some associated form of cognitive response (cf. Grady, 2005)? We have also seen
that both Sensory concepts and Motor concepts interact with metaphor in diUerent
ways than all other concepts: both Sensory and Motor concepts are much more fre-
quently used metaphorically in language than all other concepts, while Motor concepts
are even more frequently metaphorical than Sensory concepts. There also appears to be
a substantial diUerence between the frequencies of the various subcategories of both the
Sensory concepts and the Motor concepts, with additionally variable relationships with
metaphorical usage: there is a rank order from General Sensory through Sight to Sound
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concepts which diUer signiVcantly from each other in their propensity for metaphorical
use; and there is a three-way distinction between Pushing Putting and Pulling (highly
metaphorical) versus the other two Motor categories (less highly metaphorical), one
of which, however (Location and Direction) is diUerent from the other (Moving, Com-
ing and Going) on account of its extraordinarily high overall frequency as well as its
diUerent types of word classes in the top ten. In other words, almost every Sensory-
Motor category behaves diUerently than the other ones, suggesting that each type of
Sensory-Motor concept has properties of its own.
This warrants taking a closer look at the nature of each subcategory of Sensory-
Motor concepts in order to try to understand why Motor concepts may be so much
more frequent than Sensory concepts, why Motor concepts invite metaphorical use
more often than Sensory concepts, and what may be the causes behind the diUerent fre-
quencies of each of the subcategories of Sensory-Motor concepts with further variable
metaphorical use within Sensory concepts and Motor concepts as main groups. Ten-
tative explanations of these observations will be sought now by examining the nature
of word classes of the metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of the various Sensory-
Motor concept categories (section 3.2) and their relation to the four registers of aca-
demic texts, news text, Vction and conversations (section 3.3).
3.2 Sensory-Motor Concepts, Metaphor and Word Class
Can the high metaphorical usage of the Sensory concepts and even more of the Motor
concepts in comparison with all other concepts be understood with reference to particu-
lar word classes? Since previous work has shown a relationship between metaphor and
word class, word class variation between Sensory-Motor concepts and Other concepts
may also play a role in the variable metaphorical use of the three groups of concepts.
It is the aim of this section to explore this relationship impressionistically for the most
obvious understandable patterns. We shall also examine whether these main eUects
of word class on metaphorical usage of Sensory-Motor concepts are compounded by
further interactions with subcategories of each Sensory-Motor concept or not. If there
are interactions, the overall picture needs further reVned and a more diUerentiated in-
terpretation. I will therefore now check the relation of word class and metaphor to each
of the three separate subcategories of Motor concepts and of Sensory concepts.
For this purpose, only the metaphorical uses of the General Sensory concepts, Sound
concepts, and Sight concepts in our data will be related to word class (Adjective, Adverb,
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Determiner, Noun, Preposition, Verb, and Remainder). Table 5 displays the Vndings.
Frequencies and percentages only indicate the proportion of metaphorical use within
a word class for a particular Sensory category, all non-metaphorical uses having been
omitted from the table.
Adj Adv Noun Verb Remain Total
General Sensory 0 – 34 157 – 191
(n = 514) (0) (39.5) (36.9) (37.2)
Sound 13 0 33 62 0 108
(n = 456) (40.6) (0) (23.4) (26.4) (0) (23.7)
Sight 3 0 84 263 – 350
(n = 1,198) (15.8) (0) (28.7) (29.9) (29.3)
Total 16 0 151 482 0 649
(N = 2,162) (30.8) (0) (29.0) (31.3) (0) (30.0)
Table 5: Frequencies (and percentages) of metaphor related words per word class for three groups of Sensory
concepts
Systematic statistical analysis by means of a series of comparable chi-square tests
was not feasible because of the number of cells with zero observations, and collapsing
categories would have led to complications. But visual inspection conVrms that Verbs
and Nouns account for the bulk of the data (in total 482 Verbs plus 151 Nouns makes
633 out 649), with Verbs occurring about three times as often as Nouns. In itself this
is a remarkable proportion, as in general verbs display 18.7 % metaphorical usage, as op-
posed to nouns 13.3 % (e. g. Herrmann, 2013). Apparently, metaphorical uses of Sensory,
Sight and Sound words are mostly verbal, followed at great distance by nominal, which
is completely atypical in comparison with overall tendencies of the relation between
word class and metaphorical use.
Variation in metaphorical usage per Sensory category seems to be largely due to
variation in metaphorical use of the Verb class: General Sensory concepts have the
highest metaphorical use because Verbs account for 30.5 % of the data (157 out of 514).
Sight concepts follow suit because metaphorically used Verbs explain 22 % of the data
(263 out of 1,198). And Sound concepts have the lowest proportion of metaphorical
use because metaphorical Verbs comprise a mere 13.6 % of the data (62 out of 456).
Throughout these patterns, metaphorical nouns consistently account for some 7 % of
the totals and do not aUect the overall score for metaphorical use in the distinct three
Sensory categories.
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The distribution of metaphorically used words expressing Sensory concepts hence
mostly depends on the varying popularity of distinct categories of Sensory verbs hav-
ing to do with General Sensory experiences, Sound, and Sight. Since Verbs as well as
Nouns generally tend to have a higher metaphorical use than average (Steen, 2010 a,
b), part of the high metaphorical use of the Sensory concepts is also explained by the
fact that this category is dominated by Verbs and Nouns. However, at the same time,
average metaphorical use of all Verbs and Nouns is substantially lower than 30 %: if this
can be shown to be a signiVcant diUerence in more encompassing statistical testing,
this would suggest that Sensory Noun and Verbs are a special category of lexis elicit-
ing metaphorical use more often than all other Verbs and Nouns. Sensory experience
expressed in language may then indeed be regarded as a popular basis for metaphorical
meaning on the basis of its ability to conceptualize the abstract via concrete embodied
experiences.
Let us now turn to Motor concepts and relate metaphorical use of (a) Moving, Com-
ing and Going concepts, (b) Pushing, Putting and Pulling concepts, and (c) Location and
Direction concepts to word class again (Adjective, Adverb, Determiner, Noun, Prepo-
sition, Verb, and Remainder). Table 6 displays the Vndings in the same way as table
5: frequencies and percentages only indicate the proportion of metaphorical use within
a word class for a particular Motor category, all non-metaphorical uses having been
omitted from the table.
Adj Adv Det Noun Prep Verb Remain Total
Moving, Coming,
Going
(n = 4,166)
9 0 – 323 – 1267 0 1599
(37.5) (0.0) (43.3) (37.6) (0.0) (38.5)
Pushing, Putting,
Pulling
(n = 2,423)
2 – – 229 – 904 0 1135
(10.0) (39.0) (50.1) (0.0) (47.0)
Location,
Direction
(n = 17,779)
92 682 701 626 4615 280 55 7051
(21.9) (33.6) (87.7) (44.3) (52.1) (51.6) (1.5) (39.6)
Total 103 682 701 1178 4615 2451 55 9785
(N = 24,368) (22.2) (33.5) (87.7) (42.9) (52.1) (42.9) (1.5) (40.2)
Table 6: Frequencies (and column percentages) of metaphor related words per word class for three groups of Motor
concepts
Table 6 immediately throws into relief the special role of Prepositions for all Sensory-
Motor concept research: they increase the total metaphorical use of all Location and Di-
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rection concepts by 4615 cases, to the strikingly high Vgure of 9785. Since Prepositions
do not play a role in the other two Motor concept categories, nor in all Sensory con-
cepts, as we have seen, Location and Direction Prepositions might have to be treated as
a separate category. They account for almost half of the inordinately high proportion of
metaphorical use of Motor concepts in comparison with Sensory concepts as well as all
other concepts. This now appears to be a speciVc manifestation of the natural connec-
tion between the concepts of Location and Direction on the one hand and Prepositions
on the other. It does not appear to be characteristic of the behavior of Sensory-Motor
concepts in general.
Statistical analysis was not feasible without raising complications again. Yet vi-
sual inspection shows that Location and Direction concepts display a diUerent usage
of Nouns and Verbs than the other two Motion concepts. Where Verbs and Nouns
account for 99.2 % of all Moving, Coming, and Going concepts as well as of all Push-
ing, Putting and Pulling concepts (which is comparable to what happens in Sensory
concepts), Verbs and Nouns comprise a meager 12 % in the Location and Direction con-
cepts. Vice versa, Location and Direction is the only Sensory Motor concept category
that makes substantial use of Adverbs and Determiners, too—as was already suggested
by the top ten frequent words in table 4 above. Perhaps it is therefore not just Loca-
tion and Direction Prepositions, but all Location and Direction lexis which ought to be
treated as a separate category in the study of Sensory-Motor concepts.
Focusing on the two remaining categories of Motor concepts, that is, Pushing, Putting
and Pulling as well as Moving, Coming and Going, these seem to exhibit rather com-
parable patterns of word class distribution. Both largely involve Verbs and Nouns, with
Verbs dominating over Nouns in both categories. This is roughly comparable to the
situation in Sensory concepts. It should not come as a surprise that both Pushing,
Pulling and Putting concepts as well as Moving, Coming and Going concepts seem to
be naturally related to the word class of Verbs, and this explains why a good deal of the
metaphorical usage of these Motor concepts is related to the variable incidence of this
one word class category. This again accounts for part of the higher metaphorical use
of Motor concepts, given the generally high metaphorical use of verbs and nouns, but it
also leaves another portion unexplained which apparently has to do with the speciVc
nature of Motor Verbs and Nouns as apt source domains for frequent metaphorization
of the abstract by the concrete.
Location and Direction concepts display behavior which is not shared by the other
two Sensory-Motor categories examined in these data. Whereas initially it seemed nat-
99
Gerard Steen
ural to include Location and Direction under Motion and Motor concepts, this may now
require further theoretical reWection. Moving, Coming and Going concepts resemble
Pushing, Putting and Pulling concepts when it comes to their lexical expression in us-
age, Verbs and at some distance Nouns dominating the scene. Location and Direction
display a completely diUerent proVle and are the only category that is heavily depen-
dent on other word lcasses than Verbs and Nounds, with Prepositions, Adverbs and
Determiners instead being most prevalent.
In sum, the relation between metaphor and Sensory-Motor concepts may be partly
explained with reference to their interaction with word class. For the 2,168 Sensory
concepts in the corpus, there are basically just two word classes involved, Verbs clearly
dominating the picture, accounting for almost three quarters of all Sensory concepts.
What is more, one third of these Sensory Verbs are used metaphorically, which is an
inordinately high percentage: Sensory Verbs apparently lend themselves to metaphor-
ical usage very easily. Likewise, Sensory Nouns account for the remaining quarter of all
Sensory concepts, with a proportion of over 40 % being used metaphorically, which is
also strikingly high.
For the 24,566 Motor concepts, we have a situation that is comparable to the Sensory
category for two of the three Motor categories: Moving, Coming, and Going, and Push-
ing, Putting and Pulling. There is one category that is starkly diUerent, Location and
Direction: there Prepositions play a deviant and prominent role, accounting for more
than one third of all Motor concepts in the complete corpus. Moreover, metaphorical
use of Motor Prepositions is extraordinarily high, comprising over 50 % of all Motor
Prepositions. Prepositions hence account for 4,615 cases out of all 9,785 Motor concepts
that are metaphorical. With the additionally diUerent behavior of Adverbs and Deter-
miners as well as Verbs and Nouns in the Location and Direction category, a case can be
made for separating this category from the other two Motor concepts.
We already saw that Sensory concepts appear to be rather diUerent than Motor con-
cepts, but we may now add that perhaps all Sensory-Motor concepts ought to be seen
as comprising not two but three rather distinct groups of concepts: Sensory Concepts,
Motor concepts (including Moving, Coming, Going, and Pushing, Putting, Pulling), and
Location and Direction concepts. This is based on the radically diUerent relation be-
tween the various categories and word classes. Partly as a result of this, their overall
frequency in language use varies considerably too: 1.16 % for Sensory concepts, 3.55 %
for Motor concepts, versus 9.55 % for Location and Direction, respectively. The inter-
action between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor is clearly aUected by the inter-
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action between metaphor and word class. Apart from this, in the other two Motor con-
cept categories, Verbs and Nouns are more frequently metaphorical in comparison with
Sensory Verbs and Nouns (roughly over 40 % in Motor concepts versus about 30 % in
Sensory concepts)—why Motor concepts would elicit more metaphorical use than Sen-
sory concepts is an intriguing question. With a reference to Grady (2005), I have raised
the question whether they might be less abstract and involve less mental response.
3.3 Sensory-Motor Concepts, Metaphor and Register
Can the relatively high metaphorical usage of the Motor concepts and the Sensory
concepts be related to the increased use of Sensory-Motor concepts in speciVc registers,
in comparison with other concepts? Since previous work has shown a relationship
between metaphor and register, register variation in Sensory-Motor concepts may also
interact with the metaphorical use of various groups of concepts. We shall now see
whether these main eUects of register on metaphorical usage of Sensory-Motor concepts
can be reVned by checking each of the separate subcategories of Motor concepts and
Sensory concepts. We shall begin with the Sensory concepts again.
The overall distribution of the Sensory concept lexis across the four registers turns
out to be very uneven. In the complete VUAMC corpus, the four registers are about
equally large, averaging about 47,000 words each, which would predict a 25 % division
of the Sensory concepts across the registers by chance. This is not the case: Fiction has
a high 40 % of all Sensory concepts, followed by Conversation, which is close to average
with 28.1 %, while News (16 %) and Academic texts (15.9 %) are low. One interpretation
of this Vnding is that Fiction has an emphasis on Sensory experience that is there for
artistic reasons, making experience more palpable, as opposed to the more abstract
concerns of News and Academic texts.
Table 7 displays the frequencies and percentages of only the metaphorical words
per register for each of the three Sensory concept categories. The overall pattern of
metaphorical usage in the complete VUAMC corpus manifested the following percent-
ages for all lexis, Sensory-Motor and otherwise: Academic 18.5 %, News 16.4 %, Fiction
11.7 %, and Conversation 7.7 % (Steen et al., 2010a, b). From the previous sections we
already know that there is a higher percentage of metaphorical use for Sensory con-
cepts than average, but now we can observe two further conspicuous diUerences when
we turn to the relation between metaphor and register for Sensory concepts. First of
all, there seems to be a split between Academic and News texts on the one hand and
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Fiction and Conversation on the other, with Academic and News texts having double
or more than double the number of metaphorical uses than Fiction and Conversation.
And secondly, where Sensory concepts in Academic and News texts are in the same
ordering from more to less metaphorical as may be observed for all concepts, Fiction
and Conversation are in roughly the same position, Fiction having less metaphor and
Conversation having more metaphor than expected when compared with the general
pattern in the complete corpus. Upon close inspection this is solely due to what hap-
pens in the Sight category, which exerts a relatively great eUect on the overall patterns
because it accounts for half of all Sensory concept cases: in the General Sensory and
Sound categories, the rank order between the registers regarding metaphorical use is
in accordance with the overall pattern in the complete corpus. What we are dealing
with, therefore, is a three-way interaction between metaphor, concept category and
register, which moreover has to be seen against the background that Sensory concepts
are proportionately much less frequent in Academic and News texts as opposed to Fic-
tion where they are much more frequent. The relation between Sensory concepts and
metaphor in usage is thus rather complicated when we examine it from the perspective
of genre, which clearly aUects their interaction.
Academic News Fiction Conversation Total
General Sensory 44 46 66 35 191
(n = 514) (46.8) (52.3) (33.5) (26.1) (37.2)
Sound 19 35 40 14 108
(n = 456) (59.4) (36.1) (19.3) (11.7) (23.7)
Sight 131 68 70 81 350
(n = 1,198) (60.1) (42.0) (15.2) (22.9) (29.3)
Total 194 149 176 130 649
(N = 2162) (56.4) (42.9) (20.4) (21.4) (30.0)
Table 7: Frequencies (and percentages) of metaphor related words per register for three groups of Sensory concepts
For each of the three Sensory concepts, the relation between metaphor and genre
was tested by means of a two-way chi-square test of signiVcance. All tests returned
signiVcant results: for General Sensory concepts, C2(3) = 20.46, p < 0.001, Phi and
Cramer’s V = 0.20; for Sound concepts, C2(3) = 42.57, p < 0.001, Phi and Cramer’s V
= 0.31; and for Sight concepts, C2(3) = 163.14, p < 0.001, Phi and Cramer’s V = 0.37.
Standardized residuals revealed signiVcant eUects of the categories furthest removed
from the expected frequencies, such as high metaphoricity in News for general Sensory
concepts, high metaphoricity in Academic texts and News texts for Sound, and high
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metaphoricity for Academic texts but low metaphoricity for Fiction in Sight. The most
prominent diUerences between registers manifested for metaphor in each of the three
Sensory concept categories are statistically reliable.
For each of the four genres, the relation between metaphor and Sensory concept
category was also tested by means of a two-way chi-square test of signiVcance. Two
tests returned signiVcant results: for Fiction, C2(2) = 28.61, p < 0.001, Phi and Cramer’s V
= 0.18; and for Conversation, C2(2) = 9.03, p = 0.01, Phi and Cramer’s V = 0.12. Standard-
ized residuals revealed signiVcant eUects of the metaphorical use of Sound categories
in Conversation, which is extremely low compared with the other two concept types
in Conversation; of metaphorically used General Sensory concepts in Fiction, which is
very high within Fiction, as well as of metaphorically used Sight concepts in Fiction,
which is low within Fiction. For Academic texts and News texts, chi square was not
signiVcant, although revealing a tendency towards signiVcance (p < 0.1): all Sensory
concept categories are used in roughly comparable measure in both of these registers.
For Sensory concepts, we see a clear split between registers. The abstract registers
of Academic and News texts have a comparatively low percentage of Sensory concepts
that at the same time are used metaphorically relatively very often. In Academic texts,
Sensory concepts are used metaphorically even more than half of the times, which is
a unique Vnding. The more concrete registers of Conversation and Fiction have an
understandably high proportion of Sensory concepts that at the same time are used
metaphorically much less frequently than in Academic and News Texts, making Con-
versation and Fiction even more concrete. For instance, in our data the verb to feel is
used non-metaphorically only in Conversation and Fiction (feel the cold, feel warm), not
in Academic and News, where it is always used metaphorically. It is also true, however,
that Sensory concepts in Fiction and Converation are still used metaphorically twice
as often as all metaphorical lexis taken together in the entire VUAMC corpus: in the
overall corpus, Conversation has 7.7 % metaphor, and Fiction 11.7 % metaphor, whereas
for Sensory language use, these percentages climb to over 20 %. This may also be due to
the relative frequency of such constructions as feel anxious, guilty, uneasy, and so on,
which feature quite large in Conversation and Fiction. All of this is still a powerful indi-
cation that Sensory concepts do play a special role in aUording metaphorical language
and perhaps conceptualization.
We will now do the same analysis for Motion concepts. We will relate metaphor-
ical use of (a) Moving, Coming and Going concepts, (b) Pushing, Putting and Pulling
concepts, and (c) Location and Direction concepts to the four registers. Table 8 dis-
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plays only the metaphorical frequencies and percentages of the Motion concepts (with
metaphorical and non-metaphorical totals listed under n in the Vrst column).
Academic News Fiction Conversation Total
Moving, Coming,
Going
(n = 4,166)
410 460 343 386 1599
(70.3) (55.1) (30.4) (24.1) (38.5)
Pushing, Putting,
Pulling
(n = 2,423)
347 384 265 139 1135
(65.7) (61.6) (34.6) (28.1) (47.0)
Location,
Direction
(n = 17,779)
2786 1933 1311 1021 7051
(54.0) (41.9) (31.4) (26.6) (39.6)
Total 3543 2777 1919 1546 9785
(n = 160,167) (56.5) (45.8) (31.6) (26.1) (40.2)
Table 8: Frequencies (and percentages) of metaphor related words per register for three groups of Motor concepts
In contrast with the Sensory concepts, the overall distribution of Motor concept lexis
across the four registers is even. The percentages of Motor concepts across the four
registers of Academic texts, News texts, Fiction, and Conversation are 25.8, 24.9, 25.0,
and 24.4, respectively. This is in accordance with the size of the four sub corpora, and
according to what might be expected according to chance. It throws into relief the
special value of the previous Vnding of the uneven distribution of Sensory concepts
and suggests that there may be a diUerence between the roles of Sensory and Motor
concepts that needs to be examined more closely.
The overall rank order of metaphorical usage across genres in the complete corpus
is also reWected in the distribution of the Motor concepts across the four genres: Aca-
demic has the highest percentage (56.5), followed by News (45.8) and Fiction (31.6), with
Conversation at the low end of the scale (26.1). We already knew that there is a higher
percentage of metaphorical use for Motor concepts than average, but we can now see
that this holds for all registers, and that the mutual diUerence in metaphorical usage
between the four genres may be somewhat greater than for all metaphor use. This will
have to be examined in future research with more encompassing statistical tests.
Next, when we examine the diUerence between Location/Direction concepts and the
other two sets of Motor concepts, it looks as if there is an interaction between con-
cept type and register: both Academic texts and News texts display a rather high fre-
quency of metaphorically used Moving, Coming and Going concepts as well as Pushing,
Putting, and Pulling concepts, while all other concepts seem to be distributed across the
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four registers according to chance. Two series of two-way statistical tests by means of
chi-square showed whether these Vrst impressions were reliable.
For each of the three Motor concepts, the relation between metaphor and genre
was tested by means of a two-way chi-square test of signiVcance. All tests returned
signiVcant results: for Moving, Coming, and Going, C2(2) = 519.23, p < 0.001, Phi and
Cramer’s V = 0.35; for Pushing, Putting and Pulling, C2(2) = 246.69, p < 0.001, Phi and
Cramer’s V = 0.32; for Location and Direction,C2(2) = 843.75, p < 0.001, Phi and Cramer’s
V = 0.22. Standardized residuals revealed signiVcant eUects of all categories in each of
the two-way interactions, suggesting that no single category crossing two variables
behaved according to expectation by chance.
For each of the four genres, the relation between metaphor and Sensory concept cat-
egory was also tested by means of a two-way chi-square test of signiVcance. Two tests
returned signiVcant results: for Academic, C2(2) = 77.24, p < 0.001, Phi and Cramer’s V =
0.11; and for News, C2(2) = 119.52, p = 0.01, Phi and Cramer’s V = 0.14. Standardized
residuals revealed signiVcant eUects of all categories in each of these two two-way in-
teractions. For Fiction and Conversations, chi square was not signiVcant, although for
Conversation a tendency towards signiVcance was revealed (p < 0.1).
In sum, each of the registers diUers from the others when it comes to their use of each
of the distinct Motor concepts. Moreover, Academic and News texts display diUerent
usages of each of the three Motor concepts within their own register. In Academic texts,
there is a stunning 70 % of metaphorical usage of Moving, Coming, and Going lexis,
followed by 65.7 % of metaphorical usage for Pushing, Putting, and Pulling. In News
texts, Pushing, Putting and Pulling leads the way, with 65.1 %, followed by Moving,
Coming and Going, with 55.1 %. Examples would include metaphorical uses of take in
academic writing such as take issue with, take an example, take a more mature attitude,
take note of, take the view, and so on. This is to be contrasted with metaphorical usage
of both concept categories in both Fiction and Conversation, where percentages range
between 24.1 % and 34.6 %. The verb take is used in those registers relatively more often
as a verb that involves the taking of a concrete object. Location and Direction have
a much lower metaphorical percentage in Academic and News texts, while they are
relatively comparable to the other concept categories in Fiction and Conversation.
These are clear quantitative indications that the metaphorical use of Motor concepts
in language cannot be treated as one uniform phenomenon, but that more work needs
to be done on the relation between Motor concepts, metaphor, and register. A close
examination of the cases involved is the next step that needs to be taken.
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The relation between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor in language is clearly
aUected by register. Sensory concepts have an uneven distribution across registers, with
Fiction clearly favoring Sensory concepts (in order to create a Vctional world) while
Academic and News texts do not; Motor concepts, by contrast, are evenly distributed.
The language of Vction therefore has a higher Sensory-Motor quality than than other
registers, while the language of Academic and News texts is less ‘Sensory-Motory.’ At
the same time, Academic and News texts throughout favor metaphorical use of both
Sensory and Motor concepts, even in absolute terms. This accords with their abstract
nature and contrasts with the predominance of non-metaphorical use of Sensory-Motor
terms in Fiction and Conversation. In addition, since Academic and News texts tend
to be more metaphorical than Fiction and Conversation overall, it can now be seen
that Sensory-Motor terms make a substantial contribution to this two-way distinction
between the four registers.
4 Discussion
The relation between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor in usage has been on the
agenda of cognitive linguists, psychologists, and scientists in general for some time.
Theoretical motivation for this interest is amply available, but the present study is the
Vrst corpus-linguistic exploration of this relationship. Even though the study is partial
and tentative it has revealed some new tendencies which require further scrutiny on
the basis of more encompassing research, which is currently undertaken in our lab.
The most important observation is that Sensory-Motor concepts on the one hand do
display a higher degree of metaphorical use than all other concepts, but that on the other
hand this relationship is not uniform but variable across all categories as well as groups
of categories that can be distinguished between the Sensory-Motor concepts included in
this study. Thus, Motor concepts are eleven times more frequent than Sensory concepts;
Sight concepts are twice as frequent as Sound concepts and general Sensory concepts;
and Location and Direction concepts are an entirely diUerent group of Sensory-Motor
concepts than all others, comprising three quarters of all Motor concepts and having
a radically diUerent word class proVle than all other Vve concept categories. In partic-
ular, all other Sensory-Motor concepts are dominated by verbal and at some distance
nominal expression, while Location and Direction are based on prepositions, adverbs
and demonstratives. Further research including other Sensory-Motor concepts clearly
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needs to throw more light on the diversity of this group of concepts in order to establish
its internal coherence.
The second most important observation is that despite this internal variation, all
Sensory-Motor concepts are much more often metaphorical than all other concepts.
This is consistent with the idea that Sensory-Motor knowledge has a special role to play
in the metaphorical conceptualization of our experience. The ground of this idea is the
assumption that Sensory–Motor knowledge is the most speciVc and best-diUerentiated
concrete knowledge we have which can then be used as a model for less speciVc, less dif-
ferentiated more abstract knowledge, for instance about social relations and processes
(Sight for Understanding) or temporal and abstract processes (Motion for Change). The
details of these varying relationships can now be studied in context with reference to
a substantial set of natural language materials.
A third point emerging from this study is the role of register. Sensory-Motor con-
cepts are not just more frequently related to metaphor in usage, perhaps mediated via
obvious distinctions between word classes; these relations are also exploited to a greater
or lesser extent in distinct situations of language use. We saw a clear distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, the more abstract registers of Academic and News texts, and,
on the other hand, the more concrete registers of Fiction and Conversation. Sensory
concepts were dispreferred in the former two, but those Sensory concepts that were
used there were massively metaphorical. Sensory concepts were preferred in Fiction
and Conversation, but their use was much less often metaphorical than in Academic
and News, even if it was still more metaphorical than the average metaphorical use of
all other concepts in Fiction and Conversation.
Motor concepts displayed a diUerent relationship with register. They were dis-
tributed evenly across all registers but their metaphorical use went down from Aca-
demic through News and Fiction to Conversation. Metaphorical use of Sensory-Motor
concepts is clearly promoted in Academic and News texts and less so in Fiction and
Conversation.
The relation between Sensory-Motor concepts and metaphor in usage is therefore
no simple one. It involves a four-way interaction between Sensory-Motor concepts,
metaphor, word class, and register. This paper has only begun to sketch the possible
outlines of this complex picture. I hope that it will provide a useful inspiration for more
encompassing as well as thorough and detailed work in the future.
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Abstract
In this article we outline a theory of action verbs that combines a modality-independent
(or abstract) conceptual component with a modality-speciVc one. Verbs as concepts
are interpreted as ranked sets of nuclei structures in the sense of Moens and Steedman
(1988). This information is stored in the middle temporal gyrus (Bedny and Caramazza
2011). Besides being amodal, this information is underspeciVed w.r.t. a particular way in
which the action is executed (grasp a needle vs. grasp a barbell), i. e. it is not grounded in
a particular situation. This underspeciVcation can in general only be resolved if the type
of object undergoing the change (needle vs. barbell) is known. Following Willems et al.
(2009), this grounding is explained as an implicit simulation in premotor cortex, that is
a preenactment of the action which makes it possible to predict the way in which the
action evolves and which is distinct from explicit (motor) imagery.
1 Theories of grounded cognition: evidence and problems1
According to Zwaan and Kaschak (2008: 368), ‘language is a sequence of stimuli that
orchestrate the retrieval of experiential traces of people, places, objects, events, and
actions.’ They illustrate this view of language with an example taken from Barsalou
(1999). When reading the sentence John removed an apple pie from the oven, a compre-
hender understands this sentence by retrieving past experiences involving persistent
objects like apple pies and ovens as well as events of removing something, for instance,
an apple pie from an oven. These traces usually include both motor experiences such as
lifting the pie and feeling its weight and perceptual experience like seeing and smelling
the pie and feeling the heat coming out of the oven. Similarly, when processing the
verb throw or the sentence Bill throws the ball, a speaker mentally simulates an action of
throwing (Pulvermüller 2005). On this view, ‘the understanding of action-related sen-
tences implies an internal simulation of the action expressed in the sentences, mediated
1 The research was supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG) funding the Collaborative Research
Center 991.
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by the activation of the same motor representations that are involved in their execution’
(Buccino et al. 2005: 361). On this view, understanding words and other linguistic items
is based on the same neural substrate as imagining the actions and objects described by
those linguistic expressions (Gallese and LakoU 2005: 456). For example, Gallese and
LakoU argue that one can understand the sentence Harry picked up the glass only if one
can imagine picking up a glass or seeing someone picking up a glass. This view is in
line with the idea of Hebbian learning: neuronal correlation is mapped onto connection
strength. As formulated by Hauk et al. (2004: 301): ‘If word forms frequently co-occur
with visual perceptions (object words), their meaning-related activity may be found in
temporal visual areas, whereas action words frequently encountered in the context of
body movements may produce meaning-related activation in the frontocentral motor
areas’. If a verb refers to actions and events that are typically performed with the face,
arm or leg, neurons processing the word and those processing the action described by
that word frequently Vre together and thus become more strongly linked. As a result,
word-related networks overlap with motor and premotor cortex in a somatotopic fash-
ion (Pulvermüller 1999). On this semantic somatotopy view of meaning, being able to
simulate executing an action of the type denoted by the verb is constitutive of the verb’s
meaning.
Empirical evidence for theories of grounded (or embodied) cognition comes from
neuroimaging studies using FMRI or ERP. When action words are processed, there is
eUector-speciVc activation of motor areas that is somatotopically organized. For exam-
ple, a leg-related word like kick activates dorsal areas, where leg actions are represented
and processed, whereas arm-related words such as pick or face-related words such as
lick activate lateral or inferior frontal motor areas, respectively. Similarly, when read-
ing or viewing the noun hammer, the hand and not the foot area of the motor system
is activated.
Such theories of embodied cognition make a number of empirically testable predic-
tions: (i) understanding an action verb and imagining performing that same action rely
on the same neural tissue, in particular premotor cortex (Willems et al. 2009: 2388),
(ii) understanding action verbs is primarily based on early, modality-speciVc, sensory-
motor brain regions (Bedny and Caramazza 2011: 82) and (iii) these sensory-motor brain
regions are automatically engaged during word comprehension (Bedny and Caramazza
2011: 82).
The Vrst problem for theories of grounded cognition is that many neuroimaging
studies failed to observe any increased activity for action-verbs anywhere in the motor
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system (Bedny and Caramazza 2011: 87). A notable exception is the study by Willems et
al. (2009). In an fMRI study they examined whether implicit stimulations of actions dur-
ing language understanding involve the same cortical motor regions as explicit motor
imagery. The participants were presented with verbs that are either related to actions
that are usually executed with the hand, like throw, or with verbs that are not related
to this body part, like kneel. In order to control for spurious activation due to explicit
imagery, there were two diUerent tasks: participants either read the verbs (lexical de-
cision task LD) or they actively imagined performing the actions denoted by these verbs
(imagery task IM). Contrary to earlier results, they found a double dissociation. Primary
motor cortex showed eUector-speciVc activation during imagery, but not during the lex-
ical decision task. For the premotor area they found out that there was eUector-speciVc
activation that distinguished between manual and non-manual verbs, both in LD and
in IM. But importantly, there was no overlap or correlation between regions activated
during the two tasks. More precisely, portions of BA6 and BA4 that were deVned on
the basis of eUector-speciVc activity during the IM task showed no such activity during
LD. Similarly, regions in BA4 and BA6 that showed eUector-speciVc activity during LD
showed no such activity during IM. The authors conclude: “These double dissociations
show that implicit motor simulation and explicit motor imagery do not necessarily en-
gage the same neural tissues in premotor and primary motor cortices and by inference
may not include the same cognitive processes” (Willems et al. 2009: 2396).
Similar to the Willems et al. study, Postle et al. (2008) found eUector-speciVc ac-
tivity in premotor cortex only when participants viewed actions performed with hand,
arm or foot. By contrast, when they silently read the corresponding verbs, there was
only activation in premotor cortices. Importantly, premotor leg, arm and hand areas
responded to all action-verbs in the same way, i. e. there was no somatotopical reac-
tion. In addition, several of these premotor areas also responded to nouns and even
non-words. These results constitute strong evidence against prediction (i) i. e. that un-
derstanding action verbs and imagining performing those actions rely on the same, or
at least overlapping, neural tissues. Summarizing, one gets the following correlations:
• Primary motor cortex is active during motor imagery; during processing of action
verbs this cortex is not active, provided no corresponding instructions are given.
• Premotor cortex areas are active during comprehension of action verbs; however,
there is no overlap with areas in this cortex that are active during explicit imagery.
In addition, there need be no eUector-speciVc activity.
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According to Bedny and Caramazza (2011: 87), results like the above raise the im-
portant question of whether such activity in left premotor areas is speciVc to action
verb comprehension or whether this activity rather reWects a more general contribu-
tion of premotor cortex to language. Evidence for such a more general contribution
comes from several studies. Graziano (2006) showed that activity in premotor areas is
more sensitive to the behavioral context and possible goals and results brought about
by an action.2 Schluter et al. (1998) found that premotor cortex is involved in higher-
order aspects of movement like sequencing and movement selection. Similarly, this
cortex is involved in planning and predicting actions and sequentially structured events
(Schubotz and von Cramon 2004). When taken together, one gets that the premotor
cortex shares features with adjacent prefrontal cortex (Miller and Cohen 2001).
Evidence against prediction (ii) comes from studies involving the middle temporal
gyrus (MTG).3 There is more activity in MTG when participants generate action verbs
than when they generate color names for visually presented nouns. MTG is more active
when action verbs are processed compared to the processing of nouns for concrete
objects and color adjectives. Furthermore, MTG response is equally high with action
verbs like run and mental state verbs like think and it is equally low for nouns denoting
animals like tigers which are rich in motion features and nouns like rock which are low
in motion features. In addition, MTG responds more to verbs like give compared to
verbs like run. This area responds to action verbs in the absence of a sentence context.
Representations are neither visual nor motion related and regions in MTG that are
activated during processing of action verbs do not overlap with visual-motion regions.
Bedny and Caramazza (2011: 91) conclude that “these results argue that the MTG stores
modality-independent representations that encode conceptual rather than perceptual
properties. . . . Together, these results suggest that the MTG represents conceptual
information about events or meaning-relevant grammatical information about verbs.”
A key question with respect to prediction (iii) is: Do eUector-speciVc activations
show that they are used by speakers to semantically analyze the word or the words
in a sentence? As Vrst noted in Postle et al. (2008), this need not be the case. The
motor activation can be an epiphenomenon of processing the word or the constituents
in the sentence. The speaker semantically analyzes the expressions and simultaneously
or subsequently (s)he mentally imagines executing a corresponding action or event. As
2 This example as well as the following ones are taken from Bedny and Caramazza (2011).
3 For details on the following, see the discussion in Bedny and Caramazza (2011) as well as the references
cited therein.
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noted by Bedny and Caramazza (2011: 83), language-perception interactions need not
result because action-verb meanings are represented but rather because verb meaning
representations prime visual motion representations during contemporaneous linguis-
tic and perceptual tasks.4
2 Action, events and the dynamic structure of action verbs
When viewed from a linguistic, in particular semantic, viewpoint, a general weakness
of most studies involving action verbs consists in the restriction to test isolated verb
forms, in general inVnitive forms like kick or throw.5 However, what type of action or
event is denoted by an expression, say a sentence, in which an action verb occurs, not
only depends on the verb but also on its arguments and their semantic (or referential)
properties. Consider, for instance, the German examples in (1).
(1) a. Hans lief (stundenlang im Park herum).
b. Hans lief zum Bahnhof.
c. Hans lief durch den Park.
d. Hans lief zu Hochform auf.
Example (1a) is an activity expression admitting of modiVcation with a for- but not
with an in-adverbial. It describes an action as unbounded in the sense that no particular
goal (say a destination to be reached) is speciVed.6 By contrast, example (1b) describes a
running that has an explicit goal: the station. The action is therefore bounded by this
destination. Linguistically, this is reWected by the admissibility of modiVcation with
in-adverbials but not of that with for-adverbials. Example (1c) can be taken to either
describe an unbounded or a bounded event. In the Vrst case it corresponds to (1a) (Hans
ran across the park), whereas in the second case it corresponds to the English translation
Hans crossed the park. The last example diUers from the preceding ones. Here laufen
4 As noted by Willems et al. (2009: 2398), another reason why there is eUector-speciVc activity in motor
areas can be due to the fact that participants in those studies were not prevented from forming mental
images. Furthermore, Postle et al. (2008) note that the positive results can be artifacts of diUerences in
imageability between critical and control stimuli. For example, in the Hauk et al. (2004) study, action verbs
were compared to hash-marks as lower-level control. As a result, eUector-speciVc activity could have been
triggered by increased imagery to concrete action language as compared with more abstract language (see
also Willems et al. 2009: 2398).
5 This limitation becomes even more apparent in languages like Dutch or German where the inVnitive form
is in general distinct from tensed forms, whereas in English the inVnitive coincides with the present tense
form.
6 This does not mean that Hans didn’t have a particular destination in mind; for example, the university
which he was running to.
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is used in an idiomatic and not in its literal sense. (1d) does not necessarily describe
an event which involves a particular motor program involving the legs. For example, it
can be used in a situation where Hans did a great job in convincing the audience during
a talk he gave at the university.7
In order to explain these diUerences one has to take into consideration that events
occur in time, in contrast to ‘normal’ objects like tables and trees which persist in time.8
Furthermore, action and events have a particular temporal-causal or dynamic structure.
This structure can be described in terms of a nucleus structure in the sense of Moens
and Steedman (1988), which consists of a linearly ordered sequence of constituents or
parts: a development process (DP), a culmination (Cul) and a consequent state (CS) (in
Figure 1 a(e) and b(e) are the beginning and end point of the event e, respectively).
The important point is that the examples in (1) describe diUerent nuclei structures.
The nucleus structure for (1a) consists of a DP only because no destination, and there-
fore no CS (be at the destination) is speciVed. For (1b) the nucleus structure is the one
depicted in Figure 1. Here a destination is determined together with the CS Hans is at
the station. (1c) has two corresponding nuclei structures, i. e. those of (1a) and (1b).
These examples already make clear that a nucleus structure is underspeciVed in at least
two respects if only the verb, say laufen, is taken into consideration. First, the sort, or
type, of a possible goal is not (yet) determined. Second, the exact way in which the
running is executed is not (yet) determined. The two kinds of underspeciVcation are
not unrelated. Consider the examples in (2).
culmination 
development process consequent state 
.(e) (e) 
         
e 
Figure 1: Nucleus structure for bounded processes bringing about a result
(2) a. Bill grasped the needle.
b. Bill grasped the barbell.
The way the grasping is executed depends on the object that is grasped. As noted by
Willems et al. (2009: 2307), very diUerent action plans are necessary to successfully ex-
7 Though this example can also be used to describe a perfect 100 m performance by Hans in athletics.
8 Thus, for each time slice of a ‘normal’ object one always gets the complete object. By contrast, for actions
and events one usually only gets a proper part.
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ecute the two actions described by the sentences in (2). Similarly, throwing a Frisbee or
a baseball requires diUerent grips and diUerent arm motions. These examples show that
the sortal information provided by the direct object is, at least in general, important to
resolve the underspeciVcation with respect to the exact motor program to be executed.
To make the fact of diUerent nuclei structures determined by the same verb clearer, let
us consider another set of examples involving the verb kick.
(3) a. John kicked Bill.
b. John kicked Bill several times.
c. John kicked the ball into the goal.
d. John kicked the bucket.
Example (3a) can be used to describe a single (atomic) kicking, the corresponding
nucleus structure of which consists of a Cul (without a CS, see Moens and Steedman
1988 and Naumann 2001 for details): NSCul. A sequence of such atomic kickings is
described by (3b): NSCul∗. The nucleus structure is complex because it consists of a
sequence of nuclei structures having a Cul only. Sentence (3c) describes an event in
which the kicking of the ball causes the latter’s location to change: before the kicking it
was not in the goal whereas it is in the goal as an eUect of the kicking. In this case, two
nuclei structures are related by a causal relation. The Vrst nucleus structure consists
of a Cul describing the kicking proper and the second is a nucleus structure consisting
of a DP, a Cul and a CS describing the movement of the ball into the goal: NS1 CAUSE
NS2. For (3d), the situation is diUerent. In this sentence, kick is not used in its literal
sense but it is used idiomatically. Since kick the bucket means die, the nucleus structure
consists of a Cul together with a CS (be dead).
Reconsidering the examples in (3), one gets: after processing John kicked, which
is common to all four sentences, a comprehender cannot (yet) know which of the
four nuclei structures is described by the sentence. However, using linguistic knowl-
edge/experience (e. g. frequency information) as well as world knowledge (what type
of nucleus structure occurs most often in the context of a kicking), (s)he has a particular
expectation about which nucleus structure is most likely be described. For example, the
literal (non-idiomatic) uses are in general more expected than the idiomatic sense in
(3d).9 For the literal uses, a possible ordering can be NSCul < NS1 CAUSE NS2 < NSCul∗,
i. e. single kickings are most expected, followed by kickings that are used to obtain a
9 However, in a context in which it is clear that John is going to die, (3d) can be the most expected contin-
uation.
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particular eUect and sequences of atomic kickings are least expected.10 In a particular
context, this default ordering has to be changed. For example, upon listening to . . . the
ball into the goal after processing John kicked . . . a comprehender comes to know that
the kicking had a destination and that therefore this sentence isn’t used to describe an
action of the most expected nucleus structure (Cul) but of type NS1 CAUSE NS2. As a
consequence, a less expected nucleus structure has to be chosen.
3 Interpreting action verbs in the brain
In our account, understanding the meaning of an action verb is in part determined by
knowledge of (i) the set of possible nuclei structures which describe possible temporal-
causal evolutions of actions and events denoted by the verb and (ii) the default ranking
among the elements of this set. This information about the meaning of a verb is stored
in MTG.
This knowledge is only necessary for grasping the (complete) meaning of such a
verb because verbs with identical sets of nuclei structures and default ranking would
have the same meaning.11 However, they diUer with respect to implicit simulations
in premotor cortex in the sense of Willems et al. (2009). Implicit simulations are
pre-enactments of potential future experiences, the principal function of which is the
ability to make predictions about how exactly an event will evolve and what its possible
consequences are. For example, a word like grasp can serve as a cue to activate neural
circuits involved in partial preparation of an action of grasping something. As noted
by the authors: “This schematic, unconscious, prospective activation of eUector-speciVc
regions in premotor cortex presumably facilitates further action planning if subsequent
cues call for grasping to be executed or to be imagined explicitly” (Willems et al. 2009:
2388).12
Linguistically, the ranked set of nuclei structures corresponds to the level of verbs
in the lexicon. Conceptually, it can be taken as a symbolic, amodal representation of the
10 Again, it must be stressed that this ordering is to be determined empirically and that it is in general – at
least in part – context dependent. For example, in case of a penalty kick during a football match, NS1
CAUSE NS2 is likely to be most expected.
11 But see below for a reVnement of this thesis.
12 By contrast, explicit imagery is covert enactment of an action. Like overt motor execution, motor imagery
may entail the generation of an action plan (inverse model) as well as a prediction of the action’s sensory
consequences (Willems et al. 2009: 2388). Its principle function is either reWective (i. e. covert reenactment
of prior actions) or prospective (e. g. an athlete usually imagines the concrete motor program before starting
his performance).
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concept expressed by the verb that is independent of sensory and motor simulations. By
contrast, implicit simulations correspond to projections of the verb like VP or sentences.
To be precise, implicit simulations are triggered when a comprehender has enough
information to determine a speciVc way or manner in which the action is executed.
As shown in the previous section, this is in general the case if (s)he knows which
object undergoes the change brought about by the action. Thus, implicit simulation
corresponds to the choice of an appropriate activity, modulo the direct object of the
verb.
When taken together, the meaning of a verb consists of two dimensions: a symbolic,
amodal dimension and diUerent ways in which these representations can be grounded
to speciVc activities that are undertaken in a particular situation.
Dimension Level of
Abstraction
Reference Neural
Correlate
Function Linguistic Level
conceptual symbolic and
amodal
ranked set of
nuclei
structures
MTG determination of possible
evolutions in terms of a
temporal-causal structure
(isolated) verb in
the lexicon
implicit
simulation
grounded instantiated
nuclei
structures
regions in
premotor
cortex
prediction and planning
(preenactment of actions)
projections of the
verb (VP and S)
At the conceptual dimension actions and events are taken as types (or schemes),
whereas at the second dimension these types are instantiated in a particular situation
in space and time, yielding an action or event token. This diUerentiation has the ad-
vantage of computational economy since it leads to a reduction on the requirement on
storage. DiUerent nuclei structures can be instantiated (or grounded) to various situa-
tions belonging to diUerent action types. One has a small number of abstract, symbolic
and amodal temporal-causal structures (nuclei structures) that can be instantiated in
an indeVnite number of concrete situations in space and time. In particular, a nucleus
structure of a particular type, say the one depicted in Figure 1 consisting of a DP Cul
CS, can be used for (i) diUerent action verbs and (ii) diUerent instantiations of the same
type of action. An example for (i) are verbs like eat and run. Both eat an apple and run
to the station are of type DP Cul CS. They diUer with respect to (i) the place in the de-
fault ordering and (ii) the types of possible activities that can instantiate this structure.
Whereas this nucleus structure is the most expected one for eat, this does not hold for
run, which basically describes unbounded actions with no particular goal or destination.
For eat, appropriate activities include putting food into the mouth using the hands, a
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fork or a spoon or, in the case of an animal, the lips and the tongue. By contrast, for
running events appropriate activities are fast movements typically involving the legs.
If a verb is encountered, the set of possible nuclei structures in middle temporal
gyrus is activated. In the absence of further information, a comprehender assumes that
an event corresponding to the most expected nucleus structure (or the most expected
nuclei structures) is (are) described. Accessing verb meanings therefore involves ac-
cessing the corresponding nuclei structures. The more complex a nucleus structure, the
longer the time to access and/or activate this structure. Thus, there is a cost in pro-
cessing time that depends on the complexity of the nucleus structure. For example, the
most expected nucleus structure for an activity verb like run is of type DP. By contrast,
for a verb like give, which expresses a causal relation involving two diUerent nuclei
structures, the most expected nucleus structure is more complex.13
The activation of the ranked set of nuclei structures does involve no immediate ac-
tivation of premotor or primary motor areas since no particular implicit or explicit sim-
ulation can yet be determined because the choice depends on the argument denoting
the object undergoing the change as well on the actor executing the action.14 Rather,
premotor areas related to implicit stimulations are activated only after the nuclei struc-
tures are instantiated. As noted above, this is the case for projections of the verb, in
particular the VP and the sentence level.
3.1 Empirical evidence for our approach
From what has been said so far, the following predictions can be derived from our
approach:
• There is only weak activation of primary and premotor areas upon processing of
the verb. Activation of the motor system is possible only if the underspeciVcation
inherent in a nucleus structure has been removed. This is in general possible only
if the type of the object undergoing the change is known.
13 NS1 : DP (action undertaken by the actor); NS2 : Cul CS (the recipient gets the theme).
14 Though this does not exclude the possibility that a comprehender activates a particular simulation in-
tentionally or by convention. For example, a football player or a football fan might usually immediately
engage in triggering simulations of a player kicking a football upon hearing or reading the verb kick. But
such simulations are independent of understanding the meaning of the verb or the sentence in which it
occurs. Rather, the meaning of the verb primes particular sorts of motor programs that can be used in
executing the action or event type.
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• Sentences with an idiomatic sense elicit stronger activation in MTG because a
less expected nucleus structure must be chosen. This reordering triggers a higher
processing load reWected by a stronger activation in MTG.
• Complex nuclei structures trigger stronger activation because e. g. diUerent types
of nuclei structures must be related to each other (e. g. in a causal relation). The
general rule is: the more complex a nucleus structure, the stronger the activation.
• Implicit simulation depends on the expertise of the comprehender. For example,
both experts (players and fans) and laymen understand sentences about hockey
matches. However, players and fans are better able to implicitly simulate actions
undertaken during a game. Thus, one expects the same activation in MTG but
diUerences with respect to premotor activity.
Evidence for the truth of the Vrst two predictions comes from an fMRI study by
Boulenger et al. (2008). They examined how literal versus idiomatic sentences with
action verbs referring either to the leg (kick) or the arm (grasp) are processed in the
brain.
(4) a. He kicked the ball.
b. He kicked the bucket.
(5) a. He grasped the needle.
b. He grasped the idea.
Brain activity was measured at the onset of the critical word in the sentence (He
grasped the IDEA) which disambiguated between a literal and an idiomatic reading
(early analysis window) and three seconds after its end (late analysis window). They
found that (i) a common network of cortical activity was triggered for both conditions
in both analysis windows, with the idioms eliciting overall more distributed activity;
(ii) primary and premotor cortices were activated both for idioms and non-idioms; (iii)
activation of (frontocentral) primary and premotor areas was relatively weak both at
action verb onset (and therefore upon processing the action verb) and at the onset
of the critical word. However, it was strong after the oUset of the critical word both
for literal and idiomatic readings; (iv) sentences with literal meanings failed to elicit
stronger activation than sentences with an idiomatic reading in any brain area; (v) in
the late analysis, window cortical activity was greater in MTG and the cerebellum.15
In the present context Vndings (iii) and (v) are the most important ones. Finding (iii)
shows that there is no instant spreading of activation to primary or premotor cortex
15 Furthermore, there was stronger activation of idioms in inferior frontal gyrus in both windows.
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during action verb processing. Rather, this activation is delayed until after the direct
object has been processed. This is in contrast to the results for processing isolated
action verbs. Finding (v) can be taken as providing evidence for our claim that in case a
verb is used in an idiomatic sense the default ordering on the set of nuclei structures
must be changed (i. e. there is a reordering of the elements of this set), resulting in a
higher processing load, reWected in the higher activity in MTG.16
Evidence for the third prediction comes from two studies by Shetreet et al. (2007)
and Van Dam and colleagues (2010), respectively. Shetreet and colleagues found that
MTG responds more strongly to sentences with verbs that have more arguments, even
when the sentences have the same overall length. For example, processing John gave
Mary the book (three arguments) triggers stronger activity in MTG than the sentence
John ran to the station (two arguments). In our approach, a verb like give is related to a
complex nucleus structure consisting of two substructures that are linked by a causal
relation. The Vrst nucleus structure describes the action undertaken by the giver (actor)
whereas the second nucleus structure describes the event of the recipient receiving (and
thereby coming to possess) the theme, i. e. the object given. Van Dam and colleagues
(2010) found that the processing of action verbs like wipe that denote events describing
a particular way of moving part of the body triggers stronger inferior parietal activity
than verbs like clean for which no such manner is determined. This Vnding can be
explained as follows. Levin and Rappaport-Hovav (to appear) distinguish between verbs
of manner and verbs of result. Manner verbs specify a particular way in which an
action is executed. For example, wipe and brush determine a particular way of cleaning
an object without imposing the constraint that the result be attained at the end of the
event. By contrast, result verbs specify a particular end state of the action. For example,
clean requires the object undergoing the change, say a table, to be clean as a result of
the cleaning activity undertaken by the actor. However, no speciVc type of activity (or
manner) by which this end state is achieved is determined by the verb. In our approach,
manner verbs like wipe have a most expected nucleus structure of type DP, i. e. they
are basically activity verbs that are usually used to describe unbounded events which
need not bring about a particular result (similar to a verb like run). By contrast, a result
verb like clean has a most expected nucleus structure of type DP Cul CS. However, for
clean only the culmination is explicitly determined (the object has to be clean) but no
particular activity.
16 For details on how such orderings can be changed, see Naumann (2011, 2013, 2014).
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In our approach, this means that the interpretation of a result verb is already de-
termined by the ranked set of nuclei structures since the only constraint is the one
imposed on the end state (be clean), which is already speciVed at the lexical level and
which therefore is independent of the object undergoing the change. As a consequence,
being able to implicitly simulate how the action can be executed is not part of the mean-
ing of the verb. From this it does not follow that a comprehender does not engage in an
implicit simulation (and, additionally, in explicit imagery). But in this case, (s)he plans
or imagines an execution that can be described by another verb, say wipe as in wipe the
table clean.
Further evidence for our analysis comes from a study by McKoon and Macfarland
(2000). They showed that there are no diUerences in processing time between transitive
and intransitive uses of so-called externally caused event verbs like break and awake.
(6) a. The Vre alarm awoke the residents.
b. The residents awoke.
By contrast, for internally caused event verbs like bloom and wilt, processing times
are signiVcantly shorter than those for externally caused event verbs.
(7) a. The bright sun wilted the roses.
b. The roses wilted.
Again, there are no diUerences between the transitive and the intransitive form.
These results therefore show that the processing time depends on the type of the (pre-
ferred or most expected) nucleus structure. Furthermore, these examples show that the
cost in processing time is independent of the exact syntactic realization (transitive vs.
intransitive). Rather, it only depends on the corresponding types of nuclei structures.
Similar results were obtained by Gennari and Poeppel (2003). They showed that
processing non-stative verbs like vanish and solve takes longer than processing stative
verbs like love and exist (about 25 ms), even if the argument structures are identical (e. g.
exist and vanish).
Evidence for the fourth prediction comes from a study by Beilock and colleagues
(2008). They let hockey players, hockey fans and hockey novices listen to sentences
about hockey-related actions. They found that both for hockey players and hockey
fans there was an increased activity in dorsal premotor cortex compared to the activity
in this area for hockey novices. Furthermore, this stronger activity was inWuenced by
experience with hockey games but not necessarily by motor experience directly related
to playing the sport. For example, dorsal activity was the same for hockey players and
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hockey fans. In addition, only for hockey novices the primary sensory-motor cortices
were active and increased primary sensory-motor activity correlated negatively with
action sentence comprehension.
The above empirical results can be taken as evidence for the following two hypothe-
ses: (i) result verbs are not directly related to particular implicit simulations or motor
programs and (ii) for result verbs, grounding of a corresponding nucleus structure is, at
least in part, independent of their types. By contrast, manner verbs require (i) activation
of the related ranked set of nuclei structures in MTG and (ii) an implicit simulation in
premotor cortex (in order to distinguish say brush from wipe). These hypotheses raise
the following questions: (i) what is the exact relation between the ranked set of nuclei
structures and implicit simulations? And (ii) where is this relation stored in the brain
(i. e. what is the neuronal correlate of this relation)? One answer to the Vrst question
is that the ranked set of nuclei structures for a verb in MTG primes certain implicit
simulations in premotor cortex. To be more precise: both manner and result verbs are
related to a set of appropriate activities. Information about these activities is stored in
regions of premotor cortex. For manner verbs this set is more restricted than that for
result verbs. Furthermore, and more importantly, the set of activities for manner verbs
is ranked in the sense that not all elements in this set are equally expected. By contrast,
for result verbs there is no ranking on this set. For example, for wipe, one has rub with
a cloth or one’s hand and for brush, rub with a brush. The set of appropriate activities
for clean comprises those for wipe and brush (and those for other manner verbs which
denote actions for cleaning something). A possible answer to the second question goes
along Hebbian lines. Neuronal correlation is mapped onto connection strength. If an
action verb frequently co-occurs with body movements that are executions of an ac-
tion of the type denoted by the verb, this strengthens the connection between regions
in MTG and regions in premotor cortex. There remain, of course, a number of open
empirical questions, for example: Where in the brain is the ‘meaning assembly’ between
a verb and its arguments located, i. e. what is the exact relation between verbal (dynamic)
and non-verbal (static) meanings? and How is the ranked set of nuclei structures acquired
in the brain during language learning?
Furthermore, the above results also show that the various dimensions are not inde-
pendent of each other. When taken together, the Vndings of the empirical studies used
in this article suggest the following relation. Both implicit and explicit simulations are
functionally or causally dependent on the conceptual domain consisting of the ranked
set of nuclei structures in MTG. Empirical evidence supporting this claim is: (i) MTG
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responds to verbs in isolation for sentences with transitive verbs and (ii) the motor sys-
tem is activated only after the direct object has been processed. Thus, when processing
a verb, regions in MTG are activated but no eUector-speciVc activity in the motor sys-
tem is (yet) triggered. Consequently, MTG is activated prior to the motor system. By
itself, this temporal relation does not show that there is a functional or causal relation
between those dimensions. However, both types of activity are directly related to pro-
cessing the verb and therefore to understanding its meaning, which makes it likely that
some functional relation is involved. Of course, this claim needs to be conVrmed by
further empirical investigations.
Finally, an important empirical question is this: is the ability to trigger implicit sim-
ulations in premotor cortex constitutive of grasping the meaning of (or to have the
concept corresponding to) an action verb? In our approach the answer is negative for
the following reason. The two dimensions in the meaning of an action verb correspond
to diUerent functions language and cognition have. The conceptual dimension is related
to naming and recognizing objects of the given type. Evidence for this comes from stud-
ies of patients suUering from apraxia as well as from the discussion of the results about
hockey obtained by Beilock and colleagues. This dimension is non-goal oriented in the
sense that no implicit preenactment of a possible execution is involved.17 The second
dimension, i. e. implicit simulation, is related to reWecting, predicting and planning an
action of the given type by selecting appropriate activities and inferring future conse-
quences of executing this action. Possible questions are: How can the goal be reached?,
What is an appropriate activity to reach the goal or to execute the action? and What are
possible consequences of executing the action? This dimension therefore is goal-oriented
at a theoretical level (i. e. it does not involve the ability to execute a motor program).
This ability is a necessary condition for being able to attain a goal or result by executing
an action of the given type. For example, in the case of eating one can use the hands or,
alternatively, a fork and a knife. By contrast, explicit imagery corresponds to the ability
of actually executing a motor program to attain the goal.18 The inability to have implicit
simulations impairs a speaker for this particular function. This is the case for patients
17 Though it may involve naming the goal of a possible execution, e. g. making an object clean for the verb
clean since involving a goal (Cul) is part of the most expected nucleus structure of this verb.
18 Additional evidence for this analysis comes from studies of apraxia, i. e. the inability to perform particular
activities as a result of brain damage. People suUering from this inability are impaired for using objects of a
particular kind, say a hammer, though they are unimpaired for (i) naming those objects and (ii) recognizing
pantomimes associated with uses of those objects. Thus, integrity of motor processes is not necessary in
order for object naming and action recognition to be in the normal range; see Mahon and Caramazza (2008)
for details.
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suUering from apraxia. However, the Beilock et al. study shows that that the ability
to have implicit simulations comes in degrees. Hockey novices do have activity in the
motor system, though it is less strong than the activity triggered in hockey players and
hockey fans.19
3.2 Comparison to theories of grounded cognition
Our approach diUers from theories of grounded cognition in the following respects.
First, ‘automatic activation’ does not mean that the motor system is immediately ac-
tivated when a verb is processed in the brain, i. e. that linguistically processed input
immediately results in activation of the motor and sensory systems. Rather, what is
immediately activated is the ranked set of nuclei structures. Groundedness is not an
attribute of the verb proper but rather a property of its projections like VP or S. The
reason for this is that the conceptual level stored in MTG is impoverished in the sense
that verbs which have the same ranked set of nuclei structures cannot be distinguished.
This distinction is only made if a nucleues structure is instantiated. The neural correlate
of this instantiation is an implicit simulation in premotor cortex.
It may seem that this view is contradicted by the results of Hauk et al. (2004) and
others showing that the motor system is activated rather quickly. Recall that Hauk
et al. found that when presented with the word kick the ‘leg’ region of the motor
system is activated within a time span of about 200 ms. Yet those results do not provide
counterevidence to our claims. First, those results were obtained for isolated verbs and
not for sentences in which these verbs occur as a constituent and this fact was known
to the participants. When taken in isolation, a verb like kick is interpreted by uniquely
describing a nucleus structure consisting only of a Cul because a comprehender already
knows that no further information, say about a goal of the kicking, is added, which may
make it necessary to change the nucleus structure to one of type Cul CAUSE NS2.
A second diUerence is that in our approach, following Willems et al. (2009), a distinc-
tion is made between implicit simulations and explicit imagery. Third, explicit imagery
is an epiphenomenon of processing (and thereby understanding the meaning) of the
verb. As pointed out in the previous section, a verb (or its corresponding ranked set
of nuclei structures) primes certain ways in which an action denoted by the verb is exe-
cuted. As a result, an implicit simulation can be triggered. This way of undertaking the
19 However, it remains an open empirical question of whether this activity is related to both implicit simu-
lation and explicit imagery or to only one of those activities in the motor system.
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action may subsequently result in explicit imagery of the corresponding action. Fourth,
and most importantly, a distinction between a symbolic and amodal dimension and a
grounded dimension is made in the deVnition of the meaning of an action verb.
Summarizing, one can say that theories of grounded cognition only capture one par-
ticular dimension of a verb’s meaning, i. e. that related to the motor system. However,
they usually do not distinguish between implicit simulations and explicit imagery. In
addition, if it is true that both of these activities in the motor system are functionally
and causally dependent on a conceptual dimension, they fail to give a satisfactory ac-
count of how meanings are represented and accessed in the human brain. This failure is
in large part due to the fact that most often only isolated verbs and not larger linguistic
contexts, like sentences, in which those verbs occur are considered.
Another way of comparing theories of grounded cognition and ours is the following.
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) distinguish four possibilities of how the motor system
can be related to a conceptual dimension.
1. Processing the verb directly activates the motor system, with no intervening ac-
cess to abstract conceptual content.
2. Processing the verb directly activates the motor system and in parallel activates
abstract conceptual content.
3. Processing the verb directly activates the motor system and then subsequently
activates an abstract conceptual representation.
4. Processing the verb directly activates an abstract conceptual representation and
then activates the motor system.
Only on the fourth possibility is the conceptual dimension activated before the motor
system, whereas in the other three possibilities the motor system is either independent
of the conceptual dimension (1), works in parallel with it (2) or there is a cascading Wow
of information from the motor system to the conceptual dimension (3). The Vrst three
possibilities underlie the various forms of theories of grounded cognition: The motor
system is never activated after the conceptual system (provided the latter is assumed
at all). Our approach is characterized by the fourth possibility. First, the ranked set of
nuclei structures in MTG is activated and subsequently implicit simulations in speciVc
premotor areas are triggered by a spreading activation.
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4 Comparison to other approaches
Similar to our approach, the grounding by interaction account proposed in Mahon and
Caramazza (2008) distinguishes between an abstract or symbolic level of representa-
tion and its instantiation (or grounding) in a particular situation. The symbolic level
is conceptual and characterized by various output modalities like being able to name an
object or action falling under the given concept or knowing something about the way it
is built up or construed. For example, in the case of a hammer this conceptual knowl-
edge possibly involves being able to recount the history of the hammer as an invention,
the materials of which the Vrst hammer was made, or what hammers typically weigh
(Mahon and Caramazza 2008: 67 f.). This conceptual information can apply to diverse
sensory modalities like touch, vision or audition. What is missing from this level is the
interaction with the world. Conceptual information is not isolated. Rather, it can be
activated by events in the world that are processed by the sensory system. As an eUect,
the conceptual information gets instantiated in a particular situation. The speciVc sen-
sory and motor information that is activated may change depending on the situation in
which the abstract conceptual information is instantiated (Mahon and Caramazza 2008:
68). However, from this it does not follow that the sensory and motor information is
constitutive of the concept. Rather, removing the sensory and motor system would re-
sult in impoverished and isolated concepts. Thus, the activation of sensory and motor
processes contributes to the ‘full’ representation of the concept.
The approach presented here bears some similarity with constraint-satisfaction-
based approaches, like that of Jurafsky (1996) for example. According to such accounts,
the processing of a sentence Vrst involves the activation of several possible interpreta-
tions. These interpretations are ranked according to a probability measure that is based,
among other factors, on the likelihood of a particular word being used in a particular
context or the likelihood of a verb to be used with a particular meaning. For exam-
ple, the noun nail refers either to a body part (Vngernail, toenail) or a metal fastener.
Processing this word therefore involves activation of brain areas related to both mean-
ings of the word.20 This set of possible interpretations is narrowed down when further
information in the sentence is processed: The nail he used to put up the picture.
20 According to Zwaan and Kaschak (2008), from which this example is taken, the processing involves the
activation of traces or mental simulations that are relevant to both senses of the word, in accordance with
the embodiment thesis.
126
Dynamics in the Brain and Dynamic Frame
5 Conclusion
In this article we presented a theory of action verbs that combines an abstract, modality-
independent component with a modality-speciVc component located in regions of pre-
motor cortex. Semantically, this analysis is based on the observation that a verb like
kick can be used to express diUerent types of actions (kick/kick the ball/kick the ball
into the goal) that diUer with respect to parameters like telic/atelic, result/no_result or
atomic/iteration. The conceptual information about events are the diUerent types of
nuclei structures and the meaning-relevant information about a verb is the ranked set
of such structures that represents the conceptual dimension of its meaning. This infor-
mation is amodal and concerns the temporal-causal structure of an action or event. It is
stored in MTG, which has been shown to respond to the processing of verbs as opposed
to nouns and adjectives.
This temporal-causal structure is underspeciVed with respect to the exact way or
manner (motor program) an action of a particular type is executed because this way
depends on the object undergoing the change. After combining with the direct object of
the verb, this structure is grounded or instantiated by a spreading activation to premotor
cortex leading to an implicit simulation which makes it possible to derive additional
conclusions about this structure.
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Abstract
This paper addresses the question whether we should analyze Place, expressing the ab-
sence of a change of location, on a par with mode expressions specifying the type of such
a change, i. e. Source and Goal. By cross-linguistic study of spatial case systems, various
options of analysis are considered and illustrated. It is concluded that languages may
diUer in their spatial expression of Place, suggesting a non-uniform semantics and, pos-
sibly, conceptualization. Also, it is proposed to view these various analyses as diachronic
variants.
Keywords: spatial language, Place, mode/directionality, morphological decomposition
1 Introduction1
If a moving entity is to be localized, it generally does not suXce to merely provide a
location.2 Instead, it needs to be made clear at which interval of the motion event this
locatum can be found there. For this, mode expressions such as to and from can be used
(mode is probably better known as directionality, a tradition that is not followed here for
reasons explained in Lestrade 2011 and 2012). Mode expressions restrict the location of
a locatum to a speciVc interval of the event only, for example to the end point (Goal) or
to the starting point (Source) of the motion event. In the following example, the locatum
John is said to be in the house at the end point of the walking event only by the mode
expression -to:
(1) John walked into the house.
The question to be addressed in this paper is whether we should acknowledge Place,
which would then locate the locatum to the location throughout the whole event, as a
third distinction of mode on a par with Source and Goal. That is, should we think of
1 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for comments and suggestions that helped to improve this
paper.
2 For original terminology and discussion, see Talmy (1990), JackendoU (1983), Kracht (2002), Wälchil and
Zúñiga (2007), Levinson (2000), and Bateman et al. (2010).
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mode as an obligatory dimension, defaulting to Place mode in the absence of motion,
or rather as an optional dimension of spatial expressions that is only used if neces-
sary, in combination with motion verbs (only distinguishing Source and Goal)? Before
discussing this question in more detail, let us further agree on the terminology: The
locations that mode assigns to some point in time are named regions expressed by the
conVguration function, for example ‘in’, ‘under’, and ‘between’. These locations are de-
Vned with respect to a reference object called the ground. In (1), the conVguration is ‘in’
and the house is the ground, therefore the location is the inside of the house; with John
being the locatum and the mode being Goal, John is said to be in the house at the end
point of the walking event only.
The reason to consider Place as a mode option, something that may seem unneces-
sary from an English perspective, can be illustrated by the following part of the spatial
case paradigm of Hungarian:
(2) Partial Hungarian case paradigm
házon házra házrál
‘onto the house’ ‘on the house’ ‘oU the house’
(superlative) (superessive) (superelative)
Spatial expressions in Hungarian consistently come in three variants, one for Goal, one
for Source, and one for Place (a term that necessarily remains without proper deVnition
in this Vrst part of the paper). This three-way distinction suggest that, morphologically
at least, Place may be on a par with Goal and Source in some languages. But whereas
analyses of mode all agree on accepting Goal and Source, they diUer in whether they
recognize Place as a distinction of mode too (Kracht 2002, 2008; Lestrade 2010, 2011)
or analyze it as the absence of such a distinction instead (e. g., JackendoU 1983, 1990;
Zwarts 1997, 2005; Wunderlich 1991; Schank 1973).
Intuitively, it could be argued both ways indeed. If mode is deVned as restricting the
scope of the location (of some locatum) to an interval either before or after a change
of location, this function does not apply in the absence of such a change. On the
other hand, mode could be argued to be an obligatory ingredient of spatial meaning
and/or spatial expressions. In this case, the link between the location and the event
time is always made, irrespective of whether they concern stative or motion events,
and possibly by zero markers for speciVc modes for reasons of economy. (The use of
zero markers is not as obscure a strategy as it may seem, cf. the use of zero markers
for what is called nominative/absolutive case in many languages; de Hoop and Zwarts
2010; Creissels 2010). Whereas Goal and Source temporally restrict a location to the end
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or beginning of an event, Place mode in this view expresses that some location holds for
the whole event. The two options are illustrated for English in (3) and (4), example (5) is
given for contrast with an overt mode expression.
(3) Place as the absence of mode (mode is optional)
John is walking in the house.
locatum V conVguration:in ground
(4) Place as a distinction of mode (mode is obligatory (and zero marked in English))
John is walking Ø in the house.
locatum V mode:Place conVguration:in ground
(5) Goal mode (for contrast)
The cat is coming from under the table.
locatum V mode:Source conVguration:under ground
In fact, the choice is more complicated: It could be argued that there are three possi-
bilities when barring Place from the mode domain. First, it could simply be the absence
of mode as just illustrated in (3). Second, however, Place could be a generalized conVg-
uration. In this case, it generalizes over all possible conVgurations, i. e. ‘in’, ‘under’, etc.,
expressing that although there necessarily is some conVgurational relation between the
locatum and the ground in the world out there, its linguistic speciVcation is deemed
unnecessary (for example because its completely predictable, as is often the case with
typical pairings such as between coUee cups and tables). Thirdly, the function of Place
could be to change the named region referred to by the conVguration into a predicate
that establishes the link between a location and the locatum, for exampling changing ‘in
the house’ into LOC(locatum, in the house). This predicate may then subsequently be
speciVed temporally by mode expressions if necessary. Under this analysis, Place is just
another term for the locative function, a semantic function necessary for a composi-
tional semantics of the spatial expression (cf. a.o. Creary, Gawron, & Nerbonne, 1989;
Wunderlich, 1991; Zwarts, 1997; Kracht, 2002; Bateman 2010). The diUerent options are
illustrated in the abstract in the following examples:3
(6) Place as the absence of mode:
[mode {Source, Goal} [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ]
(7) Place as a generalized location:
[mode {Source, Goal} [conVguration {Place, ‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ]
3 Square brackets (“[]”) show the scope of the functions mentioned in the subscripts; curly brackets (“{}”) list
the options a function has.
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(8) Place as the locative function:
[mode {Source, Goal} [locative function Place [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ] ]
(9) Place as a distinction of mode:
[mode {Source, Goal, Place} [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ]
In the next section, these options will be illustrated with concrete cross-linguistic
examples. Then also, it will be shown that it is not possible to decide between these
options, or rather, that cross-linguistic data suggest that each of these analyses may
be true for at least some languages. Accordingly, this paper will argue that although
Place may not be a full-Wedged distinction in the mode systems of all languages, our
analysis of mode should at least leave open the possibility for Place to become one
of its distinctions. Importantly for the topic of the present collection of papers, such
diUerent morphosyntactic behavior between languages bears on our account of the
cognitive representation of spatial meaning: If the spatial systems of languages diUer
in fundamental ways, we may have to conclude that also our cognitive representation
of space is not universal (cf. for example Levinson 1996 and Li and Gleitman 2002).
2 Methodology
To illustrate the diUerent analyses above, we will make use of a method called morpho-
logical decomposition. This method assumes a fair degree of compositionality between
spatial expressions and spatial meaning: If some morpheme can be straightforwardly
linked to a semantic function, its very use is taken as evidence for the existence of this
function. In fact, we have already used this method in our examples above, suggesting
that there is something as Source mode in English on the basis of the use of from. As the
input for our decomposition exercise, we will consider a number of spatial case systems
(for a more elaborate discussion of spatial case inventories and the motivation to use
them in studies of spatial language, cf. Lestrade 2012). The reasoning goes as follows. If
in a system of paradigmatic oppositions the markers of Place are at the same level as
the markers of Goal and Source, we may want to conclude that Place semantically is
on a par with Goal and Source too. That is, if Place is mutually exclusive with Goal
and Source and all three may be added on top of conVguration distinctions, we should
probably analyze Place, Goal and Source alike as mode options. If, on the other hand,
the markers for Goal and Source morphologically include the marker for Place, this
suggests that Place is the input of Goal and Source semantically too.
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By deconstructing the spatial expressions into their morphological parts in a num-
ber of languages, it will be shown that there is some truth in each of the analyses, or,
phrased less optimistically, that the evidence from the morphological decomposition of
spatial case is not conclusive to decide once and for all which of the options should be
considered the right one. But before we get there, it should be noted that there is an
important caveat to this procedure. Morphological markers may be developed over and
over again within a stable system of oppositions (Kiparsky 2012) and apparent inclusion
relations may only be a coincidence. Therefore, evidence from this method should only
be generalized if the results are consistent throughout the spatial expressions between
or, depending on the range of the generalization, within languages. Secondly, the in-
terpretation of the results partly depends on whether or not one accepts zero markers.
Whereas zero expressions are wholeheartedly accepted by many linguists, they are at
the same time forcefully rejected by many others. In general, however, their rejection
causes increased complexity or idiosyncrasy at some other point of the analysis. The
choice thus seems to be between accepting a zero for a more general semantics vs. a
WYSIWYG account at the cost of generality. For present purposes, zero markers are
only modestly allowed and avoided whenever possible.
3 Analyses of Place
3.1 Place as the absence of mode
If Place is really the absence of mode, as again schematically represented in (10), it
should not appear.4 For if Place overtly marked the absence of Goal and Source, we
probably would want to analyze it as a mode distinction itself. That is, more generally,
whereas speciVc levels of a function may be deVned negatively with respect to other
levels (e. g. that as ‘not this’), we probably do not expect a linguistic expression to
express the absence of an (abstract) function (e. g. the in terms of the absence of deixis).
(10) Place as the absence of mode:
[mode {Source, Goal} [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ]
In some languages, the absence of a change of location is indeed covertly expressed
only, and therefore, on the basis of these languages, Place could be said not to exist (“to
be the absence of mode”). Rather than using an exotic spatial case paradigm, English
prepositions may illustrate this type of mode system:
4 The non-existence of a Place marker crucially sets this analysis apart from the others.
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(11) The mouse ran. . .
a. . . . across the Woor.
b. . . . from under the table.
c. . . . into its hole.
Whereas Goal and Source are overtly marked in (11-b,c) as indicated with bold face,
there is no additional marking in (11a). The (relevant part of the) English spatial system
can thus be represented as follows:
(12) English spatial expressions:
[mode {from, to(/-to)} [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ]
In this analysis, the absence of Goal and Source is taken to correspond to the absence
of the mode function in general.
3.2 Place as a generalized conVguration
If place is a generalized conVguration, it should not occur in combination with more
speciVc conVgurations, as these should be mutually exclusive: From a functional per-
spective, it does not make much sense to standardly, that is, not as a restatement but as
the normal way of expression, mark something in general and at the same time express
it in more detail too (cf. *a vehicle car, for an attempt to illustrate with a lexical exam-
ple). According to this analysis, Place always substitutes more speciVc conVgurations.
The abstract semantic representation is repeated as (13) for convenience.
(13) Place as a generalized location:
[mode {Source, Goal} [conVguration {Place, ‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ]
Although Place in principle may be expressed covertly under this analysis, it could then
also be argued to favor the type of analysis to be discussed next. Therefore, we will only
consider overt instances of generalized conVgurations in this section.
The locative suXx -(i)ng in Tswana (a Niger-Congo language spoken in South Africa)
could be analyzed as a generalized conVguration. Tswana has a subset of nouns used in
spatial function without the addition of the locative case marker. Spatial conVgurations
are speciVed by means of prepositions that are historically locational nouns (Denis
Creissels, p.c.). These constructions, from which the locative case marker is lacking,
are used if the conVguration needs to be expressed explicitly:
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Tswana (Creissels, p.c.)
(14) morago ga lebota
behind gen wall
‘behind the wall’
The locative suXx does not appear on top of such conVguration markers but seems
to be used in their stead, when a more speciVc expression is considered superWuous.
Consider the following examples.
(15) Tswana (Creissels, 2006a, 23)
a. Monna o dule motse-ng.
man s3:1 leave.pft 3village-loc
‘The man left the village.’
b. Monna o ile noke-ng.
man s3:1 go.pft 9river-loc
‘The man went to the river.’
The conVgurational interpretation of the locative suXx depends on the type of
ground (probably ‘in’ for villages and ‘at’ for rivers); Mode is contributed by the motion
verb (Source in (15a) and Goal in (15b)). Note that not all verbs of movement are able to
contribute Goal or Source mode (cf. Reshöft and Lestrade 2013 for more elaborate dis-
cussion on spatial-meaning dimensions expressed by motion verbs). Verbs that mostly
express manner of motion, such as taboga ‘run’, akofa ‘hurry’, fofa ‘Wy’, and feta ‘pass’,
do not contribute mode:
Tswana (Creissels, 2004, 11)
(16) Ke tlaa taboga ko tsele-ng
s1s fut run-fin distant 9road-loc
‘I will run on the road’
In sum, in Tswana the locative suXx -(i)ng seems to be used to generalize over
speciVc conVgurations. If more speciVc conVgurations are expressed, it is not used.
Also, it does not add any mode meaning whatsoever, a function that seems restricted
to motion verbs (or applicative markers, cf. Creissels 2004).
3.3 Place as the locative function
To tell apart an analysis of Place as the locative function and the previous analysis,
its expression should occur between mode expressions and overt conVguration expres-
sions:
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(17) Place as the locative function:
[mode{Source,Goal} [locative function Place [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ] ] ]
In spatial systems of this type, Source and Goal systematically have to be built on
top of Place, which intervenes between mode and conVguration expressions. Although
in principle here too Place may be expressed by a zero marker, we will not consider this
scenario as we then cannot distinguished the present from the previous analysis.
Consider the following examples from Malayalam:
(18) Malayalam (Asher & Kumari, 1997)
a. Avan viíʈʈ-il uɳʈ@.
He house-loc be.pres
‘He is at home.’ (p. 225)
b. Niɲɲaɭkk@ kiʈakkay-il kiʈakkaam; alleŋkil paayayil
you-dat bed-loc lie-permis otherwise mat-loc
kiʈakkaam.
lie.permis
‘You can lie on the bed or you can lie on the mat.’ (p. 139)
c. Addeham innale talayoolapparamp-ileekk@
he.hon yesterday Thalyolaparambu-all
pooyi.
go.past
‘He went to Thalyolaparambu yesterday.’ (p. 182)
d. Avan viíʈʈ-il ninn@ innale vannu.
he house-loc from yesterday come.past
‘He came from home yesterday.’ (p. 226)
The locative case marker -il in the Vrst two examples generalizes over whatever speciVc
conVgurations may hold in the real world between the locatum and the ground (‘in’ in
(18a) vs. ‘on’ in (18b)). Goal and Source expressions are added on top of this marker: The
alllative Goal marker in (18-c) can easily be decomposed into the locative marker plus -
eekk@ and the Source postposition ninn@ is used in addition to the locative case in (18-d).
Thus, the markers for Goal and Source are both added on top of the suXx -il, which does
not seem to express any speciVc conVguration itself, but whose interpretation rather
seems dependent on the type of ground. So far then, the locative case in Malayalam
behaves similar to that in Tswana, which was argued to have the locative function.
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Very diUerently from the situation in Tswana, however, the combination of con-
Vgurational expressions and Place seems very well possible in Malayalam, suggesting
that the analysis of Place as a generalized conVguration may not be right. The loca-
tive marker can be recognized in many conVgurational expressions, such as munpil ‘in
front of’ and pinnil ‘behind’ (although this is not always possible, cf. mite ‘above’, meel
‘on’), and also examples of the “complete” structure in (17), using both mode, locative
function, and conVguration, are easily found, as illustrated for Source in (18):
(19) Avan vaatilinre pinn-il ninn@ vannu.
he door-gen behind-loc from come.past
‘He came from behind the door.’
These combinatory possibilities then suggest an analysis in terms of the locative
function. Note however that if we analyze the locative marker in Malayalam in terms
of the locative function, the linguistic speciVcation of conVguration has to be optional,
as it would then be lacking from (16a-b). (Again, reduced complexity at one level causes
increased complexity at some other place.)
3.4 Place as a distinction of mode
Finally, Place could be a full-Wedged mode distinction. In this case, we expect it to be
mutually exclusive with Source and Goal, all three being expressed on top of conVgura-
tion expressions:
(20) [mode {Source, Goal, Place} [conVguration {‘in’, ‘under’, etc.} ]]
A pattern that suggests this type of analysis can be observed in Northern Akhvakh.
Creissels (2009, 5) shows that the spatial case paradigm of Northern Akhvakh can be
decomposed into a conVguration and mode marker. As illustrated in Table 1, the spatial
paradigm consists of complex markers that combine a conVgurational and a mode mor-
pheme. For example, the Place morpheme -e/i is put on top the conVguration -l̅’ ‘under’
to express ‘under’; if the Source marker -a(je) is added to this conVguration instead, we
get ‘from under’.
Crucially, Northern Akhvakh has an independent Place marker on top of the con-
Vguration markers that is in complementary distribution with the other mode markers.
We can observe similar patterns in the spatial case paradigms of for example Hungarian
and Finnish. Since Place patterns with the other mode distinctions in these systems, one
could argue that it is a mode distinction too.
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Place Source Goal
default conVguration -g-e -g-a(je) -g-u(ne)
‘in the vicinity of’ -Xar-i -l̅ir-a(je) -Xar-u(ne)
a. ‘in a relatively narrow space’
b. ‘distributed or diUused localization’
-q̅-e -q̅-a(je) -q̅-u(ne)
‘under’ -l̅’-i -l̅’-a(je) -l̅’-u(ne)
a. ‘in a Vlled dense space’
b. ‘on a non-horizontal surface’
-l̅-i -l̅-a(je) -l̅-u(ne)
Table 1: Northern Akhvakh spatial case paradigm
Slightly more complex evidence can be derived by considering the case forms of
the spatial adpositions of these languages. Hungarian has ten spatial cases in total,
distinguishing three mode options for three very general conVguration distinctions (ap-
proximated by ‘in’, ‘at’, and ‘on’; only the latter of which was illustrated in Section
1) and having an additional terminative case that does not combine with these three
conVgurations. In addition, Hungarian can make use of adpositions to express spatial
meaning. The stems of these spatial postpositions express speciVc conVguration dis-
tinctions, whereas their case forms specify mode. This is illustrated in the following
example (cf. also Creissels 2006b and Stolz 1992):
(21) Hungarian (Hegedűs 2008, 221)
a. a ház mellett
the house beside.PLACE
‘beside the house’
b. a ház mellé
the house beside.GOAL
‘(to) beside the house’
c. a ház mellől
the house beside.SOURCE
‘from beside the house’
As shown in (21), the adposition stem expresses conVguration whereas its diUerent case
forms distinguish between modes. Thus, instead of combining with all ten spatial cases
that are available in Hungarian, the case paradigm of Hungarian postpositions only
makes a three-way mode distinction.5 This reduced spatial case paradigm can easily
be explained from a functional perspective: Spatial adpositions in Hungarian make
5 We Vnd a comparable situation in Finnish, discussed in Lestrade 2010. For a cross-linguistic overview of
the distribution of labor between cases and adpositions within complex spatial PPs, cf. Lestrade et al. 2011.
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a much more Vne-grained distinction in conVguration than spatial cases. The very
general conVguration distinctions that are made by the nominal spatial case paradigm
are therefore redundant on adpositions and only a mode distinction is necessary (cf. also
the argumentation in Section 3.2). Importantly, Place is one of the mode distinctions
that are formally distinguished in the case paradigms of these adpositions, not one of
the conVguration distinctions that are omitted. This again suggests that, in Hungarian,
Place belongs to the mode domain, taking conVgurations as its input.
4 Discussion
Above, we have seen evidence for diUerent proposals for the analysis of Place. In this
section an attempt is made to link these various systems in a diachronic sketch of the
possible development of Place.
It can be hypothesized that Place Vrst emerges in a language as the result of a gram-
maticalization process in which the most frequently used conVgurational expression
grammaticalized to such an extent that it no longer inherently expressed any distinc-
tion whatsoever (cf. a.o. Lehmann, 1985). Place, at this stage, has become a generalized
conVguration, its locative function and mode interpretation resulting from contextual
enrichment. In the development of new conVguration markers, necessary to commu-
nicate speciVc conVgurational meaning, Place-as-a-generalized-conVguration could be
used to explicitly mark these markers for their new role. Thus, Place comes to express
the locative function. Malayalam, discussed in Section 3.3, possibly could be said to
illustrate this transition stage. In a next stage of grammaticalization, a language may
develop a morphological mode system to provide a temporal speciVcation of this Place-
with-the-locative-function in combination with motion events. Languages may develop
a Source marker that restricts the Locative function to a (time) interval before a change
and/or a Goal marker that restricts it to an interval after a change. Since Source and
Goal have the Locative function as their default input, their markers can either be used
on top of the former locative marker (reWecting their semantic relation), or in contrast
with it (as the default input of a function need not be expressed).
Interestingly, the two case systems that emerge at this point in our sketch nicely
correspond to the syncretism patterns that are attested cross-linguistically. If only a
two-way mode distinction is made with a special Source marker, the former locative
marker will come to express non-Source mode, i. e. be compatible with Place and Goal.
If, on the other hand, a two-way mode distinction is made with a special Goal marker
141
Sander Lestrade
only, the former locative marker expresses non-Goal mode, i. e. Place and Source. What
is not expected is the development of a mode function that only says that the locative
function should be linked to a motion event instead of a stative one. As explained in the
introduction, this is not very informative and therefore such a marker is unlikely to de-
velop. Indeed, virtually the only attested spatial syncretism patterns are between Place
and Source or Place and Goal (cf. Stolz 1992; Creissels 2009; Pantcheva 2010; Lestrade
2010; cf. Kutscher 2010 for a synchronous exception that can be explained away via
phonological attrition). If a second mode distinction is developed (Source, if Goal was
already there and vice versa), the Place-with-the-locative-function marker will Vrst ex-
press Place by pragmatic reasoning only: If the location is not restricted to a subinterval,
it is interpreted as holding throughout the event. Eventually, however, Place-with-the-
locative-function can be expected to end up expressing a mode distinction directly by
semantic strengthening, that is, by not deriving the Place-as-a-mode interpretation in-
directly, but by establishing the link in its lexical semantics. Thus, Place-as-a-mode
could be considered to be the fossilized version of Place-with-the-locative function and
should only emerge in mode systems in which the two other basic modes Goal and
Source are developed Vrst (cf. Wilkins and Hill 1995 for such a diachronic relation be-
tween a “pragmatic” and a “semantic” phase; cf. Blutner 2007 for a similar use of the
notion fossilization).
The following example may illustrate this last stage of the development in progress.
As shown in (22b) for Goal only, in Imonda the markers for Goal and Source are used on
top of the Place marker, whose independent use is illustrated in (22a). However, as (22c)
shows, sometimes it is possible to omit the latter and use the Goal marker directly on
the ground.
(22) Imonda (Seiler 1965)
a. iéf-ia
house-loc
‘at the house’ (p. 71)
b. Iéf-ia-m ka uagl-f.
house-loc-Goal I go-pres
‘I am going home.’ (p. 161)
c. Në-m at uagl-n.
bush-Goal com go-past
‘He has gone to the bush.’ (p. 161)
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The optionality of the locative marker could be understood as the beginning of a process
in which the Place marker changes from the input of the modes Goal and Source into
a mode distinction proper: If (22a) and (22c) are contrasted, one could say that Place
and Goal are developing a complementary distribution, which may subsequently lead
to their equivalent status semantically.
5 Conclusion
This paper discussed the status of Place markers in a cross-linguistic sample of spatial-
case inventories. It was proposed that a uniform analysis of Place cannot be given but
that languages may have very diUerent spatial systems instead. In some, Place should be
considered a generalized location, in others, it can have a locative function explicitly es-
tablishing the link between locatum a location, and in again other languages, Place may
function as a full-Wedged mode distinction contrasting with Goal and Source meanings
that are universally accepted as modes. Thus, in some languages the mode dimension is
obligatorily marked whereas in others this is only done when deemed necessary.
The diUerent options were hypothesized to be diachronic variants rather than (onto)-
logical opposites. Place may start out as the result of the interpretation of the locative
function in a system of pragmatic contrasts with Source and Goal. From this, it can be
expected to develop its own inherent mode semantics by pragmatic strengthening.
Whether this grammaticalization hypothesis is right or wrong, our semantic repre-
sentations of spatial meaning should probably at least have the possibility of allowing
Place as mode distinction to account for the variation described here.
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Abstract
Aspectuality has been claimed to be determined by the same principles in both literal
and idiomatic readings of equivalent structures. In this paper, we analyze the English
V one’s BODY PART out/oU idioms which correspond to a pattern of intensive meaning
construction involving a change in the interpretation of the aspectual classes of their
VPs. This class of idiomatic constructions denotes systematically a change of location
undergone by a body part at the source domain which is metaphorically projected into
the target domain which denotes an event carried out in an intensive fashion. The ac-
tivation of metaphorical modes of thought is the foundation of the two-level integration
model advanced here as a semantic compositional representation (semantic pole) of the
idiomatic constructions. The model, blended in nature, gives rise to emergent structures
which are foregrounded with respect to the unitary integration process. The interac-
tion between the cognitive operations involved in the construction of the Vnal idiomatic
meaning is argued to motivate the shifts toward atelicity of the idioms analyzed.
Keywords: Lexical Aspect; Aspectual Shifts; Idioms; Cognitive Grammar; Fake Resul-
tatives
1 Introduction
The main question to be addressed in this paper is whether the aspectual properties of
idiomatic constructions can be determined according to the same principles we would
use for non-idiomatic ones. We take the issue by focusing on a speciVc pattern of
intensive meaning construction in English: the V one’s body part out/oU idioms. In
particular, we provide an analysis of constructions of the type John laughed his head oU
(‘John laughed intensely/a lot’) and she cried her eyes out (‘She cried a lot’) where the
intensity of the action is systematically conveyed by a caused removal of a body part
expressed in the linguistic structure.
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The activation of this metaphorical mapping has consequences for the conceptual
interpretation of aspect which appears to be constrained by high-level cognitive op-
erations. In fact, under the literal reading of a construction containing the same VP
(e. g. the audience laughed the actor oU the stage), a diUerent aspectual class would be
involved. In more detail, under the idiomatic reading, the (unreal) eventuality can be
associated to an atelic resultative construction (a fake resultative in terms of JackendoU
1997) while under the literal reading the sentence can be deVned as a telic resultative
construction. These aspectual shifts have been motivated by advancing metaphorical
modes of thought dynamically activated in the process of idiom comprehension (Mateu
& Espinal to appear, 2010 after Gibbs 1994, LakoU 1993, LakoU & Johnson 1999).
The formulation of the metaphor an intensive action is a change of location (Mateu &
Espinal 2010) will be the basis for the application of the so-called Force Change Schema
(Broccias 2003) used as the semantic pole for resultative constructions and adapted to
the data discussed in the present study to propose a possible compositional path for
their idiomatic meaning. The model, structured by two level of successive conceptual
integration, will be advanced as a schematic representation for the meaning implica-
tions involved in the idiomatic pattern. The general goal of this paper is to investi-
gate the cognitive operations involved in the conceptual interpretation of the aspectual
properties related to diUerent classes of predicates and to account for the shifts toward
atelicity which aUect certain classes of idioms like the ones under examination. We
begin by discussing the notion of lexical aspect and its relevance within the Cognitive
Linguistics framework in subsection 2.1.
In subsection 2.2, we provide an overview of previous accounts which have speciV-
cally dealt with idioms and aspectuality. In particular, we will consider as valid metaphor-
ically driven approaches to idiomatic interpretation (Espinal & Mateu 2010) as opposed
to formal treatments of idioms (JackendoU 1997, McGinnis 2005, Glasbey 2003) which
see idiomatic meaning as a combination of the properties of their syntactic constituents.
In section 3, (i) we advance our proposal by introducing the problem of aspectual shifts
and examining the cognitive operations involved in idiom comprehension and (ii) we in-
troduce the two-level integration model as a heuristic representation of their semantics.
We conclude with some Vnal comments conclusions in section 4.
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2 Background
2.1 The Inherent Structure of Events
The Vrst point that we feel the need to clarify for a proper coverage of the topic is
the distinction between the notions of grammatical aspect and lexical aspect (or Ak-
tionsart). In the Cognitive Linguistics literature, scholars do not always support the
diUerent implications of the separation between the two types of aspect and this is
not astonishing given the impossibility to mark a clear-cut grammar/lexicon distinction
(Boogart and Janssen 2007). However, when it comes to aspectual shifts, we assume
Vendler’s classiVcation (Vendler 1967), and implicitly the relevance of lexical aspect, for
two main reasons.
First, we argue that there is a correlation between the inherent structure of events
and the typical abilities for apprehending and tracking relationships claimed in Cog-
nitive Grammar, namely the notion of scanning (Langacker 2008: 111). In fact, how
component states of an event are accessed and conceptualized crucially relates to the
binary properties assigned to the aspectual classes. Second, we endorse the deVni-
tion of aspect provided in Croft (2012) according to which lexical aspect describes how
events are construed as unfolding over time and, thus, a two-dimensional analysis of
aspectual types is required in order to investigate the semantic complexity of aspect
and the conceptualization processes that intervene in the relationship between aspect
and Aktionsart. Basically, two general approaches to aspect can be distinguished in
the literature (Croft 2012, Michaelis 2004): unidimensional and bidimensional. In uni-
dimensional approaches, there is no diUerence between the semantics of grammatical
and lexical aspect. In bidimensional approaches the two types of aspect are seman-
tically distinct. In the present account, we assume Croft’s (2012) construal approach
according to which aspectuality has to be deVned according to the semantic structure
of predicates and inferred from the interpretations of predicates in diUerent tense/aspect
constructions. In other words, events may involve diUerent perspectives, and then the
possibility of viewpoint shifts in terms of aspectual construals is fundamental to capture
the diUerences in the inherent structure of events. Since the analysis presented here is
essentially focused on the lexical aspect of diUerent classes of predicates, we assume
as a starting point the basic Vendlerian classiVcation into four diUerent categories of
lexical aspect.
(1) States: be sick [stative, durative, atelic]
(2) Activities: sing, run [non-stative, durative, atelic]
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(3) Achievements: sink [non-stative, punctual, telic]
(4) Accomplishments: build [non-stative, durative, telic]
Generally speaking, these classes are deVned according to three binary distinctions:
stative/non-stative, punctual/durative, telic/atelic. The present analysis is concerned
with detelicization processes in idiomatic contexts, namely aspectual shifts from a telic
to an atelic interpretation of a predicate when an idiomatic expression has the same
syntactic structure, or at least the same verb phrase, as a non-idiomatic counterpart.
In particular, states describe situations that are both stative and durative since they
do not change and last over time. Activities describe both dynamic events and processes
and involve a change over time. Additionally they do not have an inherent endpoint.
Processes are also instantiated by the Achievement class but provide as well a culmi-
nation of the event in a punctual point in time. Accomplishments involve a process
resulting in a change of state that lasts in time. The typical diagnostic procedure to
deVne the aspectual class of a verb is the modiVcation by the container and durative ad-
verbials (Croft 2012). The in-phrase and for-phrase modiVcation (as originally dubbed
in Vendler 1967), commonly used to distinguish between telic and atelic events, indicate
respectively the length and the span of time over which the event occurred.
These diagnostics will provide the analysis with crucial insights to deVne the as-
pectual properties of the data discussed in the present paper. Other methodologies
have been applied to deVne more speciVcally the properties of the four categories, even
though their semantics may overlap and, accordingly, the predicates may belong to dif-
ferent aspectual classes. This comes as no surprise given the fact that each category
shares at least one property with the other three categories part of the taxonomy. Now,
we are going to describe how this potential overlapping has been diagnostically disen-
tangled. The present progressive what are you doing? test has been applied with respect
to the stative/non-stative distinction, and in particular to diUerentiate states (to know)
from activities (to laugh), since both are durative and atelic but display a divergence in
terms of the dynamicity of the event.
(5) What are you doing? *I am knowing.
(6) What are you doing? I am laughing.
Finally, two other tests are used to make a distinction on the one hand between accom-
plishments and the other three categories, on the other hand between states and the rest
of the taxonomy: it took me/him/her/us–TIME INTERVAL–to test and do you – STATE?
test.
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(7) It took them two months to build the castle.
(8) Do you know the truth? Yes, I do.
Vendler (1967) posits other diagnostic questions to distinguish achievements from states.
The at what moment?-test and the for how long?-test are used to point out the compati-
bility of achievements with the Vrst temporal question while states are Vne if modiVed
by the second one. Inverting the test to evaluate the nature of the predicates for the two
classes will lead to semantic inappropriateness, or more drastically to ungrammaticality.
(9) At what moment did the ship sink?/*At what moment have you been sick?
(10) For how long have you been sick?/*For how long did the ship sink?
However, even if helpful, the above-mentioned tests do not solve completely the exact
attribution of the aspectual properties to the individual classes, being this an operation
crucially inWuenced by usage-based facets and viewpoint factors, besides the morpho-
logical/inWectional elements that, in some languages, play a role in the deVnition of
aspect (Dahl 1985).
2.2 A Conceptual Metaphor Account of Aspectuality
The model presented in this paper to account for the cognitive operations that intervene
in the conceptual interpretation of aspect and constrain the attribution of the aspectual
class to the VP in idiomatic context, is based on a previous analysis advanced in Espinal
& Mateu (2010) and Mateu & Espinal (to appear) which has posited the activation of
metaphorical modes of thought as the fundamental motivation for the atelicity of idioms
like (11) and (12).
(11) John worked his guts out all day long/*in ten minutes.
(12) John laughed his butt oU all day long/*in ten minutes.
(Mateu and Espinal to appear)
In particular, the above sentences, which appear to fall in the class of fake resultatives,
are compared to telic resultative constructions in (13) and (14) associated to literal
interpretations.
(13) The audience laughed the actor oU the stage in/*for ten seconds.
(14) She worked the splinter out of her Vnger in/*for ten seconds.
(Mateu and Espinal to appear)
By claiming the activation of conceptual metaphors, the study demonstrates how the
idiomatic readings in (11) and (12) can be associated to durative activities (given also
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possibility to modify the sentence by a for-phrase) and goes beyond JackendoU’s claim
that VPs in fake resultatives like are interpreted as “V excessively” and Glasbey (2003)’s
argument according to which in the non-literal sentences there is no gradual patient re-
lationship. The intuition to deal with fake resultatives in terms of conceptual metaphor
is inspired by Goldberg (1995)’s account of true resultatives, which in her Construc-
tion Grammar approach are seen as a metaphorical extension of the caused-motion
constructions of the type John kicked the bottle into the yard. Resorting to the basic
conceptual metaphor change of state is a change of location the resultative construction
structure is ‘inherited’ from the caused-motion. DiUerent formulations of the speciVc
conceptual metaphors involved in the interpretation of the idioms in (11) and (12) are
provided in Espinal & Mateu (2010). First, the conceptual mappings involve the pri-
mary metaphor the body as a container since a Vgurative extraction of body part from
the container occurs at the source domain and is mapped into the target domain that
is the more abstract intense action. In their terms, the action carried out in an excessive
fashion is expressed in the linguistic structure by a displacement of a body part.
(15) AN INTENSE ACTIVITY IS AN EXCESSIVE DETACHMENT (OR EX-
HAUSTION) OF A BODY PART
The metaphor as formulated in (15) is a subset of the more general (complex) conceptual
metaphor in (16) which is responsible for the interpretation of idioms like (11) and (12)
as durative activities.
(16) AN INTENSE ACTIVITY IS AN EXCESSIVE CAUSED CHANGE OF
LOCATION/STATE
In particular, the change of location denoted by the directional paths (out or oU) is pro-
jected into the domain of the activity, characterized as ‘so intense that they appear to
lack boundaries’ (Mateu & Espinal to appear). We acknowledge the role of the concep-
tual metaphor in the deVnition of aspect in idiomatic contexts but at the same time we
claim that it is insuXcient to account exhaustively for the cognitive modes of thought
involved in meaning construction which constrain the Vnal atelic interpretation of the
idiomatic constructions.
3 A Conceptual Analysis of Aspectual Shifts
In the present study, an aspectual shift is claimed to occur (in certain classes of idioms)
when a VP, that allows both a literal and an idiomatic reading, can be associated to
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diUerent aspectual classes depending on the interpretation that is accessed according
to contextual information and communicative purposes. More classes of idioms have
been argued to be aUected by aspectual shifts toward telicity. The V one’s BODY PART
idioms, examined in the present paper after Espinal & Mateu (2010), are one of those
classes. Furthermore, relevant counter-examples, undergoing the same types of shifts
and involving the same patterns of conceptual interaction have been proposed for Ro-
mance languages (e. g. Italian, see Bellavia 2012). Let us take into analysis the following
minimal pair:
(17) The audience laughed the actor oU the stage in ten seconds/*for then seconds.
(18) John laughed his head oU for ten seconds/*in ten seconds.
The verb to laugh under the literal and the idiomatic readings is associated to two
diUerent aspectual classes, respectively. In (17), the possibility to modify the event
by using an in-phrase adverbial allows us to deVne it as telic (accomplishment). The
same cannot be said for (18), where the VP under the idiomatic interpretation denotes
a durative activity. The problem at issue is complex and relates to diUerent factors.
First of all, the question we should Vnd an answer to is how the aspectual properties
of the same VP can be diUerent in the two relevant readings. Then, we should Vnd out
whether it is a problem that can be explained by looking at the structural components
of the sentence or we need to appeal to the conceptual interpretation of aspectuality.
We claim that the change in the aspectual properties can be accounted for by con-
sidering the cognitive operations involved in the conceptual mapping between two do-
mains of experience, namely the concrete change of location expressed in the struc-
tural components of meaning and the intensity of the action expressed by the idiomatic
meaning. These semantic implications are heuristically represented using a two-level
model of conceptual integration where, at the Vrst level, the integration will involve two
components of meaning giving rise to the single sentence unit of the idiom like in John
laughed his head oU; at the second level, the integration will aUect the two domains of
experience implicated via metaphorical activation. The details of the semantic model
are described in more detail in the next section.
Following the main tenets of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991), we argue
that idiomatic constructions involve at the semantic pole a complex scene that consists
of a Vnal foregrounded meaning as a result of a compositional path which corresponds
to the process of assembling of their semantic structure. The purpose of the composi-
tional path is to capture in a unitary fashion all the meaning implications, patterns of
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Vgurations (Langlotz 2006) and cognitive operations involved in idiomatic interpreta-
tion. The phonological pole implies the same conVguration as the one correspondent to
a potential literal scene implied by the sentence. In this sense, the literal scene “works
as the scaUolding against which the idiomatic meaning is conceived” (Langlotz 2006:
108). Once the idiomatic meaning can be accessed via patterns of Vguration which pro-
vide a conceptual basis to make sense of its semantics, it will be foregrounded. In the
background, the literal scene will be still available but as a more concrete domain from
which the conceptual structure is imported, or – to put it in terms of Langlotz (2006) –
as standard of comparison for the foregrounded idiomatic meaning.
We argue that the meaning implications involved in the idiomatic construction in
(9b), carry out aspectual information and since the displacement of the body is unreal
and is used as a source domain to make sense of the intensity domain, there is no
endpoint involved in the idiomatic event. But the inherent scene provided by these
idioms is much more complex and to represent it properly we resort to the Force Change
Schema (FCS) as developed in Broccias (2003). The FCS will serve as the conceptual
“scaUolding” to build up the two-level integrated model implied by the activation of the
conceptual metaphor an intense action is a change of location which will give rise to
the foregrounded idiomatic meaning.
To sum up: the sentence in (17) – associated to a literal reading – can be claimed
to be a true resultative. We have already seen that, examples such as (18) have been
deVned as fake resultatives since they are conceptually associated to atelic readings and
there is no semantic relation between the V and the NP. More precisely, there is no
semantic constraint of patienthood over the NP (Goldberg 1995: 99–100).
The FCS has been proposed to represent the semantic pole of transitive resultative
constructions (Broccias 2003: 52) as in the following examples:
(19) John hammered the metal Wat.
(20) Sally danced herself to fame.
Interestingly enough, a crucial distinction between (19) and (20) is pointed out in Broc-
cias (2003: 178). The former conveys a visible condition, the latter a not visible con-
dition. When a not visible condition is involved the event is said to be carried out in
an above-the-norm fashion.
The FCS is a composite structure which results from the integration (in terms of
Fauconnier & Turner 1996) of a force component (FC) and a change component (CC). In
a sentence like (17), the FC is the audience laughed the actor, whereas the CC is the actor
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oU the stage. The V is an intransitive verb that is constructed here in a forcible fashion
and, in terms of Langacker (2009: 256), can be considered as the skewing element of
the construction, namely an element whose the composite meaning of the expression
it appears in is incongruent with respect to the verb’s meaning. The schema in Figure
1 represents the FCS and it is related to the true resultative construction of the literal
reading in (17). At the FC, the trajector the audience exerts the force instantiated by the
verb laughed over the landmark the actor. At the CC, the force causes the displacement
of the element that corresponds to the landmark from an origin to a goal. The path
oU is instantiated by an arrow. The entities that are not in bold are not speciVed in
the linguistic structure. In this sense, even if oU the stage could be considered as the
resultant state, no speciVc entity representing the goal is expressed in the sentence. The
dotted lines indicate the correspondences between the entities of the two components
that are integrated in the single conceptual unit (the blend).
Figure 1: The audience laughed the actor off the stage
The point we make in the present paper is based on an extended version of the
FCS consisting of two levels of integration obtained via metaphorical activation. The
two-level model provides a schematic description of the semantic pole of the idiomatic
construction in (18) and is representative of fake resultatives. As represented in Figure
2, at the Vrst level (exactly like the literal reading) the integration between the FC and
the CC results into a single conceptual unit. Thus, we have a force exertion of the verb
to laugh from the trajector John over the landmark head at the FC, and a displacement
(head oU) from an origin toward a goal at the CC. Given the coreferentiality of the
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possessive determiner with the subject the origin coincides with the trajector. We claim
that the Vrst-level integration occurs within the source domain that is the change of
location.
The interaction of this domain with the target domain intensity conceptualized via
the image-schematic structure scale, giving rise to the Vnal level of integration where
the event itself of laughing is argued to assume the role of trajector moving along
the open-ended scale of intensity and providing, thus, no inherent endpoint in the
event. In fact, as deVned in Johnson (1987: 123) the image schema scale may either
continue indeVnitely in one direction or may terminate at a deVnite point. The concept
of intensity has been deVned in the literature as open-ended, hence we stipulate the
indeVnite value of the abstract concept (∞) expressed by the intense action. Still, the
dotted lines indicate the correspondences between the entities of the two components
that are integrated into a single conceptual unit.
Figure 2: John laughed his head off
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The single conceptual unit of the second-level integration will be the salient part
corresponding to the foregrounded idiomatic meaning. Blended spaces are the result
of projecting source domain onto target domains. Furthermore, conceptual units which
are the result of blending operations are hybrid (Langacker 2008: 51) in the sense that
they combine and foreground selected features of each input space. In the same way, at
the end of idiom comprehension, the speaker will select the intense activity because the
Vnal level of integration will be in the foreground.
4 Final Comments
The proposal advanced as an account for aspectual shifts has been focused on the
cognitive operations involved in idiomatic meaning construction and its processing.
Our main concern has been to explain the sistematicity of the expression of intensive
actions via a caused removal of a body part. In this respect, we have claimed a two-level
integration model as a representation of the unitary compositional paths entailed by the
semantics of the V one’s body part out/oU idioms.
The model – based on the Force Change Schema (Broccias 2003) consisting of a
single conceptual unit as a result of the integration between a force component and a
change component – implies a second level of integration given by the activation of the
conceptual metaphor an intense action is a change of location, Vrst proposed in Espinal
and Mateu (2010). The atelicity of the events has been assumed to be caused by the
unbounded nature of the concept of intensity involved in the target domain. We have
also argued that the conceptual mappings allow the diUerent experiential domains to
be integrated in an emergent structure that, given its complex blended nature, results in
a foregrounded space, namely the Vnal level of idiom processing.
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Abstract
The aims of the present studies are to assess the sensory nature hypothesis of knowledge
through a series of experimental results. Especially, we investigated the links between
memory and perception using a short-term priming paradigm based on a previous learn-
ing phase consisting of the association between a geometrical shape and a white noise.
Consequently, the priming phase examined the eUect of a geometrical shape, seen in
the learning phase, on the processing of a target (tones or picture). Our main results
demonstrate that memory and perception share some mechanisms and at least com-
ponents. These ones are involved for the processing of each form of knowledge (i. e.,
episodic and semantic). At last, reWections about the implication of this work to study
perceptual learning and memory are presented.
Keywords: Perception, Integration, Multisensory Memory
1 Introduction
How do people represent information in memory? What is the nature of the informa-
tion stored in memory? We can consider that learning representations or concepts de-
pends on upon perceptual experiences. In that view, the comprehension of the relation
between memory (i. e., concepts) and perception (i. e., percepts) is critical. Classicaly,
perception and memory are vertically describded. In that case, perception extracts per-
ceptual units from the environment thanks to bottom-up processes. These units are then
converted into representations and are stored into memory. In return, the activation of
these representations can inWuence the perception thanks to top-down processes. In
that conception, the diUerences between memory and perception are both structural
and functional (e. g., Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987). Regarding the structural distinction,
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recent neuroimaging studies suggest that both memory and perception share common
brain areas (for a review, see Versace, Labeye, Badard & Rose, 2009). For instance, Mar-
tin and collaborators (2000) showed that conceptual processes (i. e., word-object nam-
ing) and perceptual processes (i. e., picture-object naming) involve the same brain area,
depending on the perceptual (i. e., color) and motor properties of the objects. Regard-
ing the functional distinction, recent neuroimagering researches also suggest that the
neural structures of long-term memory are involved during the perception of objects
or events (see Murray & Bussey, 2007). In particular, the medial temporal lobe cortex
ensures the integration of the diUerent components of objects by means of a hierar-
chical integration mechanism. Recently, Shimamura and Wickens (2009) have provided
evidence in support of the idea that memory activities (e. g., single item recognition)
might be underpinned by this integration mechanism
In this paper, we aim at developing a conception in which perception and memory
are at the same functional level in cognitive architecture. In other words we want to
bring experimental evidence that perception and memory act simultaneously on the
same processing units. The only diUerence is that perception involves perceptually
present units whereas memory involves reactivation or simulation of these units. Seek-
ing this purpose, we have to provide evidence that 1) memory is able to keep traces
from perceptual events; 2) memory and perception use the same processing units.
2 The perception leaves memory traces
In the daily life, the organism treats essentially multisensory signals. The uniVed per-
ception of a multisensory environment requires not only multiple activations in the
sensory areas but also the synchronization and the integration of these activations (e. g.,
King, 2005). The existence of multisensory integration is particularly well illustrated by
the McGurk eUect (McGurk & Mac Donald, 1976). This eUect reveals that subjects tend
to perceive /da/ when they see the syllable /ga/ and hear the sound /ba/. This demon-
strates the ability of a sensory system to modify the processing of another sensory
system. Integration could be described as the capacity of the perceptual system to pro-
cess more eXciently (or diUerently in case of McGurk eUect) a multisensory stimulus
than the sum of these two parts. Number of neurosciences studies was dedicated to the
study of the multisensory integration between vision and audition. For example, King
and Calvert (2001) have shown that some neurons in the superior colliculus are more
highly activated by multisensory than by unisensory stimuli. Similarly, electrophysi-
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ological studies have provided some evidences of audiovisual integrations (between a
shape and a tone) that occur in the visual cortex after a period of just 40 ms (Giard &
Perronet, 1999). In the same vein, authors have shown that spatial congruity enhances
audio-visual integration (Teder-Sälejärvi, Di Russo, McDonald, & Hillyard, 2001). At
last, the role of attention during perception of a multisensory event and its consecutive
integration is not well established (see Fort & Giard, 2002).
If a visual stimulus and an auditory stimulus tend to be integrated during a per-
ceptual activity (e. g., perceptual categorization or discrimination), is it possible that
memory could capture this integration? Once perceived, the perceptual properties of
a multisensory object can be preserved in memory in the form of a memory trace.
This is due to an integration mechanism that allows for the creation of durable links
between perceptual properties within the same memory representation (see Brunel,
Labeye, Lesourd & Versace, 2009; Hommel, 1998; Labeye, Oker, Badard, & Versace,
2008). Contrary to simple associative learning (see Hall, 1991), once features are inte-
grated within an exemplar, it is diXcult to access the individual features (see Labeye
et al., 2008; Richter & Zwaan, 2010). This new unit, once acquired, becomes a func-
tional “building block” for subsequent processing and learning (in language, Richter &
Zwaan, 2010; in memory, Labeye et al., 2008; or attention, Delvenne, Cleeremans, &
Laloyaux, 2009). In this view, the integration mechanism is a fundamental mechanism
of perceptual learning (see the unitization mechanism, Goldstone, 2000) or contingency
learning (see Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 2010). From
this idea we can make the prediction that once two features have become integrated,
the presence of one feature automatically suggests the presence of the other. Thus, if
the simultaneously presentation of an auditory information (a sound) and a visual in-
formation (a shape) leads to the creation of a multisensory memory trace, then we can
easily predict that the visual component presented alone, as a prime, should inWuence
the perception of a sound targets. We examined this prediction through an original
paradigm divided in two phases. First, a learning phase (consisting in a shape cate-
gorization task) in which we manipulated the association between a given geometrical
shape and a white noise1. As a consequence, participants simply had to categorize a
shape as a square or a circle (each shape was presented in diUerents shades of gray).
It is important to stress that each shape was presented during 500 ms. One of this
shape was systematically associated with a white noise (presented simultaneously dur-
1 A white noise is a random signal with a Wat power spectral density. White noise is considered analogous to
white light which contains all frequencies.
165
Lionel Brunel, Denis Brouillet and Rémy Versace
ing 500 ms), the other not. Then, a priming phase (see Figure 1) in which participants
watched the geometrical shapes from the learning (as prime) and listened pure tones
(as target). In this phase, participants had to discriminate the target into high-pitched
or low-pitched. Our Vrst result was a selective priming eUect of the geometrical shape
seen in the learning phase with a sound on the processing of targets tones.
Figure 1: Organization of the priming phase. A prime shape (seen in learning phase), presented at different level
SOA (100 ms or 500 ms), is immediately followed by a target tones that participants had to categorize
in low or high-pitched sounds. Notes. SOA: stimulus-onset-asynchrony; ISI: Interval-Inter-Stimuli
This priming eUect could be interpreted as an evidence of multisensory memory inte-
gration during perceptual learning. Indeed, when participants saw a shape that was
previously presented with sound, it automatically reactivated the auditory memory
component associated (see also Meyer, Baumann, Marchina & Jancke, 2007) that is
able to inWuence the processing of targets tones. However considering only this re-
sult gave us any hint about the nature of the auditory memory component. Indeed,
if memory and perception share the same processing units, then each component of
the memory trace should be perceptual in nature even when they are reactivated. In
order to test this assumption we manipulated the SOA during the priming phase. More
speciVcally we predicted that reactivation of the sound should interfere with tone target
processing if only if the SOA between the visual prime and the tone target is shorter
than the duration of the sound associated with the shape during the learning phase.
In this case, the interference eUect would follow from temporal overlapping between
previously associated sound reactivation and tone processing. A second and quite op-
posite prediction followed from diUerent temporal constraints. Indeed, reactivation of
the sound (by the visual prime) was expected to facilitate tone processing but only for
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SOAs equal or longer than the duration of the sound associated with the shape during
the learning phase. In this later case, not any temporal overlap occurred between sim-
ulation of the learned associated sound and target-tone processing so that target-tone
processing should take advantage from the auditory preactivation induced by the prime.
Our results (see Figure 2) were totally in line with these predictions.
Figure 2: Interaction SOA*Prime type F(1, 30) = 14.64; p<.001. (a) For 100 ms SOA, significant principal effect
of Prime type, F(1, 15) = 5.25; p<.05. (b) For 500 ms SOA, significant principal effect of Prime type,
F(1, 15) = 9.78; p<.01. Results reproduced from Experiment 1 Brunel, Labeye et al., 2009. Notes. Sd
Prime: prime shapes that were presented with sound during learning phase; NSd Prime: prime shapes
that were presented without sound. Errors bars represent standard errors.
We demonstrated that memory keep traces from perception thanks to an integration
mechanism shared by perception and memory. As a consequence, the presentation of
one component of a memory trace is able to reactivate the other components (which
kept all of their encoded characteristics). Once reactivated, a compotenent is able to
inWuence the ongoing process (see also Riou, Lesourd, Brunel & Versace, 2011). How-
ever, according to Nyberg et al. (2000), this kind of eUect is limited to the processing
of episodic knowledge and should not be observed when conceptual knowledge are at
stake. Indeed, only episodic knowledge should keep some perceptual properties of for-
mer perceptual events. Such claim suggests the existence of modal and amodal forms of
knowledge. The next section will be dedicated to this speciVc issue.
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3 The Sensory Nature of Knowledge
What is the nature of our knowledge? Bring an answer to that question is not easy and
suggests at least two diUerents perspectives. First, we could consider that each form of
knowledge is qualitively diUerent and as a consequence diUers into their nature (i. e.,
modal vs. amodal). According to Tulving (1995), our knowledge could be viewed as
semantic or episodic. These two sorts of knowledge depend on the existence of two
independent memory systems. The semantic memory system is more likely to be in-
volved in the processing of general amodal knowledge whereas the episodic memory
system is involved in the processing of speciVc modal knowledge. Whereas Tulving
argued that these two kinds of memory are dissociated and diUer in the abstractness
of the information they retain, increasing numbers of studies have demonstrated the
existence of conceptual representations which nevertheless continue to possess a per-
ceptual nature (Barsalou, 2005; Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson,
2003). Indeed, there is experimental evidence showing that the reactivation of percep-
tual or body states facilitates later conceptual processing for those concepts that share
the same perceptual characteristics as the reactivated ones (see Pecher et al., 2004; Van
dantzig et al., 2008). In that view, memory processes are deeply rooted in perceptual
and action systems (see Barsalou, 2008) and, as consequence, access to all forms of
knowledge is linked with automatic reactivation of perceptual or body states. In that
context we can predict that conceptual processing involve automatic reactivation which
is not limited to a given sensory memory component but should be observed for each
diagnostic sensory component associated with a particular concept.
In order to test that prediction, we designed an experiment based on the same
paradigm we described in the previous section. The learning phase is still consist-
ing in learning an incident association between a geometrical shape and a white noise.
The second phase consisted of a short-term priming paradigm (see Figure 4) in which
a shape, either associated or not with a sound in the Vrst phase, preceded an object-
picture. The participants had to categorize this picture as representing either a large
or a small object (more or less than 50 cm high). We manipulated the SOA as well
as the nature of the object so that half of the objects were typically “noisy” objects
(e. g., a blender) whereas the others were typically silent (e. g., a screwdriver). In order
to perform the task, participants had to recognize the object and reactivate the actual
size of the object. However, if this reactivation is not limited to the visual component
and can spread to others diagnostic components (here auditory), we should observe the
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same pattern of priming eUect as described in the previous section but limited to the
typically “noisy” targets.
Figure 3: Organization of the priming phase. A prime shape (seen in learning phase), presented at different level
SOA (100 ms or 500 ms), is immediately followed by a target picture that participants had to categorize in
small or large target.
As depicted in Figure 4, we found a priming eUect due to the reactivation of a mem-
ory auditory component by the visual sound prime (i. e., the shape seen with sound
during the leraning phase) and limited to the “noisy” targets. As we expected, this ef-
fect was modulated by the SOA. Indeed, we found an interference eUect with a SOA of
100 ms (Panel A) and a facilitation eUect with a SOA of 500 ms (Panel B).
Panel A Panel B
Figure 4: Panel A: Interaction Prime type* Target type F F(1, 15) = 10.6 ;p<.01 (a) For Noisy target, significant
principal effect of Prime type, F(1, 15) = 10.6, p<.01. (b) For Silent Target, F<1. Panel B: Interaction
Prime type* Target type F Fs(1, 15) = 6.24 ; p<.05 (a) For Noisy target, significant principal effect of
Prime type, Fs(1,15) = 6.24, p<.05. (b) For Silent Target, F<1. Results reproduced from experiment
1 Brunel et al., 2010. Notes. Sd Prime: prime shapes that were presented with sound during learning
phase; NSd Prime: prime shapes that were presented without sound. Errors bars represent standard errors.
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We interpreted these results as evidence that the component reactivated by both the
prime and the target has the same nature (i. e., perceptual). Consequently, our results
provide a strong argument in favor of the idea that access to conceptual knowledge
is linked to the reactivation of the component dimension integrated within a concept
(see Barsalou, 2008; Vallet, Brunel & Versace, 2010) which is consistent with a grounded
view of cognition. In that case, we can consider that an opposition between modal
and amodal form of knowledge is not appropriate for understanding phenomenological
distinctions between forms of knowledge. This issue will be discussed in the next
section.
4 Discussion
The aim of this paper was to propose experimental evidences in a favor of a horizontal
view concerning the relation between memory and perception. In that view, percep-
tion and memory act simultaneously on the same processing units that are perceptual
in nature. Indeed, our studies clearly show that the activation of an auditory mem-
ory component (a component that is not perceptually present) is able to inWuence the
sensory processing of a sound or conceptual processing of a typically “sound” concept
presented later. In that case, we have to consider that memory knowledge are nec-
essarly sensory-based which is totally consistent with a grounded view of cognition
(see Barsalou, 2008). So far we can say that: 1) memory keeps episodic traces from
perceptual events; 2) memory traces integrate perceptual components; 3) the compo-
nents of a given memory trace keep their perceptual caracteritics; 4) once a component
is activated, this activation is able to spread to the others and inWuenced the ongoing
processing irrespective the cognitive activity.
However there are remaining issues that we don’t really address in that paper. The
Vrst concerns the type of processing units (i. e., exemplars vs. features). Indeed, in
the experiments reported here, participants have implicitly learned, through a simple
categorization task, that a given shape, which varied through a separable dimension
(i. e. brightness), is systematically presented with a sound and the other not. We inter-
preted the fact that only visual prime shapes (whatever the shape’s brightness), which
were presented with sound in the categorization task, inWuenced the target’s process-
ing (sound or picture of typical sound concepts) thanks to an “examplar based” memory
view (Nosofsky, 1991; Logan, 2002). Each exemplar, which was associated with sound,
reeactivate it previously encoded sound component. However, we can also interpret
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our results as an evidence of unitization (Goldstone, 1998) between a psychological fea-
ture, namely a geometrical shape (i. e. squares or circles) and an auditory feature (a
white-sound). According to the unitization mechanism, we can say that the perfect
co-occurrence of an auditory feature and visual psychological feature leads to the cre-
ation of a new functional feature combining these two features (Schyns, Goldstone &
Thibaut, 1998).
In a recent works (Brunel, Vallet, Riou, & Versace, 2009; see also, Brunel, Goldstone,
Vallet, Riou & Versace, 2013), we tried to experimentally settle between these concep-
tions of memory storage2. Basically, we used the same experimental design (learning
phase followed by a priming phase with target tones) as Brunel, Labeye and collabora-
tors (2009) experiment. Yet, we manipulated two imperfect rules of category learning
sound-shape frequency association (High vs. Low) in learning phase (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Stimuli used in Brunel, Vallet, Riou & Versace (2009) shape categorization task (learning phase). In this
example, for the high frequency condition, three squares (“non-isolated”) were presented simultaneously
with a white noise, whereas one (“isolated”) was presented without sound. Following the same example,
in the low frequency condition, one circle (“isolated”) was presented simultaneously with a white noise
whereas the other three ones were presented alone ("non-isolated"). All the experimental conditions were
counterbalanced between-subjects.
For the exemplars seen in High Frequency condition of learning, we observed a gen-
eralization eUect in the priming phase. The isolated exemplar (which was presented
without sound during learning phase) yields same priming eUect than exemplars seen
with sound in learning phase. So, generalization eUect that we observed could be inter-
preted as a consequence of a multisensory unitization between a visual feature (shape)
2 According to Goldstone (1998) we refer here at « whole imprinting » and « feature imprinting ».
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and an auditory feature (white-noise) that is an argument in favor of “feature imprint-
ing” view of memory. Nevertheless, for the exemplars seen in low frequency condition
of learning, we observed a discrimination eUect in priming phase. The isolated exemplar
presented with sound enhanced the processing of targets tones compared to the exem-
plars seen without sound during the learning phase. So, discrimination eUect that we
observed could be interpreted as a consequence of a multisensory integration between
visual features (shape and level of brightness) and an auditory feature (white-noise) that
is an argument in favor of “whole imprinting” view of memory. Taking together, these
results suggest existence of multiple levels of representation (i. e., feature and exem-
plar, see Navarro & Lee, 2002), or multiple levels of processing (i. e., dimensional and
featural), or both, during retrieval.
The second issue is related to the Vrst one but concern the ability of the memory
to produce qualitative and distinct forms of knowledge. We proposed that each form
of knowledge emerges from the activation and the integration, and the synchroniza-
tion of multiple memory traces (see also Versace et al., 2009). The diUerence between
episodic and semantic is thus no more qualitative but rather quantitative, i. e. in term
of number of episodes or traces, which are reactivated. We suggest that information is
maintained in memory through a hierarchical multimodal memory integration mech-
anism. We consider that this mechanism, as presented in Figure 6, may be of relevance
for the expression of the diUerent forms of knowledge (e. g., semantic and episodic)
and the various types of memory processing (i. e., categorization, recognition, memory
retrieval).
In this model, an object is assumed to be perceived as a uniVed object because all its
features are gradually integrated with one another. However, contrary to the exemplar-
based approach, we suggest that what is stored in memory is the result of each inte-
gration at each level of LTM. We argue that a competition is involved during feature
integration. This competition depends on both the distance between exemplar features
within and between categories, and on the frequency of the presentation of the com-
binations of the diUerent features.
In addition, we suggest that all the levels are not necessarily accessed for the pro-
cessing of an exemplar in a given task: 1) to categorize an exemplar, it is suXcient to
activate the unitized dimension which is relevant for the category; 2) to recognize an
item, it is necessary to activate each unitized feature that is relevant for the exemplar.
In conclusion, we propose that each form of knowledge emerge from the dynam-
ics interactions between multisensory units, which are both perceptual and mnesic in
172
The Sensory Nature of Knowledge
Figure 6: Illustration of multimodal hierarchical integration between features in long-term memory (adapted from
Murray & Bussey, 2007).
nature. As a consequence, the distinction between memory and perception might be
only at phenomenological level. In other words, it is the subjective attribution (wether
to a component perceptually present or absent) to the cognitive activity that would
determine the nature of this activity.
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Abstract
While the symbol grounding problem of agreeing on a mapping between symbols and
sensory or even sensorimotor grounded concepts has been solved to a large extent,
one possibly even deeper open problem remains: How do concepts and compositional
concept structures develop in the Vrst place? Concepts may be described as integrative
mental representations that encode certain sensory, motor, or sensorimotor states or
events. Compositionality, on the other hand, determines how concepts are associated
with each other in a semantically meaningful and highly Wexible manner. We argue that
progressively complex concepts and compositional structures can be developed starting
from very basic perceptual and motor control mechanisms. An experiment with a simple
simulated robot gives hints about highly relevant structural ontogenetic prerequisites
for their development. In the outlook, we conclude by sketching out the current most
pressing challenges ahead.
Keywords: concepts, compositionality, development, symbol grounding, language, neu-
ral networks, manifolds, anticipation
1 Introduction
Symbols are “placeholders” standing for other entities. In a dictionary, and often in
conversation, symbols are explained through other symbols. This is a potentially end-
less process called “semiosis” by the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: Symbols are
described by symbols, which are described by symbols – and so on. But how can this
endless process be ultimately grounded, how “is symbol meaning to be grounded in
something other than just more meaningless symbols?” (Harnad 1990, p. 340). This is
what Harnad (1990) calls the “symbol grounding problem”.
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While Steels (2008) states that the basic symbol grounding problem has been solved,
it was also pointed out that yet a deeper symbol grounding problem needs to be ad-
dressed (cf. Barsalou 2009, Harnard 1990, Sugita & Butz 2011). The robotic agents in
Steels’ works are able to come to an agreement about a symbol convention for par-
ticular communication realms (such as gestures, colors, etc.). That is, a common lan-
guage is developed where particular symbols or utterances are associated with partic-
ular perceptions or perception-action complexes. The challenge of the deeper symbol
grounding problem lies in the development (a) of compositional concept structures from
sensorimotor control capabilities and (b) of associations between those structures and
grammatical, symbolic, i. e. linguistic structures. Only when these two challenges are
accomplished, formal semantics may be actually grounded in sensorimotor codes.
The study of both the developmental progression that led to the grounding of compo-
sitional concepts and the nature of the involved structures and associations is expected
to provide insights on how “Cognitive Semantics” (Johnson 1987, LakoU 1987, LakoU
& Johnson 1980) actually pre-determine formal semantics and most likely even struc-
tural properties of the universal grammar (Chomsky 1965). Most recently, the idea
of cognitive semantics led to the proposition of a Minimalist Action Grammar (Pastra
& Aloimonos 2012), which was directly related to the Minimalist Program by Noam
Chomsky (1995). The Minimalist Action Grammar is a generative grammar that en-
ables both proper generation and parsing of sentences about physical interactions. It
binds an interaction by its Vnal goal, combining tool complements, which are about the
acting force, with object complements, which are about the aUected object, context- and
goal-dependently.
We are particularly interested in how such a Minimalist Action Grammar may de-
velop starting purely from embodied, sensorimotor interactions – in the hope to con-
tribute to the deeper symbol grounding problem sketched-out above. The aim is to
develop a self-motivated system that solely perceives its environment via sensory stim-
ulations and that probes its environment by motor activities, where sensors and motors
are coupled by the bodily morphology. Ultimately, such a model may show that many
structures present in the Universal Grammar are grounded in sensorimotor interactions
with the environment that are realized by an embodied agent. Meanwhile, such a line
of research is expected to also shed light on why and how grammatical structures in
language are structured in the way they are – hints of which can also be found in the
Minimalist Action Grammar.
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Various researchers now strongly believe that sensorimotor structures and the selec-
tive simulation of particular sub-structures set the stage for the development of com-
positional concept structures (Barsalou 2008, Grush 2004, Pastra & Aloimonos 2012,
Pezzulo 2011). How such structures are developed and how these structures may then
be coupled with higher level cognitive, symbolic encodings is still an open question,
though. While the claim that the compositionality of language may be grounded in the
compositionality inherent in interaction competencies is not new (Johnson 1987, LakoU
1987), how such grounding may be learned and how compositionality may be repre-
sented by means of sub-symbolic structures remains an open question. Arbib (2005)
proposed a developmental pathway that leads from interactions, the mirror neuron sys-
tem, and imitation capabilities over several further stages to linguistic competence. We
believe that these stages are important components in the development of concepts and
compositional concept structures. However, several other prerequisites appear manda-
tory.
The aim of this paper is to sketch out a path by means of which complex, compo-
sitional concept structures are action-grounded. We propose that in order to explain
the human capacity to generalize, to draw inductions, and to develop compositionality,
it is not necessary to resort to innate structures. Rather, as increasingly many robotic
architectures and even more so simulations with neural networks imply, compositional
concept structures can be developed by a brain “from scratch”, departing from sen-
sorimotor contingencies. Endorsing the “Cognitive Semantics” of LakoU and Johnson
(1980), we propose to make the next step to conVrm this theory by identifying the on-
togenetic ingredients that appear necessary to develop such semantics. Thus, we are
interested in the architectural constraints and learning biases necessary for developing
compositionality based on sensorimotor interactions.
In this way, the paper also takes a stand in the nature/nurture-debate about concepts.
In particular we propose that structures, which rationalists tend to regard as purely
innate, are actually derivatives of sensorimotor experiences and developmental con-
straints. Thus, we propose a nature-constraint “nurture” process, in which genetically
determined bodily and brain developmental constraints stream cognitive development
towards the acquisition of compositional concept structures and language readiness.
However, only with the additionally necessary environmental interactions including
linguistic communication can the language capacity develop. Consequently, concepts
are grounded in the experienced interactions, but genetic predispositions bias the cog-
nitive developmental process towards concept acquisitions.
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We argue that purely innate structures leave no Wexibility and are generally ex-
tremely questionable due to the immense depth of the necessary structures and due
to the fact that even innateness needs to be somehow couple such structures to percep-
tions and actions. Thus, a core claim of this paper is that the Symbol Grounding Problem
(Harnad 1990) can only be solved by an empiricist approach to concept acquisition. In
contrast to Fodor’s (1975, 2008) radical claim that concepts cannot be learned, we sug-
gest that a theory of concept learning is essential for a complete theory of cognition
and the mind.
In the following, we Vrst detail a neural network architecture with which it has
recently been shown that representational separations and multiplicative interactions
between modules are essential ingredients for the development of compositional con-
cept structures. We detail the type of compositional structures that were developed and
how thus compositionality was grounded in embodied sensorimotor interactions. We
discuss the implications of this study, but also its limitations and current most pressing
challenges. Finally, we put the insights gained into the broader perspective on how
concepts and compositionality may develop.
2 An Experiment with a Simulated Robot Platform
In a neural network simulation setup, it was shown that a second-order neural network
with parametric bias neurons (sNNPB) is able to develop generalized behavioral con-
trol routines, presenting the system solely with typical sensory-motor time series data
(Sugita, Tani, & Butz 2011). This study essentially oUers tentative answers to the ques-
tion: How can compositional concept structures self-organize based on experienced
sensorimotor interactions? Additional ingredients will be necessary to scale this ap-
proach to more complex environments and interaction capabilities.
In the experiment, a simulated robot interacted with colored objects. The robot was
equipped with two wheels for controlling motion and a camera that scanned the sur-
rounding in front of the robot. In particular, the camera reported the perceived dom-
inant hue and color intensity values covering an area of 120° in front of the robot. The
covered areas were partitioned into nine equally spaced sectors. The robot learned two
types of interactions: move-to and orient-towards a particularly colored object. In the
move-to interaction, the robot had to move to the object and stop in front of it. In the
orient-towards interaction, the robot had to simply orient itself towards an object at
a speciVc angular oUset; Vve oUsets were trained. One or two colored objects were
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Figure 1: Robot-Environment-sNNPB interaction
present during each interaction trial with the environment. During learning, the ac-
tions of the robot were controlled remotely by a hard-coded control program. Figure
1 illustrates the robot, environment, sNNPB interaction.
In the following, we will refer to the two types of interactions as the “verbs” that
were trained, to the diUerent colored objects as the “objects” that were addressed in
the interactions, and to the oUsets in the orient-towards interactions as the involved
“modiVers”. Note however that the learning system was not provided with any explicit
indicators – neither about the “verbs” nor about the “objects” or the “modiVers” –
that may have given clues or induced learning biases towards distinguishing “verb”,
“object”, and “modiVer” concepts. The only information given to the learning system
was the sensorimotor time series data the robot was trained on and the information that
particular sets of sensorimotor time series data belonged to the same type of interaction.
The resulting sensorimotor time series data was used to train an sNNPB. An sNN is
a traditional neural network, which is trained with backpropagation, which, however,
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includes some “second-order” neural connections. Second order neural connections es-
sentially are connections whose current weight values are determined by other neural
activities. In the conducted simulations, one sub-NN mapped the visual information
provided by the camera onto motor output transferring the information over two hid-
den layers. The connection weights of the connections from the second hidden layer
to the motor output, however, were determined by second-order connections. The as-
sociated neurons were activated by a second sub-NN with one hidden layer. Input to
this network was generated by “parametric bias neurons” (Tani 2003). Error backpropa-
gation was used to adjust the weights of the sNNPB as well as the activities of the
parametric bias neurons. The latter were adjusted interaction-speciVc, thus maintain-
ing a vector for each type of verb-object-modiVer interaction the system was trained
on.
After learning, the sNNPB was tested on other object constellations and on other,
untrained verb-object-modiVer interactions. For example, the sNNPB may have never
been trained on “move-to the blue object”. Nonetheless, after learning the system was
tested if it can generate such interactions. To do so, the activity of the parametric bias
neurons was set to activity values that matched a small set of generated interactions
best. After that, other constellations were tested applying these PB activities.
The results conVrmed that the sNNPB generalized over the provided sensorimotor
time series data. It was not only able to generate similar interactions in other environ-
mental constellations, but also to generate interactions that were only compositionally
related to those trained on. For example, it was able to orient itself towards a particular
colored object at a particular angle, while it only had been trained to move to such a
colored object. Thus, behaviorally the network exhibited generalization capabilities that
were of a compositional nature. Interactions that corresponded to verb-object-modiVer
constellations could be generated that were not trained – as long as a suXciently large
and distributed subset of other interactions was trained.
Moreover, analyses of the developed sNNPB showed that a self-organized geometric-
ally-arranged manifold structure had developed, which reWected the behaviorally exhib-
ited compositionality. In particular, the activity vectors of the parametric bias neurons
were considered for further analysis. A principal component analysis showed that the
Vrst principal component diUerentiated the interactions with respect to the modiVer.
The second principal component diUerentiated move-to from orient-towards. The third
and fourth principal component revealed a color ring encoding, akin to the one found
in the hue-based color encoding provided to the sensory input layer. Thus, activities
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in the parametric bias neurons self-organized via backpropagation learning into a com-
positional manifold structure, where the individual dimensions in the manifold corre-
sponded to the verb, object, and modiVer components of the individual interactions.
The manifold structure enables the sNNPB to Wexibly activate any meaningful verb-
object-modiVer interaction type and also allows generalizing to untrained interaction
types. The geometric, orthogonal arrangement was akin to a compositional concept
structure because the orthogonality enables Wexible interaction concept combinations
and the deducible geometric distances can be viewed as indicating concept similarities.
Interestingly, also the structure of the second hidden layer – the one that maps to mo-
tor output via the second-order neural connections – was analyzed. Strongly behavior-
oriented sensory encodings were found. For example, one neuron switched its behavior
from oU to on when an object is in the center and very close – resulting in breaking be-
havior when the move-to interaction is activated in the parametric bias neurons. Other
neural activities revealed activities that may be compared to gain Velds in neurons (Sali-
nas & Sejnowski 2001, Graziano 2006): neurons responded, for example, in a sinusoidal
fashion with respect to color but that response was linearly modulated by the direc-
tion where the color was perceived from. In eUect, this encoding allowed the Wexible
activation of particular color-respective encodings for approaching and orienting the
robot towards particular colors, dependent on the activated mapping given particular
parametric bias activity. From a broader perspective it can be said that object-relative
encodings developed that encoded “object aUordances” (according to Gibson 1979), in
the sense that the encodings aUorded to reach a particular orientation towards a partic-
ular object or to stop moving when coming close to an object. Providing yet another
interpretation, spatial, object-relative encodings were developed that could be directly
mapped towards motor activities, yielding a Wexible Braitenberg vehicle (Braitenberg
1984).
The network succeeded in developing these compositional concept structures with-
out the provision of any semantic cues besides the ones that were inherent in the senso-
rimotor time series data. Seeing that various other neural network architectures could
not yield similar generalizations, it was concluded that (a) goal-oriented encodings need
to be separated from sensorimotor, control-oriented encodings and (b) a multiplica-
tive approach is best-suited to project the goal-oriented encodings onto the sensorimo-
tor encodings for realizing Wexible and compositional goal-oriented behavioral control.
In the emergent, interaction-speciVc, goal-oriented encodings the mentioned composi-
tional concept structures could be found, whereas in the processed sensory encodings
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behavior-oriented signals could be found. Both were shown to be mutually dependent
on each other – the former selecting the actual interaction that should be executed; the
latter providing potential interaction options.
Seeing that various other neural network architectures were not able to generate
comparable compositional behavioral generalization capabilities – let alone actual iden-
tiVable compositional structures as the one characterized above – the results suggests
that sensory-to-motor mappings should be separated from interaction selection encod-
ings to enable the development of compositional concept structures. Essentially, the
interaction selection corresponds to the goal that is to be achieved, with considera-
tions of the component that bring each particular goal about – such as moving to a
particularly colored object. While various researchers have suggested that such separa-
tions are behaviorally necessary (Cisek 2007), we believe they have not been suXciently
considered in research on the development and structure of language and cognition.
3 Insights and Open Challenges Deducible
from the Robot Experiment
The results of the simulated robot experiment have shown that compositional concept
structures could only develop in this setup when the sensory-to-motor mapping was
separated from the goal encoding, that is, from the code that determines which sensory-
to-motor interaction should actually unfold. Also, the time dynamics had to be diUerent
in the two encodings in that one goal activity had to be maintained while one full senso-
rimotor object interaction unfolded. Moreover, it was necessary that the inWuence from
the goal encoding onto the sensory-to-motor mapping was multiplicative. Finally, the
generated sensorimotor time series data had to be separated into distinct sets with re-
spect to particular verb-object-modiVer combinations. However, no information about
the semantics or symbolic characterizations of these particular combinations had to be
provided.
In consequence sensorimotor grounded compositional concept structures and behav-
ior-oriented “Braitenberg encodings” co-developed, that is, encodings which are per-
fectly suited to be directly mapped onto motor output activities, yielding seemingly
goal-directed behavior (Braitenberg 1984). Braitenberg encodings are thus goal-orien-
ted encodings, which can be selectively mapped onto actions for pursuing particular
object interactions. Indeed, the compositional concept structures had structural simi-
larities with the emerging Braitenberg encodings, thus enabling the selective activation
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of particular Braitenberg codes for realizing particular object interactions. Composi-
tionality was achieved by embedding a manifold structure into a higher-dimensional
neural representation. The individual dimensions of the lower-dimensional (in the ex-
periment four dimensional) manifold corresponded to the compositional verb-object-
modiVer structure. The developed “object” concept was encoded on a two-dimensional
manifold (actually a circular manifold), mimicking the hue-based color encoding in the
simulated sensors. Due to the emerging orthogonal arrangement of the distinct concept
structures, the sNNPB was able to Wexibly compose any verb-object-modiVer interac-
tion, even if it had not been trained. The developed compositional concept structure
appeared to be perfectly suited to be associated with a corresponding action grammar.
However, at this point language structures have not been successfully associated
with developing compositional structures, yet. Sugita & Tani (2005) managed to as-
sociate symbolic structures with similar sensorimotor time series data. However, in
this case only a more rudimentary action grammar consisting of three possible verbs
and six possible colors was learned. Nonetheless, Sugita and Tani (2005) succeeded in
mutually shaping both the symbol-based linguistic encoding and the sensory-to-motor
mapping. Thus, associating symbolic, linguistic input with developing, self-organizing,
more complex action grammars is still a very hard challenge.
Even when focusing only on the challenge of developing pre-linguistic compositional
concept structures – without associating symbolic language components – however,
additional learning biases and developmental constraints seem mandatory for scala-
bility reasons. At the moment, the sNNPB architecture is still an extremely Wexible
learning architecture. For developing more complex compositional structures, it seems
necessary that the learning processes are further guided by additional learning biases.
However, overly constraint learning may not give enough room for the emergence of
compositional concept structures, such as the manifold structure identiVed in the robot
experiment. Thus, complex compositionality is likely to emerge only if a good balance
between learning biases on the one hand and self-organization on the other hand is
maintained.
Another challenge lies in the fact that sets of sensorimotor time series data had
to be explicitly distinguished when training the sNNPB, while the more autonomous
separation of diUerent types of interactions is desirable. While similarity thresholds
may distinguish the sensorimotor time series data, it is very hard to Vnd the right
distance metric that could suitably distinguish diUerent time series in a semantically
meaningful way. The self-organized topology in the PB neurons of the sNNPB is likely
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to be the best candidate, but the development of it relied on the distinctness information
in the Vrst place.
We believe that several of the following ingredients will be mandatory to develop
learning systems that can autonomously produce emergent compositional concept struc-
tures in more complex environments. First, the incorporation of an anticipatory drive
(Butz 2008) that stresses the capability of predicting the future based on state, context,
and motor (force) activities seems necessary. Such an anticipatory drive may guide
learning Vrst towards identifying the most obvious sensorimotor contingencies in the
sensory and motor information available to the system. Further distinctions starting
from basic sensorimotor Wow may then lead to the desired progressively more distinct
compositional concept structures.
Once sensorimotor contingencies are identiVed, sensorimotor topologies can be de-
veloped within which particular interactions can unfold. In the simulated robot exper-
iment, a topology was implicitly developed in the deep sensory encodings, providing
Braitenberg codes. Similar, but further modularized encodings are necessary to enable
the even more Wexible and selective interaction with the environment using diUerent
means, diUerent pathways through the environment, etc.
Furthermore, active, information-seeking, curious behavior, caused by the anticipa-
tory drive, may enable the more direct identiVcation of relevant concept structures, that
is, of sensory and motor information necessary for predicting particular consequences
reliably. The consequent identiVcation of contextual “concepts” that separate states into
concepts that are relevant for particular behaviors – such as free versus occupied, heavy
versus light, etc. – will be the result.
Besides these learning biases derived from the anticipatory drive, the challenge of
removing the requirement of providing distinct sets of sensorimotor time series data
may be accomplished by introducing internal motivations. Such internal motivations
may serve as the distinctness indicators – identifying a distinct interaction by its dis-
tinct eUect on the internal motivational state. Thus, distinct positive and negative re-
inforcement may serve as a critical additional clue to distinguish interactions further
into meaningful concepts.
Finally, it seems somewhat unsatisfactory that the activity in the parametric bias
neurons cannot be internally self-activated. To do so, the activity of the parametric bias
neurons may be partially activated by sensory input as well – potentially enabling the
selective activation of those interaction codes that can actually unfold in the current
circumstances. For example, a potential interaction with a red object may only be
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activated if a red object is present. Furthermore, the mentioned internal motivations
may be associated with those parametric bias neuron activities that previously had
led to a corresponding change in the internal motivational state. Consequently, the
interaction choice may be co-determined by the internal motivations and the goals
currently possible in the environment.
4 Conclusions
The robot experiment described above contributes to the solution of the symbol ground-
ing problem, and also illuminates concept learning. One of the most vexing problems
regarding this topic is Fodor’s problem of concept acquisition. Fodor (1975, 2008) essen-
tially questions that fundamental concepts – those that cannot be further partitioned
into smaller conceptual entities – can be learned. And presuming that they cannot
be learned, he concludes that they must be innate. The details of Fodor’s argument
are beyond the scope of this article. It suXces to state that according to most recent
philosophical considerations, “it appears that Fodor’s problem of concept acquisition
remains a puzzle for philosophers and psychologists to solve” (McCaUrey & Machery
2012, p. 275).
We propose to overcome Fodor’s “radical concept nativism” (cf. Laurence & Margolis
2002) by a diUerent stance towards “innateness”. This very ambiguous term may gain
a more speciVc sense if it is related to embodiment. In short, we propose that the
innateness of concepts may not be directly genetically imprinted, but concepts and
compositional concept structures may be indirectly pre-determined to develop due to
(a) the ontogenetic path laid-out in the genes of the organism, (b) the morphological
constraints given by the body of the organism, and (c) the environmental reality with
which the organism interacts.
Fundamental concepts may indeed be innate – but actually innate in the sense of be-
ing behaviorally embodied and pre-destined to be developed. For example, basic reWexes
– such as the grasp reWex in infants – can foster the development of particular concepts
– such as a concept for grasping. Separating then successful from unsuccessful grasps,
a concept structure that speciVes the prerequisites for a successful grasp develops, in
contrast to contexts were grasps are unsuccessful. Co-developing with such a represen-
tation is a concept of graspable entities. Realizing the eUects of successful grasps, will
expand and diUerentiate the grasp concept further into entities that are moveable, light
versus heavy, spiky versus smooth, etc. The basic reWex may thus lead to the gener-
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ation of sensorimotor interactions that can be diUerentiated on the one hand side by
their perceptual diUerences but, and even more importantly so, by their distinct eUects.
Essentially we point-out that the combination of an anticipatory drive with an em-
bodied, sensing and acting agent can foster the development of pre-linguistic, composi-
tional concept structures. The anticipatory drive drives the organism to actively search
for and learn about predictable and controllable (sensorimotor) structures in the envi-
ronment (Butz 2008). Due to this self-controlled, embodied developmental process, the
developing concept structures are inherently meaningful because the structures deter-
mine predictability, controllability, and their relation to changes in internal motivational
states. Thus, the combination of the human body morphology with its ontogenetic
development of body and brain fosters the development of “innate” but behaviorally
acquired compositional concept structures.
Unitizations and diUerentiations in the sense of Landy & Goldstone (2005) (cf. also
Stöckle-Schobel 2012) are fundamental processes that foster the development of compo-
sitional concept structures. We propose that these processes are not purely perceptual
or sensorimotor, but are developed for predictability, controllability, and achievability
purposes. With this proposition we go one step beyond theorists of “neo-empiricism”
like Barsalou (2009), Jesse Prinz (2002), and others. We strongly acknowledge that their
accounts on perceptually grounded symbols and concepts are highly important in over-
coming unworkable accounts of innateness. However, we would like to further stress
that cognition and – more speciVcally, concept acquisition – is not solely shaped by
(and for) perception. Rather, it is most important for being able to interact Wexibly
goal-directedly with objects and other agents.
Moreover, the robot experiment has shown that spatial, object- and body-relative
representations should be separated from goal-oriented representations in order to fos-
ter the development of compositional structures. Given this separation, particularly
the goal-oriented representations appear well-suited for the development of composi-
tionality. Thus, the separation of dorsal and ventral pathway (Goodale & Milner 1992),
which is certainly highly behaviorally relevant and mandatory for realizing Wexible be-
havioral control (Cisek 2007, Milner & Goodale 2008), may have actually set the stage
for the development of compositional concept structures, that is, structures that allow
the development of language in the Vrst place.
Certainly other processes are still highly important as well. In particular, we believe
that the development of mirror capabilities and tool use are two fundamental additional
ingredients. The capability of mirror neurons, which was Vrst most likely beneVcial for
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improving mutually beneVcial interactions with other individuals, fosters the further
development of communication between individuals, by, for example, enabling the de-
velopment of verbal imitations from gestural imitations (Arbib 2005, Rizzolatti &Arbib
1998). The capability of handling tools led to the development of much more intense
interactions between the dorsal and ventral processing streams, thus being able to view
tools and objects as part of the subject and, in retrospect, also oneself as a tool (Iriki
2006).
However, we believe that the sketched-out processes will set the stage to be able
to ultimately solve the mystery of concept acquisition. By separating goals from spa-
tial topologies and events, Wexible goal-directed behavior can be selected and pursued.
Current internal goals can be Wexibly pursued dependent on the current spatial con-
straints. Moreover, the availability of potential goals in the environment as well as the
context-dependent estimated achievability of such potential goals can yield tremendous
behavioral Wexibility and eUectivity. While the development of such a separation was
thus initially most likely purely behavior-driven, it also enabled the development of
compositional concept structures. While potential goals and the involved concepts for
achieving these goals are detached from the here-and-now, the encodings can be Wexibly
projected onto the current state in the environment. Meanwhile, state representations
must have developed that enable the Wexible activation of goals and involved concepts
for pursuing particular goals. Object-referenced encodings found in in the parietal cor-
tex (Chafee, Averbeck, & Crowe 2007) support the pro-motor representations found in
integrative, multimodal cortical areas. The parietal-frontal interactions with which ac-
tion goals appear to be transferred into actual movement control support their strong
goal- and behavioral relevance (Graziano, Cooke 2008). Arguably, similar correspon-
dences were even proposed to exist between Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas (Graziano,
Cooke 2008). Finally, gain-modulations, which are found nearly ubiquitously in the
brain, suggest selective, multiplicative computations in individual neurons (Salinas &
Sejnowski 2001), supporting the Wexible, goal-oriented selection of maximally suitable
sensory-to-motor mappings.
In the minimalist Action Grammar as proposed by Pastra & Aloimonos (2012) goals
unify particular actions with objects and further modiVers. Our proposition in this pa-
per gives Vrst hints why goals are crucial both, for the development of grammatical
structures and for being able to Wexibly combine compositional concept structures to
achieve particular goals dependent on their current urgency and achievability. Nonethe-
less, much future research is necessary to sort the identiVed puzzle pieces, identify even
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further pieces, and arrange them in the way the ontogenesis of the brain manages to
do so beautifully.
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Abstract
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between natural language and thinking.
SpeciVcally, I adopt the view that thinking operates, by and large, according to asso-
ciationistic rules and argue that natural language plays a crucial role in thinking, but
not a constitutive one, as many have argued. I propose that the suggested view enjoys
signiVcant empirical support, mainly from work done with aphasic subjects. The major
challenges that all associationistic views of thinking face are the problems of proposi-
tional thinking and compositionality of thought. I brieWy suggest how these challenges
could be met in the light of the suggested view regarding thought production.
Keywords: Language; Cognition; Associationism; Aphasia; Concept Empiricism
1 Introduction
The relationship between language and cognition is a much-debated one and widely
varying notions of this relationship have been produced over the last few decades in
Velds as varied and diverse as psychology, linguistics and philosophy. The main di-
alectic of this debate is centred on the issue of the signiVcance of natural language in
cognition. It is worth clarifying at this point that there is the issue of ‘whether thought
happens in language’ and secondly ‘whether the language in which thought happens, if
it does, is natural language’. The problem is that certain thinkers, Fodor for instance (see
below), answer the Vrst question emphatically ‘yes’ (language of thought), and others
with an emphatic ‘no’. As a result, their answer to the question ‘how important is the
role of language to thought?’ is potentially ambiguous. In the following, when talking
about language I will be referring to natural language unless stated otherwise.
The main strands in this debate can be brieWy classiVed as follows. I start from
views that bestow the least signiVcant role to language in the production of thought,
1 This paper is an early draft of Tillas, A. (forthcoming 2015). Language as Grist to the Mill of Cognition.
Cognitive Processing.
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and continue by examining views that ascribe language a greater role. Grice (1957;
1968; 1969; 1989) treats language as independent to thought and as merely being used to
express non-linguistic thoughts. Linguistic communication is seen as primarily a matter
of a speaker changing a hearer’s mental states, e. g. getting them to form a certain
belief, through recognition of the contents of their thoughts. (The hearer recognises the
thoughts of the speaker on the basis of the latter’s usage of words). Elsewhere, Grice
(1982) speculates that language may have evolved in order to facilitate correspondences
in psychological states between one creature and another. Proponents of similar views
argue for a reductive account of linguistic meaning to thought meaning. In this sense,
language is independent from thinking. A second view can be found in Fodor’s (1978;
1983; 1987) Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH). For Fodor, thinking occurs in an
inner sub-personal code which he calls ‘Mentalese’. Mentalese is distinct from natural
language and hence the role of natural language in thought is also limited. Language
is mainly used for expressing the underlying thoughts in public form. Proponents of
similar views, at least according to Carruthers (2005), include Chomsky (1988), Levelt
(1989) and Pinker (1994), amongst others. Another view is that of Carruthers (1998;
2005; 2008) according to which the language of thought is actually natural language. In
this sense, natural language plays a greater role in thinking than merely communicating
thoughts from an unconscious to a conscious level. Carruthers holds that language is
constitutively involved in thinking and inner thinking occurs as a form of inner speech.
Further views that bestow a signiVcant role to language in thinking can be found
in the works of thinkers like Davidson and Brandom who see thinking as secondary
to language. More speciVcally, for Davidson (1975) thoughts are only attributable to
creatures that are interpretable. A creature that we cannot interpret as capable of mean-
ingful speech is a creature that we cannot interpret as capable of possessing contentful
attitudes2. For Brandom (1994), thought does not take place in language but thought can
only be attributed to linguistic agents. Thought and language acquire content through
their mutual interrelations. But despite this mutual interrelation, Brandom promotes
the signiVcance of language over that of thought since he argues that the objectivity
of conceptual norms derives from public linguistic practice.
There are also views that could be seen as somehow equidistant from the two ex-
tremes of the above continuum. The view suggested here also lies at the middle of the
continuum, and in this section I clarify how it diUers from competing views.
2 See also Malpas (2009).
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The beginnings of supra-communicative views of language can be traced in William
James’ (1890/1996) idea that language, and words in particular, allow for a clearer dis-
tinction between diUerent concepts3. Vygotsky (trans. 1962) further analyses this idea
and argues for the inWuences of natural language on cognitive development and its
scaUolding role in guiding behaviour and directing our attention.
This Vygotskian scaUolding idea enjoys support from the work of Berk and Garvin
(1984) who show that language (in the form of self-directed vocal or silent speech)
guides the actions of children of 5–10 years of age. They found that silent speech is more
frequent in cases where the child is alone and when she is engaged in more sophisticated
tasks. Bivens and Berk (1990) and Berk (1994) found that increased incidence of silent
speech strongly correlated with higher levels of mastering the task in question. From
this evidence, Berk draws the conclusion that self-directed speech is a crucial cognitive
tool that allows us to direct our attention to speciVc aspects of a new situation and
direct problem-solving actions.
Gauker (1990) also suggests a view of language as a tool for aUecting changes in
the subject’s environment (as opposed to a tool used in representing the world or to
publicly express one’s thoughts). Language plays the role of a medium through which
subjects can grasp the causal relations into which linguistic signs may enter.
For JackendoU (1996), linguistic formulation allows us a ‘handle’ for attention and
with it the possibility to attend to relational and abstract aspects of thought and thus
puts us in a position to scrutinise those aspects.
One of the most prominent views that fall under the ‘middle-of-the-continuum’ um-
brella is that of Clark (1998), and Clark and Chalmers (1998) who argue for the causal
potencies of language and suggest that language complements our thoughts. Here,
the mind is seen as using external props to reduce the cognitive costs of thinking and
enhance performance, especially in regards to formation of structurally highly sophisti-
cated thoughts. Even though thinking can be purely internal, it often relies on available
external resources and uses them in a constitutive way. Language is not coincidently
available, but it rather exists to have the function of a prop for thought. Focusing on
a connectionist view of the mind, Rumelhart et al. (1986) also treat language as a crucial
element for various environmentally extended computational processes.
Dennett (1991) ascribes a more ‘extreme’ role to language and argues that the ad-
vanced cognitive skills that the human mind exhibits are the eUects of culture and lan-
3 Here I follow Clark’s (1998) terminology for views that ascribe more than a communicative role to language.
Most view presented here are reported in Clark (ibid.)
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guage. In this sense, the main cognitive diUerences between the human mind and that
of primates like chimpanzees cannot be captured in terms of our initial hardwiring.
An even stronger view comes from Whorf (1956) who famously suggests that linguis-
tic diUerences in grammar and usage shape and alter the ways in which we come to
conceptualise and experience the world4.
Finally, the language of associationistic thinking hypothesis (LOATH) – the view
suggested here – also lies somewhere at the middle of the aforementioned continuum.
By and large, LOATH is a view that builds upon associationism and ascribes a signiVcant
role to natural language in terms of its contribution to thinking but crucially it is not
a constitutive one.
Before starting an elaboration on LOATH, I clarify a number of preliminary issues
such as what thinking amounts to, at which point we get conscious access to our
thoughts, and what it is for a subject to have endogenous control over her thoughts.
Continuing, I present my views on the role of natural language in thinking and provide
empirical evidence, mostly from work done with aphasic subjects, in support of my
claims. Finally, I assess the consequences of my account by evaluating whether a bigger
role should be ascribed to language. In doing so, I examine Carruthers’s argument,
given that he treats language as constitutively involved in thinking.
2 Elaborating on LOATH: thinking is analogous to perceiving
Despite the fact that the role of language in thinking is often subject to a lively de-
bate, few things are settled in regards to what thinking amounts to. For proponents
of the view that thinking occurs in language, thinking occurs either in a Mentalese
sub-personal code or in the form of inner speech; but as explained above not everyone
believes that thinking does in fact happen in the form of language. In the view I suggest
here, thinking is analogous to perceiving to the extent that the same representations
that were produced during perception of a given object get reactivated when thinking
about this object, (e. g. Barsalou 1999; Damasio 1989). That is, on recalling a given con-
cept, e. g. DOG, the brain simulates, to use Barsalou’s term, the perceptual experience
of a dog. That is, the same neuronal conVgurations that were active while perceiving a
dog would also be activated when thinking of a dog; (see also Barsalou 1999; and Prinz
4 But see Patterson and Fushimi (2006) for evidence that the brain’s organisation of language is in fact the
same regardless of the language the subject speaks.
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2002: esp. chap. three). At the same time, thinking is diUerent from perceiving since
the phenomenology of thinking is diUerent for obvious reasons.
Fleshing out the notion of simulation further, consider Damasio’s (1989) ‘conver-
gence zones’ hypothesis. During perception of a given object, diUerent groups of neu-
rons underlie perception of diUerent parts/properties of the object in question. Further
down the line of interneural signalling, the output of the neurons that underlie percep-
tion of a dog’s head, for instance, converge with the output of the neurons that underlie
perception of the dog’s bark, legs, fur, etc. In this way, these diUerent neuronal en-
sembles interact in a way that they did not before. And they did not interact before
because they are dedicated to the perception of diUerent kinds of stimuli. Convergence
zones register combinations of components in terms of coincidence or sequence in space
and time (co-occurrence). Representations of the parts of the perceived object are re-
constructed by time-locked retro-activation of fragmented records in multiple cortical
regions. This is the result of feedback activity from convergence zones. That is, the
groups of neurons that Vred in a speciVc way during the sensory experience with the
given object are re-activated simultaneously and in exactly the same way that they were
activated during the initial perception of the object in question. In this way, a given ob-
ject is not only perceived as a whole but is crucially also represented in memory (and
later on reactivated) as a whole precisely. For what actually gets stored are the simulta-
neous activation patterns that underlie perception of that object. A key point here is
that we only have conscious access at the level of a convergence zone and not at the
level of the fragmented representations of an object in geographically spread neuronal
groups. It is for this reason that we perceive objects as wholes and not as conjunctions
of diUerent features and properties. This claim will play a signiVcant role in the sec-
ond part of the paper where I reply to Carruthers’s claims about the relation between
language and thinking.
2.1 Endogenously controlled thinking
LOATH is based on a view of concepts according to which a concept is a structured
entity comprised of a set of representations. These representations are formed during
perceptual experiences with instances of a given kind. What is also included in this
set is the perceptual representation of the appropriate word, e. g. (Barsalou 1999). For
instance, the concept DOG is comprised of a set of perceptual representations built out
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of experiences with instances of dogs, together with the perceptual representations of
the word ‘Dog’. These representations get associated on the basis of co-occurrence.
To have the ability to endogenously control the tokening of a given concept, and
thus to endogenously control thinking, is to be in a position to activate a given concept
in the absence of its referents, i. e. to token a thought on the basis of processes of
thinking. In my view, endogenously controlled thinking is merely associative thinking,
i. e. current thinking caused by earlier thinking. Here, I am committed to a view of
internal thinking which is imagistic, to the extent that conceptual thoughts are built out
of concepts, which are in turn built out of perceptual representations. In the suggested
view, concepts are associationistic in their causal patterns. That is, every concept is
associated with other concepts. Once activated, concepts associated to it to get also
activated5. For example, consider someone uttering the word ‘Trip’ and another agent
mistakenly hearing the word ‘Grip’ and as a result starting to think about friction and
laws of physics instead of travelling. This is a case where an agent is forming a thought
in the absence of an appropriate stimulus, seemingly in a spontaneous but actually in
an associative manner. In the previous example, the subject in question forms a thought
without being confronted with an instance of the kind in question, in this case the word
‘Grip’.
Note here that endogenous control over concepts (i. e. the ability to activate a con-
cept in the absence of its referents) could also be acquired in diUerent ways to the one
suggested here. For instance, non-linguistic animals might acquire endogenous con-
trol over their concepts by associating a given set of representations to some sort of
non-linguistic action, e. g. goal-directed actions over which they do have endogenous
control. This might also be the case with human subjects at early developmental stages.
The suggested hypothesis then is that when a subject Vnally does acquire a certain
degree of linguistic sophistication, the process of activating a concept in a top-down
manner is achieved by virtue of associated linguistic symbols being activated. Note also
that there are cases when we form a thought ‘on the Wy’ by activating a set of images in
a top-down manner and consciously manipulating those images. For instance, consider
being in a store and trying to think whether a particular sofa would Vt in your living
room. This is a clear case when a thought is formed by virtue of images being con-
sciously manipulated. Clearly, the activated images/representations of the inner space
5 Evidence in support of the suggested associationistic view of thinking can be found in the work of Elman
et al. (1996), amongst others, who argue that artiVcial neural networks can be highly constrained by the
network’s current weight assignment.
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of one’s living room do not have to be constitutive parts of the concept LIVING ROOM.
What is important here though, is that these representations are only activated in virtue
of their associations to certain concepts, which in turn are also activated either during
or (right) before the activation of the imagistic thought in question.
In a nutshell, endogenous control over thoughts is acquired by associating concepts
with linguistic symbols. My hypothesis here is that we have endogenous control over
our production of linguistic items, given that we are able to produce linguistic utter-
ances at will (or silent talking to ourselves). It is this executive control over linguistic
utterances that gives us endogenous control over our thoughts.
2.2 Associationist accounts and propositional thoughts
On the previous pages, I presented LOATH, an associationistic view of thinking in
which language plays a signiVcant but not a constitutive role in thinking. As such,
LOATH might be subject to the objection that it cannot account either for propositional
thinking or for compositionality of thought. However, I suggest that those problems
could be solved by appealing to natural language. Let me elaborate.
The reason why it is not obvious how LOATH could account for propositional think-
ing is that it at best describes how interconnected concepts get activated but does not ex-
plain the propositional-syntactic properties that thoughts, in the form of inner speech,
actually have. In a sense, propositional thoughts somehow involve or are about a num-
ber of diUerent items for which we have individual concepts. In a propositional thought,
those individual concepts are structured together. The way that individual concepts are
structured is important, since the same concepts can be structured in diUerent ways. For
instance, there is a clear structural diUerence between the thought ‘John loves Mary’
and the thought ‘Mary loves John’ (cf. Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988). The diUerence between
propositional and non-propositional thoughts is that propositional thoughts are com-
plex structured entities that are true or false. In this sense, some thoughts seem to have
a uniVed coherent propositional structure and content6 whereas individual representa-
tions seem to lack these features. The question then is how is it that we can move from
the individual representations to having mental representations that have this kind of
propositional content?
In reply, a single thought gets to be propositional in structure and content by pig-
gybacking on language. My starting point is that sentences are syntactically structured.
6 Structure and content are diUerent since there could be mental atoms that have propositional content.
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Sentences are uniVed structured entities and they unify and structure the concepts asso-
ciated with the components into a propositional thought in a way that mirrors the unity
and structure of the sentence. A thought gets to have propositional content by virtue
of concepts (for objects or features) being associated with individual words or phrases;
the sentence provides a kind of unity. In this sense, it is the conventional grammatical
unity and structure of the sentence that uniVes those concepts and orders them in a
certain way. It is by virtue of this, that thoughts have particular propositional con-
tent. Furthermore, the external linguistic item orders and, in a sense, binds the diUerent
constitutive-to-the-proposition parts together and uniVes thoughts.
As it happens, most of those raising the objection of propositional thinking against
associationist accounts seem to Vnd a better alternative in LOTH. What is appealing
about LOTH here is that Mentalese is structurally(/grammatically) analogous to natural
language. In this way, a thought is tokened as propositional. As explained in Section
4 below, Carruthers also objects to associationistic accounts and he favours a view in
which natural language is constitutively involved in thinking, i. e. natural language be-
comes a language of thought. Thus, for Carruthers, thoughts do not occur in Mentalese,
but rather natural language is itself the medium through which conscious thinking is
conducted. In this sense, thoughts are propositional in terms of natural language, which
of course is propositional, being constitutively involved in thinking. Both of the above
theses can account for propositional thoughts while it is claimed that associationist
accounts cannot.
As shown above, representing linguistic items allows an agent to escape from the
patterns of association that they would have been locked into had it not been for the
conventional structure of sentences and their conventional patterns of implications. In
this way, an agent can extent the repertoire of these associations beyond the actual
inductive pattern of objects as she has encountered them. For instance, one can think of
black swans even though one has only seen white ones. This is possible because some
of the patterns of associations that one can fall into using by the concept SWAN are
underpinned by and arise from the conventional structure of language. So, the (version
of the) problem of propositional thinking (that I focus on here) is solved by latching
onto the external artefacts of public language.
In a nutshell, I claim that an agent could extend the repertoire of associations beyond
a) their hardware endowment and b) the patterns of experiences that their history has
given him/her by forming associations with linguistic items. These latter associations
are much less constrained by the agent’s individual experience history and much more
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constrained in other ways, i. e. the rules of grammar, the norms of epistemology and so
forth. It is in this way that thinking in a more Wexible and open-ended way is achieved.
Clearly the suggested view bears enough similarities to the Extended Mind Hypothesis
(brieWy examined above) and Clark’s (2005) suggestions. The main diUerence between
the two is that my focus is at a more general level. In particular, I do not focus on speciVc
cognitive tasks that might be propped up by language or how speciVc processes, like
those involves in perceptual categorisation, are facilitated or inWuenced by language.
Instead, my focus here is on how language aUects thought formation.
2.3 Associationism and compositionality
Another problem that associationistic accounts of thinking face is the problem of com-
positionality. One of the characteristics of concepts is that they can combine compo-
sitionally. The problem for associationistic accounts is that it is not clear how they
can give an account of the ways in which concepts, the ingredients of thoughts, can
be put together to produce something where the meaning of the whole depends on the
meanings of the parts and the ways in which they are put together. The problem of
compositionality is particularly vivid for prototypes. For instance, the conjunction of
PET and FISH gives PET FISH. However, the prototypical pet is something like a cat
or a dog; the prototypical Vsh is something like a trout while the prototypical pet Vsh is
rather a goldVsh (cf. Fodor and LePore 1996). If thoughts are formed in associationistic
manner, how is it that concepts can combine compositionally?
This is a very interesting problem which, however, lies beyond the scope of this pa-
per. That said, a solution can be suggested; one that can be seen as another way in which
language inWuences thinking. My main claim is that since thinking piggybacks on lan-
guage, the solution to the problem of how thinking is compositional piggybacks on the
solution of how language is compositional. Admittedly, this is a diUerent problem, and
one on which I do not further elaborate here since it lies in the realm of philosophy of
language.
Returning to the problem of compositionality of thought and assuming that language
is compositional, according to LOATH the concept PET FISH is a folder that contains
perceptual representations. At this point, I align myself with Prinz’s semantic account
(2002), according to which, in order for C to refer to X, the following two conditions, (a)
& (b), have to be fulVlled:
(a) Xs nomologically covary with tokens of C
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(b) An X was the (actual) incipient cause of C
In this sense, the incipient causes of PET FISH can either be instances of pet Vsh or
representations of pets and representations of Vsh. What is important, in terms of the
semantics, is that PET FISH has to nomologically covary with pet Vsh rather than a
disjunction of pet and Vsh. In other words, that PET FISH will be activated every time
the subject is confronted with or thinking of an instance of pet Vsh. This is a nomic or
counterfactually supporting relation. The reason why PET FISH nomologically covaries
with pet Vsh is that the concept’s functional role is constrained by the constraints on
the uses of the word that are set by the agent’s locking into the conventions of how
conjunctions are formed. In this sense, an agent is a participant in a convention and
it is via the association between the word and the concept that the functional role
of the conjunctive concept is constrained. Taking a closer look at the constitutive
representations of PET FISH now, these representations can be representations of pets
like cats and dogs as well as representations of Vsh. Note that those representations are
idle in the functional role of the concept. The latter is more constrained by its link to
the words.
I do not further elaborate on the problem of compositionality here. However, it
should be clear that even though proponents of associationist accounts of thinking do
not have a fully Weshed out solution, they can tack the solution that philosophers of
language will oUer to the problem of how language can be compositional onto their
claims about thinking.
3 LOATH and empirical evidence: thoughts, language, and the
evidence from aphasia.
In the following sections, my target is to examine LOATH against empirical evidence. I
do that by arguing that it is not clear how proponents of the communicative conception
of language could account for evidence gathered from work done with aphasic subjects,
which shows that aphasics cannot form endogenously controlled thoughts. The reason
why this is useful for my purposes is that aphasia is generally understood as a language
disorder. Admittedly, there are diUerent kinds of aphasia and each kind can aUect lin-
guistic comprehension and communication to diUerent degrees. Furthermore, several
brain regions are aUected in cases of aphasia. By and large though, aphasic subjects
are unable to understand and use spoken or written language due to brain lesions. To
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this extent, I focus on the linguistic aspects of aphasia7. Furthermore, even though –
as mentioned already –language plays a key role in the acquisition of endogenously
controlled thought, stimulus driven thought might not necessarily involve language.
For instance, it might be that a stimulus produces a perception, which in turn causes
activation of concepts by associationistic links that are piggybacking on language. In
this sense, a fair quantity of stimulus-driven, yet fairly complex, cognitive processing
can occur in aphasics. However, the suggested account predicts that there will be a
dramatic drop in performance amongst aphasics executing sequential and reasonably
diXcult tasks and more speciVcally in performance of tasks in which endogenous con-
trol of thought is required. This is because, as previously explained, a key claim of
LOATH is that endogenous control is acquired on the basis of language, and aphasics
are by and large subjects with ‘compromised linguistic systems’.
In order for proponents of the view that language is not involved in endogenous
control of thinking to accommodate evidence similar to this presented below, they need
to establish a double dissociation between language and endogenous control. That
is, they have to show that aphasic subjects – who are linguistically impaired – can
nevertheless activate concepts in a top-down manner and also that (at least in some
cases) subjects who are linguistically unimpaired cannot activate concepts in a top-
down manner.
In general terms, the empirical evidence presented here shows that there is a cor-
relation between linguistic impairments and endogenously controllable thinking. Thus,
the option available to proponents of views contrasting the one suggested here is the
following: First of all, they need to adopt a massively modular view of the mind. In this
case, it can be claimed that a distinct module governs activation of concepts in a top-
down manner, and perhaps a separate module (or modules) governs all other linguistic
functions. It can then be claimed that in the cases presented below, both the language
module and the top-down-activation-of-concepts module are impaired. Nevertheless,
those two modules are distinct from each other8. If a massively modular view of the
7 Section §3 has been signiVcantly revised after publication of this volume. The main reason for this is that
aphasia is not an absolute language deVcit, as it is implied here, and more relevant and recent empirical
evidence has been considered. However, in later drafts it is shown that the suggested view still enjoys
signiVcant empirical support from work done in perceptual processing and categorisation tasks.
8 Evidence in support of this claim can be found in (Pinker 1994), (Brock 2007) and (Mervis and Beccera 2007).
The latter demonstrate that language abilities in Williams Syndrome are no more than would be predicted
by non-linguistic abilities. Furthermore there is evidence suggesting that speciVc language impairments
(SLI) related to use of language might be of a more general cognitive nature (Norbury, Bishop & Briscoe
2001); (Bishop 1994); (Kail 1994), amongst others). I do not further elaborate on this issue here.
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mind is adopted, the aforementioned double dissociation can be achieved since there
might be cases where only one of the above (two) modules is impaired while the other
is spared. Note here that a Fodorian view of the mind as merely modular cannot account
for this evidence since, in that view, there is only one language module responsible for
all linguistic functions. There are various reasons why a massively modular view of the
mind is problematic, even though I do not further elaborate on this issue here9. Having
dealt with the negative argument supporting the suggested view, I now turn to positive
considerations.
3.1 Drawing and recollection in aphasic patients
Gainotti et al. (1983) systematically examined the eUects of aphasia on drawing from
memory. Furthermore, they investigated the relationship between the performance of
subjects and the clinical form of aphasia, the severity of language impairment at the
semantic level of language integration10. They also investigated whether aphasics were
more impaired than subjects with right-brain and left-brain injuries but without any
aphasia. All of these results were compared to the results from a control group of
normal subjects of the same mental age, and comparisons were drawn between perfor-
mances of the impaired and control subjects.
During these experiments, subjects were brieWy shown drawings of simple objects
with a characteristic shape (a nail, a pear, a key, a comb, a cluster of grapes, a table, a
hand and an umbrella). The experimenters made sure that the subjects had analysed the
details of the object in question and recognised it, by asking them to name the object in
question. The experimenter then hid the object away and the subject was asked to draw
the same object from memory. It should be noted that the instructor asked the subject to
draw the object by naming it, i. e.: “Could you please draw the comb that you just saw?”
This process was repeated for the ten above objects. Finally, two independent judges
evaluated the drawings. Two points were given to drawings that contain most of the
object’s characteristic features and thus could be easily recognised. One point was given
9 For instance, evidence from (Gregory 1970) and (Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1996) could be used to counter the
cognitive impenetrability thesis. The cited evidence shows that cognition seems to penetrate perception.
This in turn counters one of the main characteristics of modules, namely informational encapsulation. I
do not further elaborate on this here. See also (Prinz 2006) for an extended attack on the modular view
of the mind on diUerent grounds.
10 An impairment at the semantic level of language integration can be detected by asking patients to discrimi-
nate the meaning of a given word by choosing from an array of semantically similar alternatives the object
corresponding to the stimulus word. This tests the semantic level of language integration (ibid. 616).
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to drawings that contained some of the characteristic features of the object and could
still be recognised. Zero points were given when the drawn object was unrecognisable.
The points given by the two judges were added and thus each subject could score a
maximum possible score of forty.
At a diUerent stage of the test, subjects were tested for constructional apraxia and
were given models and Vgures, ten in total, to copy. Once again, two independent
judges evaluated the drawings (copies) on the basis of a rating system similar to the one
described above.
On the basis of their symptoms, aphasic subjects were divided into four major apha-
sic syndromes (Broca’s, Wernicke’s, anomia and conduction aphasia). I will not further
examine the diUerent types of aphasia since, as shown from the results, such a classi-
Vcation is not central for my present purposes.
3.1.1 Results
The mean scores obtained by aphasic subjects from the Drawing from Memory Test
and Copying Drawing Tests are presented in table 1, and are compared to the average
scores of normal controls and nonaphasic subjects with right- and left-brain lesions. As
shown in the Vrst column, aphasic subjects scored the lowest means in the drawing
from memory test while the diUerence in the copying drawing test was not as dramatic.
As a matter of fact, aphasics performed slightly better in the latter test in comparison to
subjects with right-brain damage, which are considered by the examiners as the most
appropriate control group, given the damaged brain areas in aphasic subjects.
Mean scores Aphasic patients
(n=57)
R. brain-
damaged
(n=67)
Nonaphasic L.
brain-damaged
(n=44)
Normal controls
(n=23)
Drawing
from Memory
21.59 28.08 31.16 33.78
Copying
Drawings
33.83 33.53 37.70 37.04
Table 1: Results obtained by aphasics, normal controls, and non-aphasic right and left brain-damaged patients on
the tasks of drawing from memory and of copying geometrical drawings (adapted from Gainotti et al.,
1983).
On commenting on the obtained results, Gainotti et al. remark that aphasics are signiV-
cantly more impaired than any other group on the ‘drawing objects from memory’ test,
but not on the test for the ‘copying drawing’ tests. On these grounds, they argue that
205
Alex Tillas
poor performance of aphasic subjects at the drawing from memory test is a symptom
that cannot be considered as a particular aspect of a generic visuo-constructive disorder.
On testing subjects with diUerent aphasic syndromes and diUerent levels of severity,
the obtained results showed that the performance of the subjects was not inWuenced,
at least not to a signiVcant degree, by the type of aphasic syndrome or the severity of
the damage. Based on these results, Gainotti et al. claim neither the type of aphasic
syndrome nor the severity of the damage seem to be crucial with regards to the deVcit
in drawing from memory of aphasic patients.
The most striking result for my present purposes from the Copying from Memory
test is that aphasic subjects with semantic-lexical impairments performed systemati-
cally poorly. At the same time, aphasic subjects with no such semantic-lexical impair-
ments performed signiVcantly better. In this sense, there is a strong correlation between
aphasic subjects with semantic-lexical impairments and incompetence in the drawing
from memory test. These results are illustrated in table 2.
Presence of semantic-lexical
impairment (n-30)
Absence of semantic-lexical
impairment (n=27)
Copying
Drawings
33.54 35.62
Drawing
from Memory
17.52 26.33
Table 2: Mean scores obtained by aphasic patients with and without semantic-lexical impairment (adapted from
Gainotti et al., 1983)
In a nutshell, the results that Gainotti et al. obtained from the aforementioned exper-
iments show that: Vrst of all, aphasic subjects were signiVcantly poorer than control
groups at the drawing from memory test. Secondly, the examiners did not detect any
signiVcant correlation between the type of aphasia and severity of the impairment in
the results of the drawing from memory task. Most importantly though, a signiVcant
correlation was detected between poor performance at the drawing from memory task
and disruption at the semantic-lexical level of language integration.
The importance of these Vndings, for my purposes, stems from the fact that they
explicitly show that aphasic subjects have compromised abilities with regards to ac-
cessing representations and activating concepts stored in their memory, mainly in the
absence of the referent of the concept in question. This claim gathers pace from the
following facts: a) the participating aphasic subject did not suUer from any form of
visuo-constructive disabilities; b) a signiVcant correlation between impaired drawing
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from memory and disruption at the semantic-lexical level of language integration was
detected; c) aphasic subjects suUer from inabilities to use and/or understand spoken
or written language. In this sense, the above results are suggestive of the claim that
language renders possible, or in any case facilitates, the ability to endogenously control
stored representations. I will try to build a stronger case for this claim by appealing to
further empirical evidence in the following paragraphs. Before that though, allow me
to brieWy discuss a methodological issue.
A possible argument against the methodology or the design of these experiments is
that the subjects were not asked to draw anything from memory (but a given object). In
this sense, Gainotti et al. cannot securely eliminate the possibility that the poor perfor-
mance of the subjects was inWuenced by a short-term memory defect and not because of
a conceptual inability to reproduce from memory the form of objects that have a char-
acteristic shape11. In reply, Gainotti et al., claim that this objection is unsound since the
examiners did not ask the subjects to reproduce from memory a more or less meaningful
object but rather tried to raise in the subject the concept of the object, by naming it, and
then asked the subject to draw the named object. Furthermore, they claim, by reference
to the work of Faglioni and Spinnler (1969), that it is right-brain-damaged patients, and
not aphasics, who are particularly impaired in tasks of immediate and delayed memory
of meaningless visual patterns.
Gainotti et al.’s results enjoy support from Bay’s (1962) claims that aphasics are
unable to reproduce from memory the crucial characteristics of a given object due to
a basic conceptual disorder.
In an attempt to focus only on the conceptual (as distinct from linguistic) competences
of aphasics, Bay (1962) conducted a diUerent series of experiments. Aphasic subjects
were given an incomplete drawing, e. g. a cup without a handle, and were asked
to complete the drawing, i. e. to draw the missing part. Originally, this test was
conducted by Meili who asked subjects to name the missing part. Meili’s target was
to give instructions without using any verbal elements and hence to focus on the
conceptual abilities of aphasics. Bay went a step further by asking subjects not to
name but to draw from memory the missing part. Bay reports that not a single subject
was able to draw the missing part unless she was unable to name it. (At a later
stage, they asked subjects to model from memory objects of their choice in plastic
material in order to eliminate possible errors arising from the transformation from a
three-dimensional to a two-dimensional object. For this transformation presupposes a
knowledge of rules, such as of perspective, which in turn cannot be presumed in all
subjects. The results were similar to the ones from drawing).
11 Conceptual inability is an inability to reproduce (for instance, when drawing a given object) the basic
characteristics of the object in question.
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Based on the results of their experiments, Gainotti et al. suggest that Bay’s sug-
gestions could be made more speciVc by claiming that there is a strong correlation
between conceptual and semantic-lexical disintegration. By stressing this relation, Vnd-
ings about aphasics who demonstrated excellent capabilities in drawing from memory
can be accommodated by claiming that language disturbances in those subjects were
due to phonological and/or phonetic disorders and not due to a semantic-lexical im-
pairment. Had it been the case that subjects were able to think of the right answer to
the examiner’s question but were not in a position to utter the relevant words, then the
obtained results would not have shown anything signiVcant about the workings of the
cognitive system of aphasic subjects and hence could not be used in favour of the view
presented here.
Semantic-lexical impairments in aphasic subjects are also signiVcantly related to
their inabilities to understand the meaning of symbolic gestures (evidence reviewed
in Gainotti, 1983). In a similar fashion, Gainotti et al. (1979) showed that there is a
relation between semantic-lexical disturbances and the inability of the aphasic subject
to appreciate relationships between pictured objects which have diUerent levels of con-
ceptual similarity, e. g. chair and stool, bowl and cup, etc.
3.1.2 Interpreting the results
From the results of the above experiments it is shown that there is a signiVcant cor-
relation between semantic-lexical impairments and particular deVciencies such as an
inability to appreciate conceptual similarities between objects or understanding simple
gesturing. The most interesting result for my present purposes is the correlation be-
tween semantic lexical impairments and inabilities of aphasics to draw from memory.
The reason is that recalling is a characteristic case of endogenously controlled think-
ing. Given that aphasics have severe linguistic impairments, it might now be claimed
that their inability to endogenously activate a concept or a thought is down to their
linguistic impairments. This is especially the case given the characteristic relation be-
tween semantic-lexical impairments. Here is what I mean by this. First of all, subjects
were able to copy the perceived object and hence there were no signs of constructional
apraxia. Also, the instructor asked the subject to draw the object in question by using
its ‘name’ (e. g. “draw the comb that you just saw”). In this way, the instructor was in a
position to target the subject’s linguistic competences. On these grounds, any inability
to draw the object in question was due to the subject’s inability to think of a comb, to
continue with the same example, or to activate their concept COMB. Had it been the
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case that subjects were able to activate their concept COMB then perceptual represen-
tations of combs would have also been activated and they would be able to ‘copy’ them
from memory onto the piece of paper in front of them. From the above I suggest that we
are able to activate a concept or form a speciVc thought on the basis of linguistic labels
that we have for the concept in question. Further generalising from that, I suggest that
a subject’s linguistic capacity is what provides endogenous control over their concepts.
Further evidence in support of the suggested role for language can be found in Farias
et al. (2006), who shows that drawing facilitates naming; Swindell and Greenhouse
(1988) who study patients with right- and left-brain damage; and (Bay (1962) who shows
that aphasics are unable to reproduce from memory the crucial characteristics of a given
object due to a basic conceptual disorder.
PART II
4 Shall we give language an even bigger role?
As mentioned above, according to Carruthers (2005), natural language is constitutively
involved in speciVc kinds of human thinking, particularly in conscious propositional
thinking. He claims that natural language is not merely a communicative tool of inner
thinking. Rather, that natural language is itself the medium through which conscious
propositional thinking is conducted, i. e. Mentalese is a natural language. In this sense,
for Carruthers everyone’s Mentalese will be one of the natural languages they speak.
(For Fodor, on the other hand, Mentalese is distinct from any natural language).
Carruthers has two arguments in support of the claim that language is constitu-
tively involved in thinking. 1) He uses evidence from Hurlburt’s (1990, 1993) work that
suggests that thinking happens mostly in language, and 2) he oUers a philosophical
argument that shows that thinking has to happen in language or otherwise we will be
‘self-alienated’. I examine both in detail below, while my main focus is on Carruthers’s
philosophical argument.
In regards to his Vrst argument, Carruthers’s motivation stems from evidence from
introspection and in particular from the work of Hurlburt, who famously uses a char-
acteristic method for investigating inner life. Subjects are not brought into the lab and
asked to perform some task of introspection. Rather their everyday life is interrupted by
randomly occurring beeps and they are interviewed later on to report what was going
on in their minds when the interrupting beep happened. Subjects reported that in a
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signiVcant majority of the cases, where they introspected, inner thinking occurred in
natural language sentences. There were also cases where subjects reported that their
thought did not occur in the form of inner speech. For Carruthers these latter cases are
instances of a systematic illusion. That is, what we take to be non-inferential thinking
is in fact a swift bit of self-interpretation, one that we merely do not realise. Carruthers
provides support to his claim by referring to the work of Nisbett and Wilson (1977),
who show that there are a number of circumstances in which subjects confabulate self-
explanations that are manifestly false, but without realising that this is what they are
doing. Given that for Carruthers non-inferential access to a thought means that lan-
guage is constitutively involved in that thought, Carruthers’s claims about agents hav-
ing a systematic illusion seem to contrast Hurlburt’s claims that there are what Hurlburt
calls ‘amodal’ and non-linguistic thoughts. Once a subject reported that they enjoyed a
non-linguistic thought, Hurlburt followed this up with questions asking for more de-
tails about the thought, and subjects consistently replied that it did not involve any
language, or images, that they had no visual phenomenology or anything similar. Note
that Carruthers argues that the subjects in question are having a systematic illusion
since he only allows non-linguistic thoughts to be of the form of visual or some other
sort of images but not amodal. It should be clariVed at this point that Carruthers does
not claim that all thought is linguistic. He accepts that some conscious thoughts (images
of some sort) can be non-propositional. What Carruthers has in mind at this point are
exactly the sort of cases in Hurlburt’s studies where subjects reported that there were
instances when they were not thinking in inner speech. As explained, according to Car-
ruthers these are instances of a systematic illusion, (while for Hurlburt they are amodal
thoughts). In line with what has been said in Section 2.1, I suggest that those thoughts
might well be conscious manipulations of images which got activated by virtue of their
associations to concepts that were activated either simultaneously or right before the
imagistic thought in question.
I have been arguing that thinking is imagistic and non-linguistic. In this sense, it
might be argued that Carruthers’s view and the one suggested here are to a certain
extent compatible to each other. Note though that there are crucial diUerences. For
Carruthers, only some thoughts can be non-linguistic while I suggest that all thoughts
are imagistic in some way (visual, auditory, somatosensory, emotional, etc.). Clearly,
there is a tension between allowing space for non-linguistic thoughts and Carruthers’
claim that language is constitutively involved in thinking. Acknowledging this tension,
Carruthers restricts his claims about the role of language to conscious propositional
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thought. Crucially for present purposes, however, Carruthers asserts that imagistic
thoughts (apart from not being fully propositional) have content that can only awk-
wardly and inaccurately be reported in the form of a ‘that’ clause, (2005, 117). Car-
ruthers argues that imagistic theories of meaning or imagistic theories of thought are
not sound – as the standard arguments against them show12. On these grounds, Car-
ruthers argues that imagistic thinking cannot colonise the whole domain of conscious
thought, unless the images in question are images of natural language sentences. In
the latter case, the imaged sentences will have the same causal role as the thought that
produced them, and will thus be constitutive of conscious thinking. The view I suggest
here is diUerent in that thoughts and linguistic items are associated but are distinct from
each other.
Next, I turn to examine Carruthers’s philosophical argument in favour of the claim
that language is constitutively involved in conscious thought. According to Carruthers,
proponents of the communicative conception of language cannot account for the priv-
ileged nature of introspection. The reason for this is that if language is seen as not
essentially implicated in thinking but rather as a medium that facilitates the communi-
cation of thought, then the kind of access an agent has to her own thoughts is analogous
to the kind of access she has to the thoughts of a third person. Carruthers admits that
an interpretation will have to take place regardless of whether an imaged sentence is
constitutive of an occurrent thought or caused by the occurrence of a thought existing
independently of it. The diUerence is that if a communicative conception of language
is accepted, then the process of interpretation will occur downstream of the thought,
i. e. a thought will be tokened Vrst and then the representation of that thought will be
interpreted by the agent herself, in the case of inner speech. On the contrary, in the
cognitive conception of language that Carruthers suggests, the causal role of the token
thought in question is dependent upon its Vguring as an interpreted image. In this case,
it is the imaged (and interpreted) natural-language sentence that results in the further
cognitive eUects characteristic of entertaining a given thought.
Carruthers (2005, 117–8) formulates his argument that language is constitutively
involved in conscious thought in the following way:
1. Conscious thinking requires immediate, non-inferential, non-interpretative access
to our occurrent thoughts, and that access is distinctively diUerent from that of
other people.
12 What Carruthers has probably in mind here is arguments against veriVcationism and some sort of veri-
Vcationist semantics.
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2. Occurrent propositional thoughts either get articulated in inner speech or not.
In case they do, then inner speech is either constitutive of the thought-tokens in
question or not.
3. If the manipulation of natural language sentences in inner speech is not constitu-
tive of propositional thinking, then our access to the thoughts expressed in inner
speech is interpretative, and similar to the sort of access to thoughts of others, and
hence such thoughts of ours do not count as conscious (by 1).
4. The sort of access that we have to those of our occurrent propositional thoughts
that do not get expressed in inner speech also involves self-interpretation. Hence,
such thoughts too are not conscious (by 1).
5. So, if we engage in conscious propositional thinking at all, then natural language
sentences must be constitutively involved in such thinking (from 1, 2, 3, and 4).
6. But we do sometimes engage in conscious propositional thinking.
7. So, natural language is constitutively involved in conscious thought (from 5 and 6).
It should be clear by this point that I agree with Carruthers that language plays a
bigger role than merely communicating our thoughts. I believe that language empowers
us not only to gain conscious access to our thoughts but also to shape new thoughts.
However, I believe that Carruthers is mistaken in thinking that natural language and
Mentalese have to be identiVed in order for us to be in a position to explain our non-
inferential access to our thoughts. In other words, I believe that premise three of the
above argument is false and hence that Carruthers’s conclusion does not follow.
4.1 Contra Carruthers: distinguishing language from thought
Carruthers argues that in order to have non-inferential access to our thoughts, inner
speech needs to be constitutively involved in propositional thinking (P3). Carruthers
is mistaken in claiming that this is the only way in which non-inferential thinking can
occur. One alternative way to have non-inferential access to our thoughts is associative
thinking. For instance, it might be that the transition from the word to the concept that
has the very same content that a given word expresses is an associationistic link. In
the suggested view, perceptual representations and words are associated in memory. In
Damasio’s terminology, the realisation of this association occurs at the level of a con-
vergence zone. Note that this is not a case of language being constitutive to thoughts.
Rather it is a case of co-activation of a concept’s diUerent subparts: perceptual repre-
sentations of the appropriate word (A) and representations formed during perceptual
experiences with instances of a given object (B). This occurs by virtue of an instance
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of a word activating A, which in turn activates B resulting in the concept’s activation as
a whole. Nevertheless, and importantly, this kind of thinking is not interpretative. It
is not that an agent hears a word, say ‘Cat’, and then tries to guess or infer what the
word means. Instead, on hearing the word ‘Cat’ the concept CAT is activated. In this
sense, access to thinking is neither interpretative nor constitutive. Next, I Wesh out in
more detail the way in which non-constitutive non-inferential thinking is realised in
the brain. First, I show that language is not constitutively involved in thinking and con-
tinue by elaborating how associationistic thinking can be non-inferential, in the way,
for instance, Carruthers suggests.
As explained in the Vrst part of the paper, I take concepts to be built out of percep-
tual representations of instances of a given kind and also perceptual representations
of words. In this sense, perceptual representations of objects and words are distinct
from each other and are brought together under the process of concept formation. My
claim then is that these representations (or rather the neurons that underlie them) are
converged together at a level similar to that of a convergence zone. The claim that
representations of objects and words are distinct is key here since it is partly on these
grounds that I go against Carruthers’s claim that language is constitutively involved
in thought formation. It is just that we only get to have conscious access at the level
where representations of words and objects are converged. In this sense, an agent can
only access representations of objects and words simultaneously and treat them as if
they were constitutive parts of a concept/thought. It is in this way that I can account
for non-inferential access to thinking.
Going back to Carruthers’s argument, his claim was that in order to be able to ac-
count for the immediate access to our thoughts, imaged words and thoughts would have
to be identiVed – at least in the case of conscious propositional thought. In this sec-
tion, I have shown that associationism provides an alternative way for achieving non-
interpretative thinking without language being constitutively involved. In my view,
the relationship between a thought and its representation in self-knowledge is brute
causation. The particular transition between a Vrst order thought and a second order
thought are causally and not constitutively related. Thus, the relationship between a
Vrst order and a second order thought is not constitutive as Carruthers argues for but
rather a causal associative one.
On the basis of the claims made in this part of the paper, it is argued that thought
and language are not constitutively connected. Because, as shown, thought can occur
without language. And when thought does require language it is in order for thought
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to have features like propositional form and be endogenously controllable. Given our
basic perceptual hardware and associationism as the engines of thinking, our thought
would not have these features had it not been for language.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the relation between language and cognition. My starting
points were that thinking is imagistic, to the extent that conceptual thoughts are built
out of concepts, which are in turn built out of perceptual representations; and that con-
cepts – the building blocks of thoughts – are associationistic in their causal patterns. On
this basis, I have presented a view of thinking according to which language plays a cru-
cial – but not a constitutive – role in thought production. I suggest that unlike available
views, the account presented here enjoys support from independent empirical evidence
obtained from work done with aphasic subjects, while at the same time avoids the con-
troversies of views which maintain that inner speech needs to be constitutively involved
in propositional thinking in order to have non-inferential access to our thoughts. I also
argued that the associationistic account of thought production I presented in this paper
could accommodate propositional thinking and compositionality.
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Postface
(Olaf Hauk, University of Cambridge)
The question as to how the mind creates “mental images” of concepts and memories,
and how we use them in communication and thought, has fascinated philosophers for
centuries. While it seems obvious that we acquire the meaning of objects, actions, words
and abstract entities through our senses by interacting with our environment, the ques-
tion as to how our bodies and environment shape the representation of meaning in mind
and brain is still highly controversial in cognitive science. The last two decades have
seen a number of exciting developments in this area. The concept of “embodiment”,
i. e. the idea that sensory-motor systems can be part of abstract higher-level processes
and representations, has penetrated a wide range of scientiVc Velds. As demonstrated
in these conference proceedings, the topic is discussed in literature studies, theoreti-
cal and computational linguistics, psycholinguistics, and cognitive neuroscience. From
Chinese characters to metaphors and Shakespeare – the involvement of sensory-motor
representations is part of the debate.
The analysis of every-day usage of language, the measurement of reaction times in
laboratory tasks, or imaging the brain activity during language comprehension have
provided us with a wealth of data on the role of sensory-motor knowledge in language.
However, the excitement over the interdisciplinarity of this research area also comes at
a cost: Are we all talking about the same things when we talk about embodiment or the
role of sensory-motor systems? While for some researchers embodiment manifests
itself in the diUerent usage of verbs in metaphors, others require changes in brain
activity in speciVc parts of the cortex. The conference “Sensory Motor Concepts in
Language and Cognition” in Düsseldorf provided an ideal forum to discuss issues like
these, and brought together world-leading experts from several relevant disciplines.
It became apparent that the abstract concept of embodiment is itself embodied in
diUerent ways in language corpora, reaction times and brain activation. We may not all
ask the same questions. But connecting diUerent theoretical approaches will help us to
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ask better questions, and introducing each other to diUerent methodological approaches
will help us answering them. Let us hope that our research will be embodied in more
conferences like this in the future.
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